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demonstrate evidence consistent with a target-group fit account of exclusion judgments. 
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Peer relationships have been shown to be important for adolescent’s healthy 
development (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). With a lack of quality peer 
relationships, and particularly in situations in which individuals are rejected from social 
groups, children experience a wide range of negative consequences such as antisocial 
behavior and depression (Rubin et al., 2006). One line of research, conducted from a 
Social Domain theory perspective (Smetana, 2006), has been designed to examine how 
children reason about social exclusion. This approach has investigated children and 
adolescents’ evaluations of the acceptability of different kinds of social exclusion from 
groups based on a range of factors, including group membership, such as gender, race, 
and culture, and personality traits, such as aggression and shyness (Killen, Sinno, & 
Margie, 2007).  
This research program complements behavioral research conducted on the 
phenomenon of social exclusion, which focuses on the types of target characteristics that 
children use to include or exclude others in peer interaction situations (see Rubin et al., 
2006 for a review). Specifically, the ability to systematically manipulate variables within 
hypothetical vignettes that have been found to be important in behavioral work gives 
researchers the chance to probe more deeply into the nature of a participants’ reasoning 
about those variables (see Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010, for a review). Further, this 
orientation to social exclusion serves to advance developmental theory regarding child 
and adolescent perspective taking and moral development by shedding light on the 
origins and development of morality. This line of research has examined the underlying 
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social-conventional, moral, and psychological bases by which children exclude some 
peers and include others.  
Studies on how children and adolescents evaluate exclusion from groups have 
shown that children and adolescents show concern for the targets of exclusion (Horn, 
2003), for the group who excludes (Theimer, Killen & Stangor, 2001), and for personal 
choice considerations (Park & Killen, 2010).  A main finding has been that concerns with 
group functioning increase with age, and that these concerns are often driven by 
stereotypic expectations (Killen & Stangor, 2001). An example of a concern for group 
functioning is as follows: “Admit the one who is more qualified because then the club 
will know more and work much better as a group together” (Killen & Stangor, 2001, p. 
179), and one focusing on stereotypic expectations would be: “It’s okay to pick the girl 
for ballet because boys aren’t good at ballet” (p.183). In this second instance, it is clear 
that stereotypes drive the assessment of who will most likely help the group function, 
which in turn drives the choice of whom to exclude.  
Complementing this line of research have been studies conducted on group 
dynamics and intergroup attitudes (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, 
Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009). This line of research has focused on evaluations of 
exclusion through an examination of how it is that children evaluate deviance from group 
norms.  This line of research has been conducted from a Social Identity theory 
perspective, which focuses on the importance of group identity in the maintenance of 
self-esteem (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). As an example, this research has shown that 
deviating from one’s group norms (i.e., cheering for another nation’s soccer team) is 
evaluated harshly through exclusion of the deviant member. Recently, these two lines of 
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work have been integrated to more fully explore the nature of group functioning 
considerations in exclusion (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). 
Study Rationale 
In past research, information about a target (e.g., nationality, aggression, loyalty 
to group) and the group to which the target desires entry (e.g., activity, norms) was 
provided. With this information, participants were asked to decide whether exclusion of a 
particular target was acceptable or unacceptable.  
As mentioned above, by manipulating information about a target, research on 
social exclusion has revealed that group functioning considerations become increasingly 
salient across adolescence. Specifically, as concerns with group functioning increase in 
salience, it becomes more acceptable to exclude based on certain target characteristics 
that are perceived to be detrimental to efficient group functioning. While research has 
manipulated the information presented about the target (gender, ethnicity, nationality, 
aggression, shyness, prior experience, talent, merit, reputation), and even the group’s 
goals (to win a race, to not draw attention to the group, to finish school projects) no 
research to date has systematically varied the group goal along with target characteristics 
for comparative evaluation. Rather, past work typically varies target characteristics while 
holding constant the group to which the target desires entry (for a review of the different 
contexts and characteristics used, see Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010; Killen 
et al., 2007). 
This past work has demonstrated that exclusion based on group membership 
characteristics (e.g., gender, nationality, and ethnicity) is evaluated more negatively than 
exclusion based on information about personality or loyalty (e.g., aggression, cheering 
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for another team) (Park & Killen, 2010; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). What remains 
unclear is whether these judgments are relative to or generalizable across different group 
goals (e.g., competitive, noncompetitive). The extent to which judgments about exclusion 
shift with shifts in group goals allows for a metric of how information about target 
characteristics is used. If, for example exclusion based on a target’s aggression as 
opposed to a target’s shyness is seen as acceptable across a variety of group goals, then 
there is evidence that aggression is seen as a more generally disruptive personality trait 
than shyness.  
Past studies have noted greater group functioning concerns cited in support of 
excluding disloyal and aggressive targets than targets described by their gender, 
nationality, or ethnicity. Given this, it was reasoned that adolescents would take into 
consideration the group’s goals when determining the acceptability of excluding different 
targets. Further, it was expected that the acceptability of excluding any one target would 
depend on the extent to which an adolescent could judge target-group fit. That is, if the 
target was perceived to fit well with the group, (ex: a good soccer player trying to join a 
competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be seen as unacceptable. In contrast, if the 
target were seen to fit poorly with the group, (ex: a bad soccer player trying to join a 
competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be deemed acceptable. Finally, if target-
group fit was difficult to determine, (ex: someone with long hair trying to join a 
competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be seen as unacceptable. Because past 
work has yet to systematically manipulate both group goals and target characteristics, the 
interactive effect of group goals and target characteristics on exclusion judgments has yet 
to be addressed.      
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Participants were asked to evaluate the acceptability of excluding different 
targets in either a competitive or noncompetitive soccer club context. Further, a novel 
aspect of this study was to examine how stereotypes about others bear on exclusion 
decisions in competitive and noncompetitive contexts. That is, how does the group goal 
of competition elicit (or inhibit) the use of stereotypes to make decisions about 
exclusion?  These were the overarching questions addressed in this study. 
Two main reasons were forwarded as justification for the importance of studying 
how group goals affect exclusion judgments. Theoretically, a full analysis of group 
functioning considerations in social exclusion requires an assessment of the extent to 
which group goals interact with target characteristics to affect exclusion judgments. 
Additionally, from a social cognitive perspective, there may be important distinctions 
between being able to judge a group’s goal states, judging the likelihood that a target will 
negatively impact the group’s ability to achieve a goal state, and the judgment that is 
thought to result from these two considerations.  
Based on the extensive literature on theory of mind and perspective taking 
(Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009; Banerjee, 2000), it is expected that 
knowledge about the group’s goals will aid participants in judging whether a certain 
target will help the group to function. To the extent that the target is deemed to be a 
liability to the group’s functioning, it is expected that exclusion will be evaluated 
positively. It may be however, that despite our ability to judge when targets do not fit 
with group goals, the moral concern for the target outweighs the group’s concern for 
efficient functioning. If this is the case, exclusion evaluations will not be expected to vary 
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depending on the target-group fit, but will rather be evaluated negatively regardless of 
how well the target fits with the group.  
In this study, and considering the argument that target characteristics are 
evaluated in light of group goals, different target characteristics, such as shyness, 
aggression, nationality, and gender, were predicted to be differentially salient to an 
exclusion decision depending on the group’s goals (e.g., competitive or non-competitive). 
More specifically, if a competitive soccer club is deciding whether to include different 
targets, they may prefer information about one’s soccer ability, as those with ability will 
more likely help the group to win competitions. In contrast, a noncompetitive soccer club 
that wants to play soccer for fun may want to know whether targets are enjoyable to be 
around before deciding whether to include them, as enjoyment of one’s time will be 
easier when enjoyable people are included. The overarching expectation of the study was 
that group goals provide a means by which individuals evaluate whether a target is likely 
to affect the group’s functioning. Said another way, it was expected that exclusion of a 
target would be seen as acceptable to the extent that the target is considered a barrier to 
group functioning. 
While competition exists in a range of social contexts (e.g., academics, sports, 
music, art), the focus in this study was on competition in the context of sports given that 
past studies on exclusion have oftentimes included sports as the focus of the group (see 
Abrams & Rutland, 2008). The contrast between explicitly competitive and 
noncompetitive group goals was thought to allow a detailed assessment of how it is that 
adolescents integrate considerations of group goals and target characteristics when 
making exclusion judgments.  
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Secondly, no studies have systematically evaluated competitive contexts in 
which a target is put in a position to either help or hurt a group directly as a result of his 
or her skill at the activity in question. This focus on group goals, and competitive 
contexts in particular, was thought to help further clarify how it is that stereotypic 
conceptions of groups affect exclusion judgments. Specifically, and due to the salience of 
the goal of winning in competitive contexts, it may be that individuals reject exclusion 
based on gender or nationality in favor of exclusion based on whether or not the target is 
good at soccer. Similarly, in noncompetitive contexts, information about a target’s 
personality (e.g., “is she aggressive or shy?”) might be important when evaluating the 
acceptability of exclusion. To the extent that stereotypes influence exclusion judgments, 
it is expected that different stereotypes will be salient depending on the context (i.e., 
stereotypes about ability for competitive contexts, and stereotypes about personality for 
noncompetitive contexts).  Beyond theoretical considerations then, a second goal of this 
study was to evaluate the extent to which individuals make use of stereotypes to justify 
exclusion based on a group’s goals. 
Indeed, Social Domain theory research on children and adolescents’ evaluations 
of social situations has shown that children and adolescents possess the capacity for 
careful reflection on complex issues (Park & Killen, 2010; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; 
Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). Documenting adolescents’ capacity to flexibly assess 
group goals when considering the acceptability of exclusion situations is yet another 
means by which researchers can evaluate the extent to which adolescence is a time of 
deliberate reflection.  
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Considerations within Exclusion Scenarios 
Adolescents make use of peer crowd affiliation (e.g., Jocks, Preppies) when 
making judgments about social situations (Brown, Mory, & Kinney, 1994; Horn, 2003; 
Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999). One argument is that the use of information about group 
membership serves to reduce the cognitive load associated with trying to make sense of 
the social world (Bigler & Liben, 2006). For some, knowing an individual’s gender or 
nationality activates stereotypes, (Baron & Banaji, 2006) which can bias one’s recall of 
stereotype-confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidence about group members (Bigler & 
Liben, 1993).   
While stereotypic associations can serve to simplify and bias our recall of 
information, these associations are often misrepresentations that do not fully capture the 
variation within the groups by which individuals are categorized. Further, the above-
mentioned research does not reveal whether the activation of stereotypic associations will 
reduce the motivation to search for information about individual group members. One 
expectation is that, when given direct information about a target, (e.g., personality, 
interests) individuals will use that information over any stereotypic notions that are 
active. In support of this contention, McGlothlin and Killen (2006) found that children 
rated dyads that shared activity interests as more similar than dyads who only shared 
racial characteristics.  
Given the above finding, predictions can be made regarding what information 
will be most salient in social situations. When asked whether race or gender-based social 
exclusion is considered acceptable, one might expect some individuals to utilize 
stereotypes to make a judgment about exclusion acceptability. In a soccer context, 
individuals may activate the stereotype that females are not as good as, or not as 
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competitive as males in athletic contexts, while they may activate the stereotype that 
Brazilians are better at, or more competitive than Americans in soccer contexts.  
These expectations have some indirect support from the literature. For instance, 
Horn, Killen, and Stangor (1999) have shown that stereotypes are utilized narrowly when 
deciding whether a group should receive punishment for a transgression in which no 
proof of guilt exists. In these types of situations, some individuals will utilize stereotypes 
as a means of filling in where proof is missing. In this study in particular, when a 
transgression was consistent with a stereotype about a group, (e.g., techies likely 
damaged the computer systems) adolescents viewed it as more acceptable to blame that 
group. This finding extends to situations in which prior history of transgression serves as 
the only piece of information to which an individual is privy when trying to judge 
whether a target had committed a transgression (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 
2010). Results revealed that adolescents were more accepting of accusations when the 
suspect had than did not have a prior history of transgression. In both cases, without 
proof, other information was utilized to make sense of the ambiguous situation.   
Given the above, it could be expected that some individuals will make use of 
information about a target’s gender and ethnicity given no other information. In terms of 
exclusion expectations based on stereotypic conceptions of targets, it would be expected 
that individuals would be more accepting of excluding a female than a Brazilian from a 
soccer club. It might however, be the case that individuals will reject exclusion until they 
are presented with more pertinent information about the targets. This result would 
suggest that stereotypic conceptions are not strong enough to sway one’s exclusion 
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considerations. From this standpoint, one would expect that neither ethnic or gender 
exclusion would be considered acceptable. 
Social exclusion is often ambiguous, given that we often need to consider many 
variables when deciding whether someone should be included or excluded. Recently, 
Park and Killen (2010) have shown, in a context in which a target desires entry into a 
group of peers completing their school projects, that exclusion of an aggressive target is 
much more readily accepted than exclusion of a target based on her gender, nationality, 
or level of shyness. This evidence seems to provide support for the notion that 
stereotypes are not salient enough to justify social exclusion. Whereas information about 
one’s aggression and shyness provides direct information about behavioral propensities, 
information about gender and nationality do not provide such direct evidence. 
Justifications for judgments provided further support for the contention that group 
membership information does not provide direct evidence of behavioral propensities. 
Specifically, group functioning concerns were cited more often for personality-based than 
for group membership-based exclusion.  
Toward the end of evaluating the above expectations, two characteristics (i.e., 
lack of soccer ability and long hair) were included to anchor the judgments made for the 
above-mentioned characteristics. Specifically, a target that lacks soccer ability was 
expected to evoke group functioning concerns in a competitive context but not in a 
noncompetitive context, while the target described as having long hair was not expected 
to evoke group functioning concerns in either goal condition, given the lack of relevant 
stereotypes for either a competitive or noncompetitive context. In this way, these two 
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anchor characteristics serve to provide a test of the “relevant information” account of 
information use in social exclusion scenarios. 
As mentioned above, another goal of the present study was to extend this past 
study through the assessment of these same target characteristics across competitive and 
noncompetitive contexts, with the expectation that, to the extent that participants reveal 
stereotypic expectations about females (not as athletic as males) and Brazilians (more 
athletic than Americans), they will accept and reject exclusion from competitive soccer 
groups, respectively. In contrast, it was expected that exclusion of shy and aggressive 
targets would be evaluated contextually, with positive evaluations of exclusion in 
noncompetitive contexts and negative evaluations in competitive contexts, given that 
dispositional characteristics were expected to be more salient to a group trying to have 
fun than a group trying to win.  
Finally, follow-up questions were asked that pitted the original characteristics 
(aggression, shyness, hair length, gender, and nationality) against further individuating 
information. Specifically, participants were asked to judge whether it would be more, 
less, or similarly acceptable to exclude the above targets if it was found out that they 
were: 1) better than others on the team; and, 2) worse than others on the team. Again, in 
terms of the relevance of information account of decision making, it was thought that this 
information would trump the original descriptions. This was expected given that the 
original descriptions were thought to be more loosely associated with group functioning 
considerations than information about the target’s ability. 
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Study Design and Hypotheses 
 While the concern with group functioning increases throughout adolescence (e.g., 
Killen & Stangor, 2001), the willingness to accept exclusion based on stereotypic 
conceptions of groups decreases (Horn, 2003). It is for this reason that 14 (7th grade), and 
17-year-old (11th grade) participants were included in this study. Participants were first 
presented with a prompt specifying the group’s goals (to win or to have fun while playing 
soccer).  
 They were then asked to evaluate the acceptability of excluding 6 different targets 
that vary on the characteristic described: GROUP MEMBERSHIP: 1) gender, 2) 
ethnicity; PERSONALITY: 3) aggression, 4) shyness; PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
5) hair length; and, 6) lack of soccer ability. The exclusion context (i.e., competitive or 
noncompetitive) was a between subjects factor, in that each participant only evaluated 
one context.  
 While it may be argued that competitive co-ed soccer groups are infrequent at this 
age, we wrote the prompt in the following way to eliminate this concern:  
“A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. There are many 
other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to 
have the best shot at winning the local tournament's first prize trophy. They 
come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to 
exclude based on each rule.” 
 It was argued that including the phrase: “There are many other soccer clubs in 
their area” would serve to make more salient the group’s goal of winning, as well as to 
suggest that there exist other outlets for those who are excluded from this group in 
particular. This we argued would put the focus on the group, rather than an institutional 
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convention that males and females cannot play together. As a result, it was argued that 
this prompt would serve to equate all forms of exclusion in the competitive context. 
While there was not the same concern in the noncompetitive context, this scenario was 
nonetheless written in a similar manner: 
“A group of kids decide to form a noncompetitive soccer club. There are many 
other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to be 
able to have the most amount of fun playing together. They come up with the 
following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to exclude based on 
each rule.” 
 Beyond evaluating the six exclusion scenarios in isolation, participants were 
asked to consider further individuating information about the targets. Specifically, 
participants were asked to consider the acceptability of excluding the same target if that 
target were discovered to be: 1) better than most in the club, and 2) worse than everyone 
in the club. This manipulation was argued to provide an opportunity to assess the relative 
weight adolescents give to different types of information about a target when considering 
exclusion situations in both competitive and noncompetitive contexts.  
 Participant Variables. Beyond design variables, four main participant variables 
were assessed that were thought to relate to exclusion judgments: 1) 
hypercompetitiveness (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990); 2) affirmation of 
stereotypes (i.e., how good, and how competitive, are certain groups in a soccer context); 
3) experience with competition and exclusion; and 4) belief in the changeability of traits 
(Levy & Dweck, 1999).  
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Hypercompetitiveness. Participants were asked to describe themselves in terms of the 
extent to which they saw both competitive and noncompetitive contexts through a 
competitive lens (see Appendix D for the instrument). 
 Affirmation of Stereotypes. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they saw the following “groups” (girls, boys, Brazilians, and Americans, those 
who are aggressive, and those who are shy) as, 1) competitive; and, 2) good at soccer. 
Experience with competitive sports and exclusion. Items were developed that 
asked participants to judge how often they have been involved in competitive contexts, 
how often they have been excluded, and how often they have excluded others from group 
activities more generally.  
 Changeability of personality. Two items taken from Levy and Dweck (1999) 
were used to assess the extent to which participants believe personality to be changeable.  
 Group Functioning Considerations, Group Membership, and Stereotypes. It 
was expected that not only would excluding based on hair length be seen as unacceptable 
in the competitive context, but that it would be seen as unacceptable in the 
noncompetitive context as well. The basis for these predictions was again the 
presumption that hair length would not carry with it any stereotypic associations about 
either ability (salient in the competitive context) or personality (salient in the 
noncompetitive context).  
 In contrast, it was expected that gender and nationality (Brazilians) would be 
associated with stereotypes about ability, and potentially competitive drive, such that in 
the competitive context, exclusion based on gender would be seen as acceptable and 
exclusion based on nationality would be seen as unacceptable. Again, it was argued that 
  15      
stereotypic conceptions of groups’ abilities (e.g., females are not as good as males at 
soccer; Brazilians are better at soccer than Americans) may be more readily called upon 
in a competitive context, as the group desire to win a competition necessitates the 
inclusion of group members who are good at the activity in question. As mentioned 
above however, this expectation was tempered given that, because the stakes are high in 
the competitive context, individuals may want more information before excluding based 
on a stereotypic conception of ability, and thus reject exclusion based on stereotypes 
about a group’s soccer ability. In contrast, it was argued that stereotypic conceptions of 
groups’ likeability or personality may be more readily called upon in noncompetitive 
contexts, as the group goal is to enjoy the activity. Finally, and as with the above 
expectation, we were aware of the possibility that, similar to the competitive context, 
participants may want more information about a target beyond group membership before 
making an exclusion decision, and thus would reject exclusion based on stereotypes 
about a group’s likeability. 
 Gender exclusion is often viewed as more acceptable than racial/ethnic exclusion 
in the context of exclusion from a friendship dyad, and a music club (Killen, Lee-Kim, 
McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002).  Thus, for the non-competitive context in this study, it 
was expected that exclusion based on gender would be seen as more acceptable than 
exclusion based on nationality. 
 When adolescents are presented with both the target’s group membership 
characteristics and their ability, it is predicted that ability will trump group membership 
as a means of deciding whether exclusion will be considered acceptable only in the 
competitive context, as it is expected that ability information will be the most salient 
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information one could desire about a target in the competitive context. It is acknowledged 
however that participants might believe that groups can have more fun in a 
noncompetitive soccer context when good players are included, and therefore a target’s 
lack of ability may increase the acceptability of exclusion in the noncompetitive context 
as well. 
 Group Functioning Considerations and Ability. As Horn (2003) has shown in 
adolescents’ considerations of whether to exclude a target from student council described 
as belonging to the ‘dirty’ social crowd (i.e., group members often wear old/dirty 
clothing, are uninvolved in school, and participate in delinquent activities), information 
about a target becomes more salient to an exclusion situation as that information becomes 
more relevant to considerations of group goals. In addition to providing the target’s 
crowd membership, Horn manipulated the target’s involvement in school activities as 
well as his reputation with his teachers and peers. The question addressed was whether 
information about one’s crowd membership alone (the ambiguous condition) would be 
used differently than information about one’s reputation and past behaviors, either 
positive or negative (unambiguous conditions). Results revealed that participants were 
more willing to accept exclusion of the target from the student council given negative 
manipulations (the target is not active in school, and is negatively perceived by teachers) 
than either positive manipulations (the target is active in school, and positively perceived 
by teachers) or no information beyond group membership (the target belongs to the 
‘dirty’ crowd). Because her study focused solely on manipulation of target 
characteristics, she was not able to assess the extent to which information about the target 
is used contextually based on a group’s goals. This study sought to extend her work by 
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manipulating both target information as well as information about group goals. In the 
context of this study then, it was expected that exclusion based on soccer ability would be 
seen as acceptable only in the competitive context, as ability will be seen as highly 
relevant when the group goal is to win a soccer tournament.  
Group Functioning and Aggression. It was further expected that while 
exclusion based on aggression will be seen as acceptable across both contexts, it would 
be seen as more acceptable in the noncompetitive context than in the competitive context. 
Using a non-competitive context in which a group is preparing projects for school, Park 
& Killen (2010) have shown that it is more acceptable to exclude based on a target’s 
aggressiveness than on a target’s shyness or group membership characteristics (gender or 
nationality). Researchers have often noted the social salience of externalizing symptoms 
in the peer group, as assessed, for instance, through negative correlations between 
sociometric popularity and aggressive behavior (Hymel, Rubin, Rowden, & LeMare, 
1990). Converging on sociometric ratings, Park and Killen (2010) have shown that 
participants are aware of the aggressive child’s potential for violence against the group 
who decides to include, and that this concern helps them justify their judgments of the 
acceptability of exclusion. In essence, one group goal is to avoid being hurt in the process 
of completing the group project, a goal that they may have judged to be more difficult to 
achieve with an aggressive target in the group. From this perspective then, it was 
expected that excluding an aggressive peer would be seen as acceptable across both 
competitive and noncompetitive contexts (note the conflict between this expectation and 
the expectation derived from a stereotypic conception that aggressive targets may be 
good for a competitive context). 
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When considering whether it is acceptable to exclude an aggressive target from a 
competitive context who is also better than most of the players on the team, it was 
expected that exclusion would be evaluated less positively than when exclusion was 
based solely on aggression, because the group functioning considerations become more 
complex (he may get us kicked out of tournaments because he is fighting, but he may 
help us win).  
Group Functioning and Shyness. In contrast, shyness involves internalizing 
difficulties (Findlay, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009) and does not bring with it the same 
concerns for personal safety from the group’s perspective as does an externalizing target. 
Indeed, reasoning about safety does not show up in one’s justifications for exclusion 
when asked about excluding a shy target (Park & Killen, 2010). It is because shy 
individuals are not perceived to pose a threat to group functioning that exclusion based on 
shyness was expected to be seen as unacceptable across both competitive and 
noncompetitive contexts. While this prediction was made, it was also acknowledged that 
shy individuals may be seen as having the potential to negatively affect group 
functioning, especially in the noncompetitive context due to their social reticence, which 
in noncompetitive contexts could affect the group’s ability to have fun. 
Again, as with group membership information (gender & nationality) and 
information about aggression, ability information was expected to trump information 
about one’s shyness in the competitive context. 
 Age of Participant. The decision to sample 14 (7th grade) and 17 year olds (11th 
grade) was based on the attempt to extend the age range of inquiry. Specifically, Killen 
and Stangor (2001) have shown increases in group functioning considerations across 1st, 
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4th, and 7th grade participants, and this study served to assess whether 11th graders make 
even greater use of group functioning considerations beyond that which 7th graders 
utilize. Horn (2003) has shown that younger adolescents exhibit a greater propensity to 
accept exclusion based on stereotypic conceptions of groups. Based on this finding, and 
given older adolescents’ greater experience with groups, it was expected that in the 
competitive context, 14 year olds (7th grade) would be more accepting of exclusion based 
on gender and nationality (i.e., excluding a Brazilian and a female) than would 17 year 
olds (11th grade). 
 Age differences were expected to disappear however when information about 
ability was provided in the competitive context. That is, it was expected that information 
about ability would be salient enough to eliminate any age differences in perception of 
the competitive context.  
 Gender of Participant. As has been reported across many studies, females are 
less accepting of exclusion than their male counterparts (e.g., Horn, 2003). Given past 
findings, it was expected that females would be less accepting of exclusion overall than 
males, and in particular they would be less accepting of gender based exclusion than 
males, given that this type of exclusion makes salient the fact that they are also potential 
targets as a result of their gender. While this served as the overriding expectation for the 
present study, as with age expectations, it was expected that gender differences would 
disappear when information about a target’s ability was presented. It was further 
predicted that any difference in acceptability judgments by gender in the competitive 
context would be explained by gender differences in hypercompetitiveness.   
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 Nationality. Past studies on judgments about social exclusion utilizing Social 
Domain Theoretical expectations have included studies with a range of ethnic 
backgrounds (most ethnic majority, mostly minority, and evenly divided samples) with 
few differences reported for the participants’ ethnicity except for studies in which racial 
and ethnic exclusion is the explicit focus (in which cases the findings have shown minor 
but significant differences in terms of how wrong it is with all samples viewing it as 
wrong). Given past findings, it was expected that ethnic minorities in the sample would 
be less inclined to accept nationality-based exclusion than would ethnic majority 
individuals. 
 Hypercompetitiveness. As one main goal of this study was to assess the extent to 
which individuals think differently about competitive and noncompetitive group goals, 
this participant variable was expected to relate to that goal. In particular, it was expected 
that those who are hypercompetitive would be more likely to see exclusion based on 
ability as acceptable across both competitive and noncompetitive contexts. In contrast, 
those individuals who are not hypercompetitive were expected to view exclusion based 
on ability as acceptable only in the competitive context. Again, the more general 
expectation was that characteristics that are perceived to deter groups from achieving 
their goals would be seen as a legitimate basis by which to justify exclusion. With a 
hypercompetitive individual, it was thought that the perception of the noncompetitive 
group goal of having fun might incorporate being good at soccer (i.e., hypercompetitive 
individuals would more likely perceive bad soccer players as deterring the group from 
having fun).  
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Affirmation of Stereotypes. Before specifying expectations about the role that 
stereotyping plays in one’s judgments, it is worthwhile to explain the multiple ways in 
which we coded for stereotype use. First, we assessed participants on how likely they 
were to make use of a stereotype about competitiveness and ability through explicit 
questioning about how competitive and good they thought different groups were (i.e., 
how competitive are Americans?). Secondly, and because stereotypes have been defined 
as an overextension of a trait to a group without regard to intragroup variability, we 
coded spontaneous justifications that extended a characteristic beyond the main 
descriptor as a stereotype. For instance, the following type of comment was sought when 
coding for justifications that relied on a stereotype in the gender or nationality context: 
“It’s okay to exclude because females are bad at sports”; “It’s okay to exclude Brazilians 
because they are aggressive”. Similar comments that extended the described 
characteristic were sought for the other four characteristics: “shy people don’t play hard”; 
“people who get into fights are good at soccer”; “People with long hair aren’t nice”. The 
key difference between gender, nationality and hair length, and the other three 
characteristics, is that the first three characteristics do not explicitly specify a behavioral 
propensity. It remained an open question whether participants would utilize stereotypes 
more or less frequently based on this distinction between characteristics that did or did 
not specify a behavioral propensity. 
It was expected that participants who stereotype a group as good or bad at soccer 
would be more likely to accept exclusion of a member of that group in the competitive 
context, as ability in a domain was expected to be most salient when considering 
competitive group goals. In contrast, it was expected that stereotypes about the 
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competitiveness of the groups would relate to the acceptability of exclusion in the 
noncompetitive context, as competitiveness was expected to be antithetical to 
noncompetitive group goals.    
 Just as an individual might stereotype a certain nationality or gender as 
competitive or as good at soccer, so too could an individual stereotype those that are 
labeled as aggressive or shy. Just as with gender and nationality then, stereotypes about 
ability or competitiveness that are linked to aggression or shyness were expected to 
similarly affect exclusion judgments.  
Interaction between Hypercompetitiveness and Affirmation of Stereotypes. It 
was expected that those hypercompetitive individuals who stereotype groups based on 
ability would accept exclusion of a member of the negatively stereotyped group across 
competitive and noncompetitive contexts. For instance, if a hypercompetitive individual 
believes that females are not good at soccer, then that individual is expected to accept 
exclusion of females across both contexts. It was further expected that any stereotypes 
about ability that a non-hypercompetitive individual attributes to groups would only be 
utilized as justification for exclusion in the competitive context. As above, if a non-
hypercompetitive participant holds a stereotype about competitiveness, they were 
expected to accept exclusion of that target in the noncompetitive context.  
Experience with competition and exclusion. The amount of experience one has 
with competitive contexts was believed to relate to the extent to which ability information 
was deemed a valid means by which to include in competitive contexts. The basis for this 
expectation was a perspective taking account of exclusion considerations. Specifically, 
those without experience in competitive contexts may find the target’s feelings more 
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salient than the group’s goals when deciding whether exclusion was acceptable. In 
contrast, those with experience in competitive contexts may find the group’s goals most 
salient. A number of items were developed that asked participants to judge how often 
they have been involved in competitive contexts.  
Experience with exclusion, both as an excluder and as someone who has been 
excluded was thought to relate to the acceptability of exclusion. Specifically, it was 
predicted that those who have experience excluding others would, similar to those who 
have been involved in competitive contexts, show more concern for the group’s goals 
than for the target’s feelings. In contrast, it was predicted that those who have been 
excluded would have a heightened sensitivity to the perspective of the target. 
Changeability of personality. Perhaps the most important consideration is 
whether exclusion judgments based on a target’s ability, and more specifically a target’s 
behavior, relate to group functioning concerns only if the traits are perceived to be 
unchangeable. Past behavior has been shown to be salient in ambiguous contexts in 
which individuals evaluate the acceptability of accusations of wrongdoing (Killen, 
Richardson, Kelly, & Jampol, 2010). Specifically, an individual viewed accusations of 
wrongdoing (i.e., stealing, skipping school, pushing, leaving a mess) as more fair if the 
“transgressor” had been caught before for committing the transgression in question. The 
belief that past behavior reflects on current and future behavior is one of at least two 
orientations to the use of information about one’s past (i.e., that the past will be stably 
represented in the present and the future). An important second orientation that stands in 
contrast to that above is the belief that the past does not necessarily reflect on the present 
or future behavior of the individual in question.  
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In the context of this study, some may believe that prior instances of aggression 
and shyness can be changed (see for example Levy & Dweck, 1999). The acceptability of 
exclusion was argued to be dependent on whether one believes behavior to be 
changeable. It was expected that if you believe behavior to be changeable then no link 
between past behavior and potential to interfere with group goals would be made. As a 
result, exclusion would be seen as less acceptable than if you believe behavior to be 
stable, assuming that the behavior was perceived as negative from a group goals 
perspective.  To address this issue, participants were asked to make judgments about the 
extent to which they believed behavior to be changeable. As an example, it was expected 
that someone who believes aggression to be stable as well as detrimental to a group’s 
goals would accept exclusion of a target described through past aggression. In contrast, 
someone who believes that past behaviors do not necessarily inform predictions about 
future behavior would be more likely to reject exclusion of an aggressive target.  
Stereotypic expectations were expected again to interact with the belief in the 
changeability of behavior. Specifically, and continuing with the females and soccer 
example, if someone believed females to be bad at soccer, and they believed this to be a 
stable relationship, then they would accept exclusion. Contrast this with the expectation 
that exclusion would be seen as less acceptable if one believed that females are bad at 
soccer, but also believed that individuals had the capacity to develop over time. 
 Justifications for Judgments. Based on Social Domain theory, it was expected 
that participants who rate exclusion as unacceptable would do so primarily because 
exclusion violates a moral concern for harm to the target. In contrast, it was expected that 
participants who accept exclusion would do so because they found group functioning 
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considerations to be salient. In the context of this study, it was expected that moral 
justifications would be most often utilized when evaluating gender, nationality, and hair 
length based exclusion, while exclusion judgments based on shyness, aggression, and 
ability would be most often justified with group functioning concerns. 
Expected Contribution to the Field 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, peer relationships have been 
shown to be important for adolescent’s healthy development (Parker & Asher, 1987). By 
studying children and adolescents’ interpretations of different exclusion situations, it is 
feasible to document how it is that individuals of different ages understand and evaluate 
exclusion situations. Adolescents who view exclusion situations very differently than 
their peers may be at greater risk for exclusion.  
The attempt to assess the extent to which adolescents make use of stereotypic 
conceptions of groups across different group goals may help in developing interventions 
aimed at revealing how stereotypes can affect morally relevant decision-making. To the 
extent that adolescents engage thoughtfully with difficult social situations, interventions 
aimed at revealing the ways in which stereotypes can affect judgments may help 
adolescents engage with their own preconceived notions toward the end of adjusting how 
they consider variables in morally relevant decisions. In sum, this study sought to further 
the theoretical discussion of group functioning by assessing adolescents’ use of group 
goals, in terms of whether the goals are explicitly competitive or non-competitive, as a 
guide for judging group functioning considerations.  




The focus of this literature review is research on individuals’ evaluations of social 
exclusion (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006; Killen, Kelly, & Richardson, 2010), derived 
from an integration of research on peer relations (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006), 
intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999; McKown & Weinstein, 2003; Tajfel, 1978) and 
Social Domain theory (Smetana, 2006).  
This review builds off of past reviews of Social Domain theory and exclusion 
(Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006; Killen, 2007) by suggesting a reframing of the extant 
research on children’s reasoning about peer exclusion. Specifically, this review calls for 
viewing judgments of the acceptability of exclusion from a perspective that takes into 
account the nature of the information presented to participants about both the target of 
exclusion and the group’s goals.  
As this area of study draws from research derived from Social Domain theory, so 
too does this review. Social Domain theory is, at its most broad level, a conceptual 
framework for investigating how individuals reflect, evaluate, construe, categorize, and 
understand the social world. Specifically, thirty years worth of evidence from a Social 
Domain theoretical perspective shows that individuals consistently reason about social 
events and interactions from three qualitatively different perspectives (i.e., domains): the 
moral (e.g., unprovoked hitting), social-conventional (e.g., calling a teacher by her first 
name), and the psychological (e.g., personal choice of when to get a haircut) (Smetana, 
2006; Turiel, 2006).  
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This review will start with a general review of social domain theory, as well as 
other theoretical frames or reference where applicable, that identifies important 
contextual information used to evaluate actions, and when it is that the information 
becomes salient to the individual. For example, research has shown that children’s moral 
judgments are heavily dependent on whether harm is present in a situation (Leslie, 
Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). Being able to assess whether harm is present in a situation is 
in turn heavily, but not solely dependent on whether behavioral distress is present (e.g., 
crying) (Smetana, 1985). Behavioral distress is one example of information that may be 
used to infer the presence of harm to another, which is in turn used to evaluate whether an 
action is morally relevant.  
This more general review will then turn to the more specific topic of research on 
evaluations of exclusion, again with a focus on research that confirms that certain types 
of information are used to make evaluations. Beyond the simple review of the extant 
research in these related areas, another goal is to identify why it is that certain pieces of 
information hold more weight in one’s evaluations of actions, both within as well as 
outside of the social exclusion domain. The underlying theme of this review is that 
certain pieces of information invite stronger inferences about a situation and its actors 
than other pieces of information. The review will conclude with suggestions for future 
research.  
Social Domain theory 
 Social Domain theory arose from a Piagetian constructivist perspective (Turiel, 
2006), which in its most basic form suggests that individuals construct knowledge. Turiel 
and others before him (e.g., Piaget (1932/1965), Peterson, Danner, & Flavell, 1972) have 
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argued that, similar to the acquisition of logical and scientific knowledge, we construct 
knowledge of the social world as well (i.e., just as we actively construct a more refined 
understanding of the principle of reversibility through experience and argumentation, so 
too do we develop a more refined understanding of fairness). Recognizing limitations in 
Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1963), Turiel (1983) 
formulated an alternative conceptualization of moral development, in which three 
primary domains of social knowledge (moral, conventional, and psychological) were 
posited as the way in which individuals parsed the social world. Social Domain theory 
has used both hypothetical vignettes to measure judgments as well as observational 
schemes to code social interactions (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; 
Turiel, 2008).  Assessments of judgments have included both hypothetical vignettes in 
which prototypic situations are evaluated (i.e., situations in which an action is perceived 
as being relevant to only one domain), as well as multifaceted situations (i.e., situations in 
which actions are perceived as being relevant to two or more domains). In addition, 
measures of social interactions have been conducted using coding schemes examining 
both peer and parent-child interactions (Nucci, Killen, & Smetana, 1996; Killen & Turiel, 
1991).  
Theoretically, Nucci and Turiel (1978) make the following distinction between 
the moral and conventional domains:  
“Social conventional acts in themselves are arbitrary in that they do not 
have an intrinsically prescriptive basis: alternative courses of action can 
serve similar functions…As an example, the content of a conventional 
uniformity regarding modes of dress (e.g., formal attire in certain social 
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contexts) is arbitrarily designated, so an alternative mode of dress could 
be designated to serve the same function.” (p. 400) 
And,  
“In contrast, within the moral domain actions are not arbitrary, and the 
existence of a social regulation is not necessary for an individual to regard 
an event as a (moral) transgression. An example of such an act would be 
one person hitting another and thereby causing physical harm. An 
individual's perception of that type of event as a transgression would stem 
from factors intrinsic to the event (e.g., from the perception of the 
consequences to the victim).” (p. 401). 
 Empirical research, comprising over 120 research studies (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 
2006) has borne out these early theoretical expectations. In addition to the distinction 
between moral and conventional domains, children and adults view a range of issues as 
falling within the psychological domain, which is characterized by activities whose 
regulation by outside entities is thought to illegitimately violate personal autonomy 
(Lagattuta, Nucci, & Bosacki, 2010; Nucci, 1981, 2001; Smetana, 1988). A prototypic 
example in this domain is choosing how to wear your hair (Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 
1996).  
Given that the ability to identify when an action will cause harm to another is the 
means by which the moral becomes differentiated from the conventional and 
psychological domains (Smetana, 1985), it is perhaps equally important to note how it is 
that the conventional is reliably distinguished from the psychological domain. Again, 
results suggest that the distinction is made to the extent that one perceives regulation 
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from outside entities such as teachers, parents, and other authority figures to be justified. 
This consideration seems to revolve around the perception of the role that the regulation 
will have on the maintenance of social order. As an example, it is more often seen as 
unacceptable to regulate one’s hairstyle than one’s manner of address toward one’s 
teacher, with the former scenario consistent with the psychological and the latter with the 
conventional domain (Nucci, 1981; Smetana & Asquith, 1994).  
It is important to emphasize that early research found evidence in support of the 
individuals’ ability to distinguish and reason between different domains, and that this 
early evidence was garnered from testing participants in prototypic situations (e.g., 
unprovoked hitting with intent to harm). More recent research has documented the ways 
in which participants reason about multifaceted situations (e.g., excluding an aggressive 
child from a play group), in which a number of domain considerations become relevant, 
finding within a more complex picture that can explained in part by what we will argue is 
a differential weighting of domain concerns across these multifaceted contexts, that often 
involve the salience of the act (e.g., how wrong or how disruptive the act is for the 
individual or the group). Research by Smetana and colleagues (1994) has shown for 
example that adolescent - parent disagreement can be explained by the extent to which a 
parent and a child reason differently about an action (Smetana & Asquith, 1994). More 
specifically, disagreements arise when a child perceives an action as falling within a 
different domain than does the parent (e.g., cleaning one’s room as a conventional or 
personal choice issue) (Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Daddis, 2004).  
 As another example, research in the area of social exclusion has revealed an 
interesting asynchrony between evaluations of different types of race-based exclusion 
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(Killen, Stangor, Price, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004). As an example, racial exclusion in the 
form of racially motivated voting patterns has been evaluated more negatively than 
racially motivated dating patterns, explained by an increased reliance on personal choice 
reasoning in the dating context (i.e., she can date who she wants to date). 
 Finally, while cultural differences have been identified, such as Chinese as 
compared to Canadian adolescents’ greater appeals to utility when reasoning about non-
democratic forms of government (Helwig, Arnold, Tan, & Boyd, 2007), or that working-
class Brazilian adolescents were found to be more concerned about personal autonomy in 
dating contexts than were their middle-class counterparts (Milnitsky-Sapiro, Turiel, & 
Nucci, 2006) it is the extent of the similarities between members of different cultures that 
are striking. Helwig (2006), for instance notes in his review that the development of 
personal autonomy concerns is a phenomenon that has been observed in every cultural 
context studied to date. Wainryb’s (2006) review of the literature has revealed that 
individuals from both “individualistic” and “collectivist” societies assert their right to 
maintain control over certain issues, such as personal appearance, while at the same time 
exhibiting concern for interpersonal obligations, a notion that some argue is antithetical 
to an individualist orientation. Finally, in his review, Turiel (2002) argues through 
evidence that individuals in “collectivist” societies reject illegitimate authority control, 
opting instead to rebel against authority in an attempt to establish a realm of personal 
control that again seems to be a culturally universal need. Because so much has been 
written on the unwarranted focus on cultural differences in spite of the extensive 
evidence for cultural similarities, we will refer the interested reader to the above review 
articles rather than devoting more space to the issue here.  
  32      
 While there is striking similarity in judgments across cultures, disagreement does 
indeed manifest both within and across cultures (e.g., Wainryb, 1991). To the extent that 
there exists variation in one’s orientation to whether an action is deemed morally 
acceptable or not (take for example the debate about spanking), research has shown that 
informational assumptions drive the difference (Smetana, 1981; Wainryb, 1991). 
Importantly, differences in informational assumptions link to different ways of 
conceptualizing the morally relevant concern for harm to individuals (e.g., spanking is 
effective, and therefore is worth the temporary pain caused to the child v. spanking does 
not work, and therefore is not worth the pain caused to the child), and thus the difference 
in acceptability judgments regarding the act. The observation that there can exist 
disagreement between individuals in matters of harm does not mean that the 
disagreement arises as a result of a differential propensity to concern oneself with harm to 
others; indeed, it seems to be that both groups are concerned with avoiding harm. In 
essence then, both groups are concerned about avoiding harm; the groups simply have 
different perspectives on the worth of the temporary pain caused by spanking in light of 
their beliefs about the long-term benefit of spanking. 
 The picture would not be complete without a discussion of the minority of human 
beings who show no concern for harming others (Blair, Newman, Mitchell, Richell, 
Leonard, Morton, & Blair, 2006; Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, Colletti, 2000). In these 
extreme cases we find evidence for a lack of concern with the prospect of harming others.  
As an historical note, I argue that the utility of domain theory in accounting for 
variability in multifaceted situations is nowhere more apparent than in the reinterpretation 
of Kohlberg’s (1963) findings on moral development (Turiel, 2008). Specifically, from a 
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domain theoretical perspective, Kohlberg’s dilemmas involved more than one domain, 
making all of his dilemmas multifaceted in nature. Specifically, Heinz, as a result both of 
the obstinacy of the druggist and an inability to procure the necessary funds to purchase a 
drug to cure his wife’s health problem (despite varied attempts to procure the funds 
legally), was faced with the choice to either let his wife die, or steal the drug to save her 
life. In this scenario, Heinz had to consider the harm to his wife due to inaction (moral-
physical harm), the harm to the storekeeper of action (moral), the harm to himself if 
caught in action (personal choice), and the societal implications of his actions 
(conventional – free market economy & monopolization of a market). At the time that 
Kohlberg was interpreting the results, he did not have access to the theoretical 
formulations of Social Domain theory, nor did he have access to the wealth of evidence 
that has been garnered in support of Social Domain theoretical propositions. Kohlberg 
was essentially trying to make sense out of a multifaceted situation before he had a sense 
of the extent to which his scenarios could be further reduced into separable domains. In 
other words, Kohlberg had unknowingly conflated domains by using a multifaceted 
situation, making it difficult to accurately identify how it was that participants were 
engaging with the story (Turiel, 1974).  
In contrast to Kohlberg’s starting point, Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana started with 
prototypic, fully reduced scenarios (i.e., scenarios in which only one domain concern was 
present) in order to assess whether young children showed an ability to identify situations 
as morally relevant, finding that even at three, children can differentiate between morality 
and convention (Nucci, & Turiel, 1978). Once domain theorists had a strong empirical 
base with which to argue that individuals reliably use domains in prototypic contexts, 
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they moved on to assess how it is that individuals coordinate domain concerns in 
multifaceted contexts (Smetana, 1983). This was, in essence, a shift back to where 
Kohlberg had started, but with a better sense of the reducible nature of the multifaceted 
situations. As briefly reviewed above with the exclusion example, domain theorists found 
consistency in what others may have viewed as inconsistency in reasoning. Domain 
theorists simplified Kohlberg’s scenarios by challenging his developmental account that 
children were simply selfish moralists, noting instead that children could identify victim 
status even at three years of age (Turiel, 2008). 
Use of Information in Judgments 
 What is it that makes certain domains salient in a social situation? Research has 
shown that individuals reliably consider the information given in the description of the 
scenario (Smetana 1985), and when not enough information is given, individuals will 
sometimes fill in what they need to make a judgment with stereotypic conceptions of 
groups (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001) or inferences about how likely 
certain outcomes are as a result of an action (Nucci, 1981; Park & Killen, 2010). In fact, 
Social Domain theory’s proposal that social life could be organized into three domains 
hinged on the ability to predict differences in judgments given different information.   
Evaluations of Harm and Others’ Welfare 
In one of the first studies to attempt an empirical verification of the proposed 
theoretical domains, Nucci and Turiel (1978) observed and interviewed preschool 
children (range = two years, ten months - five years, two months) about social 
transgressions witnessed in preschools, assessing whether they could place transgressions 
into either the moral or the conventional domain (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). An example of 
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a conventional transgression was playing an activity in the wrong area, while an example 
of a moral transgression was one individual hitting another. In this study, the test was to 
see 1) whether and to what extent child and adult responses to observed transgressions 
differed by domain classification, 2) to what extent children would identify a distinction 
between domains, and 3) to what extent children’s and observer’s distinctions would 
converge. Specifically, children were asked a rule contingency question (e.g., If there 
were no rule against [hitting] would it be alright then?) to identify the ability to 
distinguish between domains. To be clear, Social Domain theory’s proposition is that 
actions that are conventionally bound will be evaluated negatively contingent upon the 
presence or absence of rules prohibiting the action. This is in contrast to theoretical 
expectations for actions that are morally bound, which are evaluated as unacceptable 
irrespective of the presence or absence of rules prohibiting the action.  
As expected, the children’s responses to the rule contingency question were 
consistent with the trained observer’s ratings of particular events as moral or 
conventional in 83% of the cases, suggesting that children spontaneously distinguished 
between domains as predicted by theory. For the purposes of this review then, 
information about a prohibition against a certain action became salient only when harm 
was not likely to result from an action.  
 The convergence between observer and child interviewee through responses to 
the rule contingency question (mentioned above) was the first concrete piece of evidence 
that participants, even at the age of 3, did indeed make reliable distinctions that were 
consistent with theoretical claims. This study did not, however, ask participants to justify 
their judgments, which leaves us without a way to empirically verify whether the 
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distinction between morally and conventionally relevant situations was drawn by 
identifying the intrinsic consequences to a victim or by some other means (note that, as 
quoted above, the intrinsic consequences to a victim are proposed to be present only in 
morally relevant situations).   
Nucci’s study (1981) was the first study to look at the nature of individuals’ (age 
range: 7-20years) domain distinctions. Not only did this study help to ground judgments 
with justification data, but it also provided evidence that distinctions are made not only 
between actions that are prototypically moral or conventional, but also between actions 
that fall in the personal domain (Nucci, 1981). An example of a conventional 
transgression was one person stealing something, while a conventional transgression was 
a boy addressing a teacher by her first name, and a personal issue was a boy wearing long 
hair that was contrary to stated rules.  
Confirmation of domain distinctions was found through asking participants to sort 
actions according to: 1) degree of wrongness; 2) degree of wrongness in the absence of 
rules against the act; and, 3) whether the decision to engage in the act should be up to the 
individual. It was found that participants sorted moral transgressions into the “most 
wrong” pile more often than conventional transgressions, which were in turn sorted as 
“more wrong” than psychological transgressions. Older children and young adults more 
often justified their placements of actions into the most wrong pile by citing harm to 
others as a result of engaging in the action.   
Results from the above studies support the contention that it is the concern for intrinsic 
negative consequences that distinguishes moral from conventional and psychological 
domains (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Given that this study showed that individuals evaluated 
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scenarios consistent with Social Domain Theory’s expectations, it was possible to extend 
this finding to see under what conditions domain distinctions could hold, and in what 
ways they might break down. Smetana (1985) for instance studied the ability of 
participants to make domain distinctions in the absence of a specified action.  
 Smetana (1985) interviewed children ranging in age from 38 to 76 months about 
unspecified actions (i.e., actions identified by nonsense words) to see whether context 
cues were sufficient in making domain distinctions. Specifically, the context cues that 
were varied were: 1) consistency of the prohibitions of the acts, and, 2) the type of 
responses to the acts. Results revealed that when actions were not consistently prohibited 
(i.e., conventionally relevant) they were evaluated as more permissible and less serious 
than the actions that were consistently prohibited. Information about the consistency of 
the prohibition then is used as information to judge an action.  
 Why might this result manifest as it did? One suggestion is that the results hinge 
on the participants’ perception of the regulators. With no information about the nature of 
the action, a participant may be less likely to question the legitimacy of the regulation 
(i.e., more likely to trust the regulator’s good sense) when two regulators prohibit an 
action than when only one of the two regulators prohibits the action (see Jaswal & Neely, 
2006 for empirical confirmation of a “trust the authority” orientation in childhood).  
 For this study on regulation of novel actions, trust in the regulator may come in 
the form of accepting that the regulator is asking for compliance when compliance is 
considered legitimate (i.e., when compliance is perceived to maintain social order). 
Because this study does not allow an assessment of the trustworthiness of individual 
regulators (i.e., participants do not know anything about the regulators except that they do 
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not want the child to engage in the novel action in the consistent prohibition, and that one 
of the two regulators does not want the child to engage in the action in the inconsistent 
prohibition), participants seem to “trust” the consistent regulators more than the 
inconsistent regulator. While interesting, this finding may be an artifact of the lack of 
information about the regulators. One testable implication of the “trust-through-past-
behavior” explanation for the findings is that participants may rate the novel action as 
more permissible than reported in the study when they know that the regulators have tried 
in the past to illegitimately regulate behaviors that are seen as personal choice concerns.  
 In terms of harm and the perception of novel actions as morally relevant, 
participants’ justifications for their judgments were consistent with Nucci’s (1981) study 
in that when victim distress was present, participants made mention of that fact when 
justifying their judgments. Interactions between prohibition and behavioral distress are 
also important to note, such that in the consistent prohibition condition with no victim 
distress present, participants were less able to justify their judgment that the act was 
unacceptable than they were when they were given information about victim distress. 
Another person’s welfare was the justification given by over half of the participants when 
the child victim showed distress and when no distress was mentioned, more than two-
thirds of participants said they did not know why the act was morally relevant, with 14% 
of participants justifying their judgment by citing the consistent prohibition. The simple 
theoretical explanation for this finding is that consistency in prohibition is not what is 
used to sort actions into the moral domain, but rather the presence of harm to others. 
In the above-mentioned studies, it is clear that information provided in the 
situations is used to evaluate the scenario. Also clear is the fact that information is added 
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as needed, when not specifically provided. For instance, hitting is evaluated as a moral 
transgression, except in cases in which a target desires to be hit (Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 
1996).   Individuals, even at the age of three, will differentiate between actions by domain 
both with and without behavioral cues, and with and without typical act-outcome 
relations. Indeed, researchers studying theory of mind would not find this result 
surprising, as work by Tomasello and colleagues has shown that toddlers will infer intent 
from certain behaviors of a confederate without any explicit verbal indication of one’s 
intent (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). It 
seems that humans are very ready to infer information from less than explicit cues. 
Given that behavioral distress is a useful way to infer harm to another, and thus 
the moral relevance of an action, the question becomes to what extent does behavioral 
distress guide us to moral relevance, and are there situations in which behavioral distress 
might lead to an incorrect conclusion about the moral relevance of an act? Up until this 
point, the proposed link has been from behavioral distress to harm to moral relevance. It 
should be further specified that harm implies a victim; specifically, that harm to another 
is equated with harm to a victim. Given this further specification, one can ask whether 
there are times in which behavioral distress results from a situation that does not involve 
victimization.  
At least one study suggests that it is incorrect to automatically infer victimization 
from behavioral distress (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006) and one study that suggests 
that it is incorrect to automatically reject victimization in situations in which victim 
distress is absent (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). As mentioned above, when thinking about 
the moral domain, it is additionally important to assess not only when victimization 
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occurs, but also when victimizers are culpable (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, 
Helwig, & Lau, 1996). 
Behavioral Manifestations of Harm 
 It has been argued, both here and by other researchers (e.g., Smetana, 1985), that 
the ability to identify harm is an important component needed to be able to evaluate the 
moral relevance of actions. What has not yet been considered is the complexity of the 
task of identifying when distress implicates victimization, or relatedly, transgressor 
culpability, as individuals can show distress in many situations in which there is no one to 
blame. Leslie and colleagues compared moral judgments of 4-6 year olds in a 
prototypical unprovoked hair pulling scenario (a victim cries as a result of getting her hair 
pulled) with moral judgments in a situation in which behavioral manifestations of harm 
do not correspond to victimization (a “victim” cries upon being thwarted in her attempt to 
eat both hers and another’s cookie). The harm without victimization condition was 
labeled the “cry baby” condition (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). As expected, results 
revealed that children evaluated pulling hair as negative, which is consistent with the 
behavioral distress account. More importantly, results reveal that children evaluate eating 
one’s own cookie as positive; regardless of the effect it has on others.  
This finding is of major theoretical interest, as it requires that participants make a 
decision about whether the act of eating one’s cookie is morally relevant given that eating 
one’s cookie caused the “victim” distress. The basic finding suggests that behavioral 
distress, while important in moral judgment as an indicator of harm/victim status, is not 
the sole determinant of moral judgment, at least for this age group. What is it then that 
helps children flexibly apply knowledge of behavioral distress when trying to infer 
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victimization? Drawing an analogy to Nucci’s sorting task, the act of eating one’s own 
cookie would likely be evaluated as least wrong, as it is likely to be seen as a 
prototypically personal domain issue (i.e., an action that primarily affects the self). If this 
is the case, then children may be able to disregard distress as a result of acting in the 
personal domain, as prohibiting actions in the personal domain is seen as unacceptable 
(Nucci, 1981). Whether this finding would hold in a condition in which the cookie owner 
eats her cookie despite knowing that eating her cookie will cause distress to a victim 
remains to be seen, but results from Piaget’s early work on intention, and other’s more 
recent work with varied intention paradigms would suggest that if the intent was to harm 
the victim by eating one’s cookie, then eating one’s own cookie in order to cause distress 
would be evaluated negatively.  
The above review suggests that harm to another is a factor that is flexibly applied 
when attempting to identify the moral relevance of an act, and yet, dating back to (Piaget, 
1932/1965), it is well known that the intentional structure behind the act also plays a role 
in one’s moral evaluations. In fact, it looks as if we integrate information about harm and 
intent when deciding on whether the transgressor in question should be punished 
(Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). In the next section, the 
research on intention within the moral domain will be reviewed, as intent is yet another 
piece of information that is sought when evaluating a morally relevant scenario.  
Intentionality and Harm 
Piaget’s now classic moral judgment task, which involved asking children to 
evaluate two basic action sequences, provided the foundation for research on the role of 
intention in act evaluation. One sequence depicted a child who unintentionally caused 
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substantial property damage while engaging in a prosocial act (a boy made a large ink 
mark on a table cloth in an attempt to help fill his father’s empty ink well with ink), and 
one that unintentionally caused minimal property damage while engaging in an 
prohibited act (a boy dropped and broke one cup in an attempt to get some jam while his 
mother was out). Piaget noted that children begin taking into account the intentional 
structure underlying actions at around age 10, evaluating the “sneaky” act of getting a 
forbidden item as less acceptable than the prosocially intentioned act of helping maintain 
a household (Piaget, 1932/1965, p.123). The scenarios that Piaget utilized bear striking 
resemblance to the scenarios developed by Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen (2006), in which 
actors act knowing that their actions will have unintended side effects for others.  
Extending Piaget’s research on the link between intention and moral judgment, 
Zelazo, Helwig, and Lau (1996) developed scenarios in which a transgressor either 
intended or did not intend to physically harm a victim, and was differentially successful 
in bringing about the desired outcome. Results revealed that at five years of age, children 
began to take into account the intentional structure behind the actions, evaluating 
positively intended actions as more acceptable than negatively intended actions (Helwig, 
Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). These studies suggest that it is 
not only the outcome of the action (i.e., harm) that identifies the moral relevance of an 
action, but that the intent is used as salient information with which to make an evaluation 
of an act.  
 The above three studies (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Piaget, 1932,1965; 
Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) definitively converge on the same conclusion that, in 
addition to harm to another, intentional structure is important when evaluating the moral 
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relevance of an act. There are cases, though, in which we do not have direct access to the 
intentional structure behind acts, and yet in many ambiguously intentioned situations we 
find a strikingly consistent interpretation of intention across individuals. Take for 
example research on evaluations of lying, in which a person’s intentions are 
methodologically left vague, and yet we find consistency in evaluations of lies, 
suggesting perhaps a 1-to-1 correspondence between the nature of the lie and the 
intentional structure presumed to support it. Bussey (1999) found that children at all ages 
(four, eight, and eleven years) included in the study evaluated antisocial lies (defined as 
comments meant to hide the liar’s negative action from another) as more serious than 
white lies (defined as comments meant to hide the lie teller’s true feelings that would hurt 
another if expressed) (for further confirmation/extension of the above findings, see Fu, 
Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, 
& Lee, 2007; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Shaw & 
Wainryb, 2006). The above studies converge on the idea that lying is evaluated 
contextually, and in cases in which both harm to another and the liars’ intentions are left 
implicit, the harm and intentional structure are nevertheless extracted in a reliable 
manner, resulting in predictable evaluations of situations. Again, it is the study of the 
ability to infer moral relevance from different salient factors (e.g., harm to another; 
intentions) that I think will help clarify inconsistencies in the research on evaluations of 
social exclusion. 
Up to this point, it has been shown that evaluations of moral relevance hinge on 
intentions of the transgressor and the victim’s behavioral distress in response to certain 
actions. What about cases in which a victim does not show obvious signs of distress? A 
  44      
study by Shaw and colleagues asked to what extent participants would identify an act as 
morally relevant when the victim’s response cannot easily be identified as distress (Shaw 
& Wainryb, 2006). Using situations in which participants resist, subvert and comply with 
a transgressor’s unfair demands, Shaw and Wainryb found that although all participants 
recognized that a transgressor’s requests were selfishly motivated, and were thus 
evaluated negatively, 83% of five year olds attributed sadness to victims who resisted, 
compared to 10% of 16 year olds, who instead opted for accomplishment as the emotion 
most likely to be shown by a victim who resists. Similarly, when victims subverted the 
transgressor, 96% of 5 year olds attributed sadness to the victim, whereas only 2% of 16 
year olds did so, instead attributing to the victim the following emotions: fear (17%), 
accomplishment (25%), and anger (50%). Finally, for victims who complied, 5 year olds 
were most likely to attribute sadness (50%) and pro-social (46%) emotions to the victim, 
whereas 16 year olds were most likely to attribute fear (54%) (p. 1055). 
Given this discrepancy in emotion attribution at the different ages, it may already 
be clear that for the youngest age groups, victim status will be mistaken for freely chosen 
prosociality when the victim complies with the transgressor’s demand. Indeed, 5 year 
olds evaluated compliance as the most positive response, whereas 16 year olds evaluated 
resistance as the most positive response to a transgressor’s unfair demands (p.1056).  
There seems to be an age related change in participants’ ability to coordinate both 
the actions of the transgressor and the responses of the victim. Specifically, five year olds 
held that resistance was unfair toward the transgressor, while concurrently suggesting that 
the transgressor’s demands were unfair toward the victim (these two orientations to the 
situation are logically irreconcilable, because if one holds, the other cannot). At age 
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seven, participants start to recognize the negative implications of compliance, beginning 
to coordinate the transgressor’s unfair demand with the victim’s compliance. Shaw and 
Wainryb (2006) suggest that at around age seven, children begin to understand the 
difference between compliance, which is forced, and consent, which is freely chosen. I 
argue that results from this study complement the results garnered from the study by 
Leslie, Mallon, and DiCorcia (2006) in that there is further confirmation that victim 
distress is not the sole determinant of the moral relevance of an action, and may in fact 
play a role in this determination only to the extent that other conditions are met (e.g., 
whether the distress is appropriate, the ability to coordinate a transgressor’s actions with a 
victim’s reactions).  
Again, both harm to another as well as the transgressor’s intentions seem to be 
powerful pieces of information that support our ability to make domain distinctions, with 
both variables becoming more salient with age. Further, we seem to have a relative 
amount of flexibility when making use of this information, being able to infer harm and 
intention when it is not explicitly given (Dodge, 1980; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006), and 
being able to use harm and intention information in a multitude of situations (Zelazo, 
Helwig, & Lau, 1996). What do we need to extract from a situation in order to be able to 
infer intention and harm? To answer this question, one can profit from a focus on the 
research on theory of mind (ToM) (e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944). More specifically, I 
argue that inference processes within a morally relevant situation draw on the ability to 
extract: 1) the actor’s desires/goals (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), 2) the actor’s access to 
information (Woodward, 2003), 3) the actor’s beliefs (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), 
and 3) any heuristics/assumptions/stereotypes that would help to identify the above three 
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pieces of information (Bodenhausen & Wyer, Jr., 1985) (see Sobel & Kirkham, 2007 for 
a related discussion about inference processes derived from nonsocial information).  
For instance, research in social information processing has shown that attributions 
surrounding a negative event (i.e., provocation or rebuff) depend in part on whom it is 
that is provoking or rebuffing (Nummenmaa, Peets, & Salmivalli, 2008). If it is someone 
who is disliked, then attributions will be more negative than if someone who was liked 
drove the same action.  
The review of how it is that we infer certain mental states and foresee or predict 
certain outcomes and behaviors (i.e., how we infer a transgressor’s intentions, a victim’s 
feelings, and when outcomes will be harmful towards the in-group) when the mental state 
is not explicitly mentioned is relevant to the discussion of the research on social 
exclusion. Specifically, the proposition is that the age related increase in the acceptance 
of certain exclusion scenarios results in part from an increasing capacity for inference 
given access to certain pieces of information about a situation. At the most basic level, an 
evaluation of an exclusion situation potentially involves taking into consideration: 1) the 
potential harm to the target upon exclusion (a moral domain concern), 2) the potential 
harm to the group upon inclusion of the target (a moral domain concern), 3) the potential 
reduction in group functioning upon inclusion of the target (a conventional domain 
concern), and 3) the right to choose with whom one desires association (a personal 
domain concern).  
Given the focus of this proposal on group functioning considerations in exclusion 
judgments, the ability to infer motives, desires, and beliefs may predispose older children, 
adolescents, and adults to judge all exclusion as unacceptable. To clarify, and as 
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mentioned above, targets who desire group entry will be disappointed if they are 
excluded. Furthermore, targets that desire group entry might be judged to be willing to 
support the group in whatever way they need. Given this potential to view targets that 
desire inclusion into the group to be willing to help the group function, then harm to the 
target may be seen as more salient, and exclusion judged more harshly.  
As noted above, however, along with the ability to judge desires, beliefs, and 
motives, individual also make inferences about the likelihood that an individual will have 
the capacity to help the group function effectively (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Two 
questions addressed in this proposal then are: 1) do participants link the desire to join a 
group with the desire to help the group function; and, 2) do participants differentiate 
between a desire and the capacity to help the group?  
Finally, and as mentioned above, individuals vary in their tendency to judge 
behavioral propensities as stable across time (Levy & Dweck, 1999). The judgment of the 
likelihood that an individual will remain as described may affect the perception of the 
likelihood that a target will disrupt group functioning. Before addressing the literature on 
evaluations of social exclusion, it will be instructive to briefly review the peer relations 
literature, toward the end of further synthesizing the two literatures.  
Adolescent Social Cognition, Peer Relations, and Norms 
 Peer ratings of individuals in their social surroundings have proven time and again 
to be a useful assessment tool, (Gest, Rulison, Davidson, & Welsh, 2008) complementing 
teacher, parent and self-report methodologies. This suggests that peers, at least at an 
aggregated level, are highly attuned to what others exhibit in their social milieu. The 
findings of group and friendship homophily, both from a behavioral and a values 
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perspective also suggests an ability to identify and associate with individuals that have 
certain desired tendencies (Chen, Chang, & He, 2008; Hill, Rubin, & Peplau, 1976; 
Kandel, 1978; Rubin, Lynch, Coplan, Rose-Krasnor, & Booth, 1994).  
 Beyond the ability to judge individuals’ fit with group or personal desires/goals, 
the ability to identify group norms seems to be similarly developed. One interesting 
instantiation of adolescents’, young adult’s, and adults’ capacity to extract meaning out of 
subtle cues in the social environment is that of the effect of descriptive (i.e., what people 
do) and injunctive (i.e., what people believe is acceptable) norms on behavior. A study 
focusing on norms and their relation to littering behavior revealed relations between the 
norms that were extracted from environmental cues (i.e., a clean or an already littered 
environment) (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). For example, it was argued that when 
individuals noticed an already littered environment, they were more likely to litter 
themselves, suggesting that norms had the power to alter behavior.  
 In addition, norms as well as direct peer communication have been revealed as a 
predictor of adolescents’ use of alcohol (Real & Rimal, 2007). Beyond the perception of 
what is normativc, adolescents evince an ability to utilize person-information as well. 
Horn’s (2003) study on the acceptability of exclusion from social groups, for instance 
revealed that adolescents made greater use of an individual’s level of school engagement 
than their group membership (e.g., dirty, preppy, gothic) when evaluating whether it was 
acceptable to exclude a target from the cheerleading club.   
 While adolescents as a group seem to be able to parse the subtlety of social 
interaction, atypical social information processing has also been identified for 
increasingly well-defined subgroups of adolescents. Fite, Goodnight, Bates, Dodge, and 
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Pettit (2008) for instance, asked adolescents to indicate the extent to which they endorsed 
an aggressive response to a hypothetical and ambiguous provocation. They found that the 
relation between response evaluation and adolescent aggression was moderated by how 
impulsive the adolescent was rated to be by his or her teachers, with the most impulsive 
participants endorsing aggression more often than those low in impulsivity. Self-efficacy 
beliefs regarding aggressive behavior have also been shown to relate to adolescent 
aggression (Davis-Kean, Huesmann, Jager, Bates, Collins, & Lansford, 2008).  
The question that I now address is whether the above-mentioned research can 
inform the research on social exclusion. In particular, the question is whether and to what 
extent does the evidence presented in favor of a developing ability to coherently integrate 
information into a judgment relate to judgments in social exclusion scenarios. 
Specifically, for typically developing adolescents the above suggests an ability to assess 
the fit between the self, others, and social groups in one’s environment. From a judgment 
perspective, it is expected that this capacity to engage with accessible information will 
translate to considerations of social exclusion in hypothetical situations. In particular, it is 
expected that judgments of the acceptability of exclusion will involve taking into 
consideration the perspective of the group and the perspective of the target of exclusion. 
As a result, both research on behavioral distress as well as research on perspective taking 
will be applicable to a study of social exclusion.  
First, I will detail the main findings in the area of reasoning about social 
exclusion, moving next to a discussion of how these findings may link to the research 
reviewed above, concluding with an attempt to identify future directions within this 
research program. 
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Multifaceted Situations: Evaluations of Exclusion 
Our ability to evaluate an action has been shown to be dependent, at least in part, 
on the information to which we have access. Knowledge of an action, and any explicit 
contingencies surrounding that action aids us in evaluating the likelihood that the action 
will result in victimization (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Leslie, Mallon, & 
DiCorcia, 2006; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana, 
1981; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). It is generally accepted that the act of excluding a 
target often results in psychological distress for the target, and it is the knowledge of the 
link between exclusion and distress that is proposed to drive, in part, one’s moral 
judgments in multifaceted exclusion situations. Importantly however, exclusion situations 
comprise more than just moral concerns for the target. Beyond the moral concern for the 
target, individuals seem to take into consideration the group’s conventional concerns 
about, or desire for, efficient group functioning, as well as each individual group 
member’s personal choice about who they desire to associate with more generally. 
Finally, group members can be granted victim status just as targets of exclusion could be. 
Essentially, the argument in this proposal is that some types of exclusion are, if not 
deserved, then readily justifiable given considerations for the group’s welfare. This line 
of thought will be extended after the literature on exclusion judgments has been 
reviewed. 
As was shown in a subset of the above studies, (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; 
Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) with age, individuals could more 
readily integrate information, which in turn affects their judgments. Age related increases 
in the acceptability of exclusion have also been reported (Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 
2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Park & Killen, under review; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 
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2001). What is it that changes with age? For one, concerns for group functioning become 
increasingly salient. As indicated above, and where relevant in the review of exclusion 
studies below, I attempt an integration of the research reviewed above toward the end of 
identifying which pieces of information seem to be most salient to individuals in 
exclusion situations, and whether developmental trends are a result of a developing 
ability to integrate multiple pieces of information, or whether certain pieces of 
information become more salient over time regardless of competing considerations. 
Finally, I will suggest future directions that attempt to detail why it is that those pieces of 
information are differentially salient.  
Over 10 years of study by Killen and colleagues has shown that exclusion 
situations are evaluated differently based on certain factors that are or are not present in 
each situation (for a review see Killen, Richardson, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, revise-and-
resubmit; Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007). Some general findings reveal that, 1) 
Exclusion is evaluated negatively when it is explicitly based on a target’s group 
membership (e.g., gender, or ethnicity), but that gender exclusion has been more accepted 
than ethnic exclusion (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002); and, 2) In 
comparison to exclusion based on a target’s group membership, exclusion is evaluated 
less negatively when it is based on knowledge of a target’s behavioral tendencies or 
reputation. Below I will review in depth these two general findings, with a focus both on 
the methods and age of the sample used, toward the end of identifying gaps in our 
knowledge base where future research should be directed.  
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Group Membership Characteristics 
 One of the first studies to look at exclusion from a social domain perspective was 
conducted by Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey (2001) in which they asked 
young children (4.5 year olds and 5.5 year olds) to judge the acceptability of group based 
exclusion using different hypothetical vignettes. Children were given four exclusion 
situations to evaluate. The doll scenario is provided as an example: “A group of girls is 
playing with dolls. John comes over and asks if he can play. Two of the girls say that 
John cannot play because he is a boy. Is it all right or not all right for the girls to tell John 
that he cannot play? Why or why not?” (p.590). The other three stories involved group 
play with trucks, and role-playing a teacher or a firefighter.  Findings revealed that 87% 
of children judged the straightforward exclusion to be wrong, with the most often cited 
justification being moral reasons (84%) (for convergent findings using ethnicity as an 
additional group membership category, see Killen & Stangor, 2001).  
These findings are of theoretical interest as this scenario pits ostensible concerns 
about group functioning with concerns about harm to the target. To be more specific, two 
girls desire exclusion due to the target’s gender status, which could be based potentially 
on the stereotypic belief that John (and boys more generally) will not be good at the 
activity. Because there were so few group functioning justifications for exclusion (and 
many moral justifications for inclusion), it was assumed that children reject the group 
functioning concerns raised by the two girls, in favor of protecting the target from harm. 
In light of the above discussion about processes of inference, it may be tempting to 
suggest that, through rejecting exclusion these young children reject stereotypes, as the 
boy’s gender is the only reason cited for exclusion. Minimally, we know that exclusion is 
rejected in favor of inclusion, suggesting either that these children do not think that the 
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target’s gender is relevant for assessing whether to exclude, or that any relevance of the 
target’s gender is overwhelmed by the concern for harm to the target.  
The question that arises from the above result is whether, and under what 
conditions, children accept a target’s gender as relevant to an exclusion decision. The 
second scenario presented to participants in Killen and colleagues’ study (2001) asked 
participants to evaluate a complex exclusion scenario in which the choice was between 
including a female or male child in the play group (participants received both a male 
stereotyped activity and a female stereotyped activity). No additional information was 
provided beyond the straightforward exclusion scenario: “Let's say that two children, 
Tom and Sally, come over and want to play with the girls. There is only one doll left. The 
group has to decide whom to pick. Whom should the group pick? How come they should 
pick him/her?” (p.590). Although asking the participants who they would pick is, on the 
surface, slightly different from the evaluative question posed in the straightforward 
situation, comparisons remain relatively coherent between the scenarios. Results revealed 
that less than half (44%) of the sample chose the stereotypic child for the play activities. 
It should be noted that given the relative proximity to chance responding (50%) the 
results suggest that there was little compelling the participants as a group to include one 
or the other target, and yet we see a slight preference for the nonstereotypical child in the 
activities condition. Again, it should be noted that stereotypic conceptions of gendered 
activities could have affected one’s judgments of the acceptability of exclusion. As 
indicated throughout this review however, stereotypic conceptions of gendered activities 
may not be salient enough to overcome concerns for harm to the target.   
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Given that gender was the only information provided about the two targets, why 
do we see this differential pattern of responding across the simple and complex exclusion 
scenarios? It might relate to the fact that in the complex case, someone is assured of 
being hurt by exclusion, and therefore the decision about whom to include becomes less 
clear as a result of the impending harm that will befall one of the two targets, whereas 
when only one target desires entry, the harm to the target becomes more salient as 
inclusion would eliminate any harm caused to the target. It should be noted that in the 
complex exclusion scenario, as in the simple exclusion scenario, gender is the only piece 
of information available for the children to use.  
Children’s selections (e.g., choosing to include the stereotypical child) were 
probed by having them consider reasons for including the child not selected. Specifically, 
for children who chose the stereotypical child to play, the interviewer asks participants to 
consider that someone might want to include the nonstereotypical child as that child does 
not often get an opportunity to play the nonstereotypical activity (moral probe). Likewise, 
if the child chose the nonstereotypical child to play, the interviewer asked the participants 
to consider that someone might chose the stereotypical child as the stereotypical child is 
the one who usually plays with the stereotypical toy (conventional probe). Results 
revealed that children were more likely to switch their choice of whom to include from 
stereotype to nonstereotype than from nonstereotype to stereotype. 61% of children chose 
the nonstereotypical child post-probe. Compare this to the straightforward exclusion 
condition in which participants overwhelmingly said that gender exclusion was not 
acceptable (87%). Why is it that in the complex exclusion case children are not 
overwhelmingly choosing to include the nonstereotypical child, even after being probed 
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with a moral concern for equal opportunity? It might relate, as mentioned above for the 
pre-probe choice in the complex scenario, to the fact that in the complex case, someone is 
assured of being hurt by exclusion, making the need to switch one’s choice for moral 
reasons less salient.  
The results from the counterprobing in the complex scenario, and the simple 
exclusion scenario suggest that for this age group, either the stereotypical information 
about gender is not yet relevant enough to maintain concerns for group functioning, or 
moral concerns trump conventional concerns no matter the relevance of the information 
to which one has access. Given the review of the studies that follow, the former 
possibility is more consistent with the overall trends.  
Thinking back to the argument about the ability to draw inferences from 
information, one can ask whether a target’s gender is seen as a relevant piece of 
information with which to draw inferences, and derivatively, to make a decision about 
whom to include. Recall that behavioral distress has been shown to be a relevant piece of 
information which children make use of in their moral evaluations (Helwig, Zelazo, & 
Lau, 2001; Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006; Smetana, 1985; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 
1996). Focusing on the simple exclusion scenario, gender does not appear to be 
considered a relevant piece of information by which one can justify exclusion. 
Specifically, participants overwhelmingly reject exclusion based on gender in the simple 
exclusion scenario. Why might this be the case? I argue that it may be that information 
about one’s gender does not provide enough information as to why exclusion should be 
condoned. In other words, it may be that a target’s gender cannot readily be used to infer 
reductions in-group functioning.  
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To be clear, in the first scenario in which a girl desires the exclusion of a boy 
from the doll playing group, the desire to exclude could derive either from a stereotypic 
belief about boys’ lack of doll playing prowess (and that this incapable boy will reduce 
group functioning), or a dislike of boys more generally. Indeed, research has revealed a 
distinction between an individual’s sociometric ratings depending on the gender of the 
target at around this age (Hayden-Thomson, Rubin, & Hymel, 1987; Ramsey, 1995). It 
should be recalled that the maintenance of group functioning is seen as a legitimate basis 
for action when harm to others is minimal or nonexistent (e.g., Nucci, 1981). I argue in a 
similar vein that the maintenance of group functioning is seen as a legitimate basis for the 
exclusion of a target that may threaten the group’s functioning, provided that the 
exclusion does not create undue harm to the target. Given the increasing distinction made 
between boys and girls throughout early childhood, gender may be salient from a group 
functioning perspective. Add to this the fact that the context involves a gender stereotypic 
activity, and it may be no wonder that half of the participants select a gender consistent 
target for inclusion. 
The relation between stereotypic conceptions and group functioning deserves 
further elaboration. Many scholars have shown the effect of stereotypic conceptions on 
cognition (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Bigler & Liben 1993). The 
association between a group membership category, a behavior, and an individual 
belonging to that group may affect the acceptability of exclusion. Importantly, in the 
context of this proposal, it is expected that stereotypic conceptions of groups will only 
affect exclusion decisions to the extent that the stereotype can in some way be linked to 
reductions in the group’s functioning. As described above, if a group’s goal is to win in a 
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competitive soccer tournament, then stereotypes about ability will affect exclusion 
judgments (e.g., girls are bad at soccer, and therefore we should exclude girls from the 
soccer club). In contrast, in a noncompetitive soccer club context, stereotypes about 
ability may not be as salient, as the group goal may no longer be consistent with 
including good soccer players. Instead, stereotypes about behavioral propensities may 
predominate any exclusion decisions in the noncompetitive context (e.g., Brazilians are 
aggressive, and we don’t want aggressive people to ruin our fun).  
What does it mean to have a legitimate concern about threats to group 
functioning? It is argued that legitimate concerns derive from both the information about 
the group’s goals as well as information about a target to which one has access. Once 
information is collected about a situation, then one may make judgments about whether 
the information provided about the target is relevant when deciding whether to accept or 
reject exclusion. A group has to make decisions about who to include based on 
information about targets that desire group entry. Some major classes of information have 
already been thoughtfully identified in the extant research, and include: 1) group 
membership information (Killen & Stangor, 2001), 2) information about behavioral 
propensities (Park & Killen, Under Review), and 3) experience information (Theimer, 
Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Related, but not synonymous with the experience category is 
ability information (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003). I 
argue that the above four categories of information about a target can be laid out on a 
“continuum of relevance” that people use when evaluating the acceptability of exclusion.  
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Information Beyond Group Membership 
A study similar in form to that of Killen et al., (2001) was conducted by Killen 
and Stangor, (2001), in which older children (seven, ten and thirteen year olds) were 
asked to evaluate different acts of social exclusion in the presence of more information 
about the relative qualifications of the targets (Killen & Stangor, 2001). The selection of 
older participants was for comparative purposes to the findings with the younger 
children. The expectation was that with age, children would grant more salience to group 
functioning concerns, as a result of their greater exposure to situations in which group 
functioning is important. As in the above-described study, participants negatively 
evaluated exclusion based on group membership (gender or race) in straightforward 
stereotypical play conditions (ballet without boys, baseball cards without girls, math 
without blacks, and basketball without whites). In the second and third condition, as in 
the complex exclusion scenario developed in the study by Killen et al, (2001) the 
participants had to make a choice of who to exclude, given that there were two targets 
desiring group entry, and only one space left in the playgroup. In the equal qualifications 
condition, participants more often chose the nonstereotypical child to be included (gender 
exclusion percentages: 7 yr olds: 71%, 10 yr olds: 67%, 13 yr olds: 60%, with more 
participants choosing to include the nonstereotypical target in the race context: 7 yr olds: 
79%, 10 yr olds: 88%, 13 yr olds: 77%). In the final condition, participants were asked to 
choose whom they would include given the fact that the stereotypical target was also 
more qualified in the activity. In this condition, 13 (78%) year olds more often that 7 
(59%) or 10 (45%) year olds justified choosing the more qualified gender target for group 
functioning reasons, again with less participants selecting the more qualified race target 
(7 yr olds: 49%, 10 yr olds: 26%, 13 yr olds: 71%). Although the target’s qualifications 
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were not isolated from their group membership status (i.e., there was no control condition 
in which the nonstereotypical child was more qualified than the stereotypical child), we 
can look at the extent of the shift between the straightforward and complex exclusion 
scenarios. To the extent that there is a shift in choice of whom to include from the equal 
to the unequal qualifications conditions, we can say that experience information is 
relevant to one’s decision to include. Put another way, participants may be sensitive to 
the fact that someone who is better qualified for the activity in question will be more 
consistent with group goals, which in this case may be to simply have fun. Indeed, 
looking at the percentages, all three age groups shifted in their judgments from the equal 
to the unequal qualifications condition, more often choosing the target that fit the 
stereotype when that target was also more qualified, and so this use of relevant 
information might be robust across a wide age range. As will soon become apparent 
however, the moral concerns in an exclusion situation can create another layer of 
complexity, even in the case of increasing the information available to participants.  
Even though the unequal qualifications conditions affected the choices of all ages, 
the result for the 7 and 10 year olds looks similar to the results of the 4 and 5 year olds in 
the Killen et al., (2001) study in that they did not seem to be compelled either way by the 
information given (i.e., their responses were close to chance responding). What will 
happen when younger children evaluate exclusion in unequal qualifications conditions? A 
study by Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, (2001), addressed this question in a manner 
identical in form to the Killen and Stangor (2001) study, by looking at how 4 and 5 year 
olds use relative qualification information (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Again, as 
in the above two studies, a straightforward exclusion scenario revealed that children 
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evaluated exclusion negatively. Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings in the older 
age groups, 4 and 5 year olds were more likely to suggest including the nonstereotypic 
target when she was relatively unqualified than when she was equally qualified. This is of 
interest, as it suggests that there might be a shift in one’s use of relevant information 
around the age of 6, which is consistent with Shaw and Wainryb’s findings regarding the 
ability to integrate competing considerations at this age (2006). Either that, or younger 
children are equally aware of the potential for reduction in group functioning, but are 
more concerned with questions of equal access for the target who has less experience 
with the activity in question. Specifically, and assuming that children are making the 
distinction between the target’s qualifications and the target’s group membership (i.e., 
gender or race), 4 and 5 year olds seem to be increasingly interested in giving the 
unqualified target an opportunity to play, whereas older children seem to be more 
interested in making groups function efficiently. This interpretation is reflected in the 
differential justifications for the choice of whom to include across ages. Specifically, the 
younger children’s justifications reflect greater use of moral justifications for their choice 
in the unequal qualifications condition, whereas older children’s responses reflect greater 
use of social conventional justifications for their choice in the unequal qualifications 
condition.  
I propose that this age related finding will hold across many exclusion scenarios, 
but will interact with the level of harm caused to the target as a result of exclusion (i.e., 
excluding a physically disabled child) as well as the level of need for efficient group 
functioning (i.e., excluding an uncoordinated child from a group competing for a prize in 
which coordination is required to win).  
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One concern about the above findings is that costs to group functioning are yet 
again left implicit, and when this is the case, the moral justifications for inclusion of the 
target could be multiply determined. Specifically, these justifications to include could 
either reflect: 1) a lack of awareness of the potential costs to the group, 2) a lack of 
concern about the potential costs to the group in light of the harm that will result from 
exclusion of the target, or 3) the lack of an ability to integrate both costs to the group and 
target when making a decision. The latter explanation derives from the above mentioned 
research by Shaw and Wainryb (2006) in which the shift in the prediction of the target’s 
emotion between ages five and seven was interpreted to be a result of an increasing 
capacity to integrate distinct pieces of information. In contrast to the interpretive 
difficulties given moral justifications, it is reasonable to assume that those that are citing 
group functioning reasons for exclusion are those same participants who are thinking 
about group costs of including the less experienced individual. 
Based on the lack of ability to directly compare across straightforward and 
complex exclusion scenarios in the above three studies, it remains unclear whether older 
children will make similar use of, and younger children will make any use of different 
pieces of information in straightforward exclusion scenarios. To be clear, the basic 
concern is that we do not know to what extent the results are tied to the fact that this was 
a manipulation done in a complex exclusion scenario as opposed to a straightforward 
scenario. It might be that manipulating the qualifications in a straightforward scenario 
would not affect exclusion judgments because the harm to the target remains more salient 
than how capable the target is in the activity in question. In the case where someone is 
assured to be harmed, the children might favor perceived increases in-group functioning 
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by including the more qualified target over perceived decrements in group functioning by 
including the less qualified target. It would be prudent for future studies to assess 
participants’ judgments in different contexts and with different descriptions of the 
target(s) both within a straightforward exclusion scenario, as well as a complex exclusion 
scenario. For instance, and as proposed as a part of this proposal, one could have 
participants evaluate exclusion of targets who are bad and good at soccer in competitive 
and noncompetitive contexts, respectively. If there exists a developmental shift in the 
propensity to consider group functioning, then it would be expected that those who 
consider group functioning would accept exclusion of a bad soccer player only in the 
competitive context, while those who do not consider group functioning will show no 
difference in their acceptability judgments across the contexts.    
What about cases in which a target is described by her propensity to behave a 
certain way? A recent study by Park and Killen (under review) sought to compare the 
acceptability of different pieces of information. Specifically, they varied the pieces of 
information about a target, such that one context described the exclusion of an aggressive 
target, another a shy target, the third a female or male target (depending on the gender of 
the participant), and the fourth a Korean or American target (depending on the nationality 
of the participant). In addition to varying the information provided about the target in 
each of four conditions, they also varied the type of exclusion, including a friendship 
rejection, group exclusion, and victimization situation. Results revealed that participants 
viewed victimization as least acceptable, with friendship exclusion as most acceptable, 
and exclusion from groups as more acceptable than victimization, and less acceptable 
than friendship rejection. It may be of no surprise that excluding based on aggression was 
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seen as more acceptable than excluding based on shyness, as aggression is salient from a 
moral perspective, such that the excluders may consider the cost to the self through the 
concern that they will be aggressed upon, whereas excluding a shy target may only 
involve a personal choice plea in that the individual does not want to be around a shy 
person.  
From an inference perspective, it may be that excluding based on a target’s 
behavior is more acceptable than excluding based on group membership characteristics 
because information about one’s behavior helps an excluder to figure out what a target 
will do in the future. If that is the case, then information about a target’s behavior can 
help one to infer whether including the target will come with threats to smooth group 
functioning. 
Similar to information about one’s behavioral propensities, information about 
one’s reputation seems to be relevant to exclusion decisions. Horn (2003), for instance, 
assessed the acceptability of excluding a target that was labeled as a dirty (i.e., someone 
who wears old/dirty clothing, is uninvolved in school, and participates in delinquent 
activities) from the student council because of his membership in the ‘dirty’ crowd. In 
addition to providing the target’s crowd membership, Horn manipulated the target’s 
involvement in school activities as well as his reputation with his teachers and peers. The 
question addressed was whether information about one’s crowd membership alone (the 
ambiguous condition) would be used differently than information about one’s reputation 
and past behaviors, either positive or negative (unambiguous conditions). Results 
revealed that participants were more willing to accept exclusion of the target from the 
student council given negative manipulations (the target is not active in school, and is 
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negatively perceived by teachers) than either positive manipulations (the target is active 
in school, and positively perceived by teachers) or no information beyond group 
membership (the target belongs to the ‘dirty’ crowd).  
Summary 
 It has been shown that exclusion decisions involve moral, conventional and 
personal domain considerations, all or none of which may be utilized in the process of 
making a judgment about the acceptability of exclusion. Varying information about the 
target results in different acceptability judgments, with exclusion based on race seen as 
most unacceptable, exclusion based on gender and shyness as next most unacceptable, 
and exclusion based on aggression as most acceptable (Park & Killen, 2010). Horn 
(2003) showed in a similar vein that the valence of individuating information about a 
target relates to the acceptability of exclusion, such that it is seen as less acceptable to 
exclude a target who associates with the “dirties”, but who is perceived positively within 
the school than it is to exclude a dirty who is perceived negatively by the school.   
The context in which exclusion is manifest also makes a difference. Specifically, 
varying the intimacy of the exclusion scenario (i.e., a personal domain consideration) 
affects the acceptability of exclusion, with exclusion from a romantic partnership seen as 
most acceptable, exclusion from friendship as next most acceptable, and exclusion from 
an opportunity not having to do with friendship as least acceptable (Killen, Stangor, 
Price, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004).  
Judgments are supported by domain justifications. Specifically, if exclusion is 
deemed to be unacceptable, it is largely a result of a concern for the harm to the target 
(e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001). If on the other hand exclusion is deemed to be acceptable, 
  65      
it is largely a result of a concern with the maintenance of one’s ability to choose with 
whom he or she associates (e.g., Killen, et al. 2004), or of a concern with group 
functioning (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001).  
Future Directions 
 Group Functioning Concerns and Exclusion Judgments. Of particular interest 
to exclusion scenarios is the notion of concerns for group functioning. What exactly is it 
that makes a group function, or alternatively, how is it that individuals perceive group 
functioning? One suggestion, and the focus of this proposal, is that it depends on the 
nature of the group’s goals.  
Take, for example, two exclusion scenarios that only vary by the group’s goals. In one 
context, the group wants to play soccer to win prizes in competitions, while in another 
context the group wants to play soccer for fun on the weekend. If adolescents understand 
how target characteristics can affect the likelihood that a group’s goals will be met, then a 
target that lacks ability in soccer may be perceived differently across these contexts. 
More specifically, ability information may be more salient to a group in which the desire 
is to win than it is to a group who wants to have fun while playing. To the extent that 
adolescents accept exclusion of a bad soccer player in the competitive context and reject 
exclusion of that same player in the noncompetitive context, there exists evidence as to 
the relative weight group functioning considerations are given in exclusion situations in 
adolescence. Knowing whether and when individuals consider group goals in light of 
target characteristics in exclusion decisions may help to further our understanding of peer 
interaction, and can provide yet another means with which to integrate research on theory 
  66      
of mind (e.g., understanding of others’ desires, including the understanding of a group’s 
goals) into research in moral judgment. 
How exactly might individuals think about ability information in the above 
example? From a group functioning perspective, ability information about a target may 
provide information through which participants evaluate the likelihood that the target’s 
inclusion will result in reductions in the potential to achieve the group’s goals (to win or 
to have fun, respectively). Including a target that is not good at soccer will likely reduce 
the chance that the group will achieve their desire of winning matches. In contrast, while 
including this same target in the noncompetitive context may bring with it the same 
concern about the likelihood that they could win competitive matches, winning may not 
be the standard against which they judge whether or not they achieved their goals (to 
have fun). In short, one’s ability in the domain and one’s ability to contribute to the 
enjoyment of the interaction may not coincide. Adolescents’ justifications for their 
exclusion judgments are expected to reveal this orientation to information about a target.  
What then would be salient in noncompetitive contexts if not ability information? 
Information about one’s behavior might be salient in contexts in which the desire is to 
have fun. Someone who is aggressive or shy, for instance, may be evaluated differently 
than someone who is easy-going. Identifying whether these relations exist between 
information about a target and the group context of exclusion will allow both basic and 
applied researchers to further contextualize the complexity of exclusion scenarios.    
 Salient Information from a Group Functioning perspective. The fact that 
information about a target’s reputation, (Horn, 2003) behavior, (Park & Killen, 2010; 
Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003) ability, (Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 
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2003) and gender (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001) is related to the acceptability of 
exclusion is provocative. Specifically, these disparate pieces of information about a target 
may provide a window through which participants can evaluate the likelihood that the 
target’s inclusion will result in a reduced chance of fulfilling the group’s goals.   
Some information about a target might be more readily identified as salient when judging 
whether a target is likely to negatively affect the group’s goals. Analogous to ability 
information, information about one’s reputation and past behavior (e.g., Horn, 2003) 
could be used to judge the likelihood that the target will negatively affect the group’s 
goals in future engagements. Park & Killen (2010) have shown, for example, that 
participants accept the exclusion of an aggressive peer more readily than they accept 
exclusion based on a target’s nationality or gender. When asked to justify their judgments 
about excluding an aggressive peer, participants mentioned concerns about the 
maintenance of the group’s goals (e.g., “This is okay because the group might not want 
someone to disrupt their peace.” p.15).  
 As mentioned above, personal choice and group functioning considerations are 
salient in exclusion decisions. If the group desires the maintenance of peace, and 
inclusion of the target might result in the group desire not being fulfilled, then exclusion 
is seen as acceptable. Essentially, exclusion judgments seem to simultaneously consider 
the extent to which the group may need to adjust its goals upon inclusion of the target, 
and the extent to which the target should be asked, or could be convinced to adjust herself 
to fit with the group’s goals. The more the balance shifts toward the group making 
concessions for the target, the more the exclusion is seen as acceptable.  
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 From a moral perspective, the idea of balancing concessions between group 
members and target is a simple and yet powerful means with which to judge fairness in a 
social setting. If, for instance, a group of 10 is playing happily together and a target that 
desires group entry insists that the group change the game to suit her needs, fairness, per 
force of the lack of equitability in the number required to make concessions on either 
side, would often suggest the exclusion of the target. To think otherwise would privilege 
the target’s desires over the 10 other group member’s desires. In fact, Leslie, Mallon, and 
DiCorcia (2006) have presented evidence that four year olds are not willing to privilege 
one child’s desires over another’s.  
 In the context of this proposal, this logic links to the expectation that it will be 
viewed as acceptable to exclude a bad soccer player from a competitive soccer club, or an 
aggressive soccer player from a noncompetitive soccer club, because the group’s desires 
hold more weight than does the target’s, simply as a result of the greater number of 
individuals that would be required to make concessions upon inclusion. One way to test 
the extent to which this logic holds would be to vary the number of people that would 
have to make concessions around a group goal (i.e., would it be perceived as different if 
10 people get excluded so that 10 people could put themselves in a position to fulfill the 
goal of winning the competition?).    
 Stereotypes as Salient Information. If we are to believe that individuals make 
use of information about a target to assess the likelihood that the target will negatively 
affect the group’s chance at fulfilling its desires, and that this assessment will affect one’s 
acceptability ratings of exclusion, then how can we reconcile the fact that information 
about a target’s gender can affect one’s acceptability ratings (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 
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2001)? More specifically, in what way might information about a target’s gender help 
one to judge the likelihood that inclusion will result in reductions in the potential to 
achieve the group’s goals?  
As mentioned above, another future direction, and goal of the proposed study is to 
evaluate the extent to which stereotypic conceptions of groups will influence decision 
making about the acceptability of exclusion under conditions in which group goals vary. 
For instance, how does the competitive desire of the group bear on individuals’ views 
about exclusion based on group membership, such as gender and nationality?  On the one 
hand, stereotypic conceptions of ability might dominate an exclusion decision when the 
group desire is to win. When the stereotypic associations are negative, such as is often the 
case with gender (girls are not good at sports), then this could lead to more exclusive 
judgments; when the stereotypic expectations are positive, such as with nationality 
(Brazilians are good at soccer), then this could lead to more inclusive judgments. An 
alternate interpretation, derived in part from the moral and the conventional domain, is 
equally plausible however. It may be that as a result of the group desire to win, exclusion 
based on group membership may be seen as unacceptable, as group membership does not 
provide you with enough certainty about an individual’s ability with which to make an 
exclusion or inclusion decision. If someone believes that group membership information 
does not provide enough information about the individual, then it is predicted that moral 
concerns for the target will increase in salience.  
 Finally, as mentioned above, it is predicted that different group goals will result in 
different stereotypes being made salient, such that the noncompetitive context will invite 
stereotypes about likeability or behavioral propensities, whereas the competitive context 
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will invite stereotypes about ability. In the competitive context, after being told about the 
target’s gender, nationality, aggressiveness, or shyness, respectively, it is predicted that 
information about the target’s ability will overwhelm any stereotypic notions about that 
target’s ability previously considered. In contrast, information about a target’s ability in 
the noncompetitive context is not expected to overwhelm any stereotypic notions about 
likeability or behavioral propensities based on the initial descriptions of the target, as 
ability information is not predicted to be salient in noncompetitive contexts.  
 Extensive research has shown that stereotypes serve to organize the social world 
for some individuals (Levy & Dweck, 1999; Bigler & Liben, 1993). Staying with the 
above-mentioned example, if an individual believes that girls are not good at sports, and 
that a girl desires entry into a competitive soccer club, then it would not be surprising to 
see that person accept gender-based exclusion. In fact, research has shown that 
stereotypic expectations about others are used to justify exclusion. Theimer, Killen, and 
Stangor (2001) showed that, when asked to consider whether it was acceptable to exclude 
a boy from a group of girls who were playing with dolls, or a girl from a group of boys 
who were playing with trucks, nearly half of the participants referenced a stereotype in 
their justification for their judgment. These issues are central both to future directions and 
to the present project. 
 Group Goals. It is a simple, and important extension to manipulate not only what 
is described about a target, but also the group’s goals, as these goals can come in many 
forms (e.g., to enjoy time together, to win a competition, to make money). I argue that not 
only is information about a target important when evaluating exclusion, but that 
information about a group is equally important in one’s evaluations. Specifically, I 
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propose that information about the target will be evaluated as relevant or irrelevant to an 
exclusion decision depending on one’s knowledge of the group’s goals.  
This has many interesting implications, which are ostensibly applied in day-to-
day life (e.g., a child’s ability to play the piano will be seen as irrelevant when that child 
is being evaluated for inclusion in a competitive chess club, but will be seen as relevant 
when being evaluated for membership in a band). In less benign exclusion situations, 
information that may often be seen as irrelevant when deciding on whether to include 
(e.g., gender or skin color) may become relevant depending on the group’s goals. Take 
for example the oppression of women throughout history, the criteria for oppression 
being gender. In these cases, the goal of oppression is highly salient and consequently, so 
too is gender as a relevant category of information. It should be noted however that the 
relevance of gender in this situation might be of a different quality than the relevance of 
gender in a case where oppression based on gender is not the group’s goal. Specifically, 
because one’s group membership is often uninformative of many individual qualities, 
such as interests, abilities, personality and behavior, (e.g., both females and males can be 
good at sports, interested in clothing, intelligent, aggressive) this information will be, by 
nature of the variability within the category of interest, less informative than direct 
information about those individual qualities. Take for example the situation in which a 
group of chess players knows that the target is very tall and is not very good at chess. The 
hypothesis is that the latter piece of information will be more readily utilized to both infer 
the extent to which inclusion of the target will affect group functioning, and derivatively, 
to evaluate the acceptability of exclusion. This is a testable hypothesis, and would allow 
for more firm conclusions about what it is that relates to the acceptability of exclusion.  
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As for attempting to answer why it is that different pieces of information are used 
differently given variations in exclusion scenarios, one could profit from an analysis of 
how the individual perceives the situation in total. This might take the form of asking 
participants to predict the group’s exclusion decision, the group’s level of prejudice 
toward the target, the target’s effect on the group’s functioning, and expectations about 
the target’s future behavior. As an example, one could ask participants to infer why it is 
that a group excluded a target who was ostensibly consistent with group goals in terms of 
relevant traits (e.g., a chess group, made up of males, excludes a highly capable, very 
nice woman target from their group). The ostensible reason for exclusion is that she was 
not a male. The extent to which a participant evaluates this situation as unacceptable 
could be a measure of the extent to which they define moral relevance in terms of the use 
of relevant information to make an exclusion decision.  
Developmentally, and based on prior research, it may be that younger children 
have difficulty reconciling the different domain concerns when coming to a conclusion 
about whether exclusion is acceptable or not. In this case, moral concerns might remain 
the most salient, and thus the reason for the fewer instances of children viewing exclusion 
as acceptable.  
 Emotional Distress. Beyond, and integrally linked to questions about behavioral 
prediction and perception of costs to the group (i.e., recognition of group functioning 
concerns), there exists an interesting question about the role that emotional distress plays 
in one’s judgments about exclusion more generally (see Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 
2006). It is argued that moral justifications for inclusion are associated with recognition 
of the harm that would be done to the target upon exclusion, but as Leslie et al. noted, 
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harm (as assessed through emotional distress cues) does not necessarily imply 
victimization. At the age of 4, children demonstrate an ability to differentiate victims 
(e.g., those who cry as a result of getting their hair pulled without cause) from cry babies 
(those who cry as a result of not being able to eat both their own and another peer’s 
cookie) (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). Might this result extend to the exclusion 
scenario, and methodologically, is there a way to equate an exclusion situation to 
something like the cry baby scenario? I argue that there exists such a possibility; namely, 
that by increasing the costs to the group, the definition of victim becomes blurred 
between the target and the group. Specifically, one can think of a case in which an 
aggressive target cries as a result of being excluded, with the exclusion being motivated 
by a desire to avoid harm at the hands of the target. Similar to the above logic about 
behavioral prediction, emotional reactions to exclusion might be similarly contextually 
important depending on the target’s identified characteristics.  
In the above-mentioned studies (e.g., Park & Killen, under review), it is argued 
that the threat to group functioning was not increased enough to give us the ability to 
develop a cry baby exclusion scenario. By systematically increasing the threat to the 
group by giving participants information about the aggressiveness of the target in one 
condition, Park and Killen (under review) might have given participants greater impetus 
to view the aggressive target as posing a greater threat to the group than a comparative 
target that was described only by her group membership. What if the aggressive target 
cries after being excluded? Does that aggressive child have a claim to victim status, given 
that the aggressiveness might infringe on the right of the group members to avoid harm? 
The suggestion laid out in this review, and purposefully similar in form to Leslie’s logic 
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in the cry baby case is that distress will be contextually relevant depending on the reason 
for exclusion. Specifically, in cases in which the group is at risk for harm as a result of 
inclusion of the target, (e.g., inclusion of an aggressive target) the target’s distress will 
not be taken into consideration when evaluating the exclusion decision. In contrast, when 
the group is under no threat of harm as a result of the target’s inclusion, (e.g., inclusion of 
a shy target) the target’s distress will be taken into consideration. Essentially, the 
argument is that exclusion of certain targets is often seen as reasonable from a group 
functioning perspective. In this proposal, the assessment of exclusion judgments over 
multiple contexts will help to identify the characteristics that are salient across both 
competitive and noncompetitive contexts, and those characteristics that are salient only in 
one context.  
Linking the hypotheses about emotional distress to the hypotheses about the effect 
of the relevance of information, it is argued that emotional distress/harm to the target will 
be more relevant when exclusion is based on group membership traits, as that piece of 
information is argued to be less relevant than other pieces of information such as 
character traits or ability. Finally, the assumption is that 1) the relevance of the 
information, 2) the emotional distress of the target, and 3) the rights of the group 
members will be meaningfully integrated toward the end of evaluating the exclusion 
decision starting at around the age of six. As mentioned in the above review, the ability to 
integrate disparate pieces of information seems to emerge at around the age of six (Shaw 
& Wainryb, 2006). At this age, children may have the information processing capacity to 
maintain in mind different considerations toward the end of integrating perspectives into 
a coherent judgment (Magimairaj, Montgomery, Marinellie, & McCarthy, 2009).  
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In terms of evaluating exclusion, the prediction from a relevant information 
account is that when the target is in some way irreconcilable/mismatched with group 
goals (e.g., a bad chess player wants to join a championship chess club, an aggressive 
child wants to join a group that does not want to be aggressive), then exclusion will be 
evaluated positively. Alternatively, when a target is matched to group goals (e.g., a great 
chess player wants to join a championship chess club, a nonaggressive child wants to join 
a group that does not want to be aggressive), then exclusion will be evaluated negatively, 
and as mentioned, it may be inferred that the group has a prejudice against the target in 
cases in which the group desires exclusion of a target who seems consistent with group 
goals. Finally, one can have a case in which the information is irrelevant, and, as in the 
case of matched characteristics to goals, participants are hypothesized to be less 
accepting of exclusion, as there is no relevant information for them to go on in the 
scenario. The goal for future research then is to more systematically connect participants’ 
inferential processes given information about a target to evaluations of exclusion. 
Given the above mentioned approach to more fully connect the process of 
inference in exclusion situations to one’s evaluations of exclusion, it may be possible to 
more fully define the nature of the age related shift seen in the above three studies in how 
participants use information to evaluate exclusion at around the age of six. As stated 
above, it might be that, 1) children around this age reject the concern for the group’s 
functioning in light of concerns for the harm to the target, or 2) before the age of seven 
children can take information about targets and exclusion contexts into account, but they 
lack the ability to integrate the information about the target, the potential harm to the 
target, and the concerns for group functioning (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, 
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& Lau, 1996). Indeed, even 18 month olds can correctly assess another’s desires 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and 4 year olds have been shown to take the perspective of 
their play partner (Putallaz & Gottman, 1981; Rose-Krasnor, Rubin, Booth, & Coplan, 
1996). It therefore should not be assumed that this six-year shift is a result of an increase 
in the ability to take the perspective of others, as this ability is evident much earlier than 
age six.  
In order to isolate the ability to assess decrements in group functioning, one could 
ask participants whether a certain target will increase, decrease, or keep the same the 
functioning of the group. This independent variable could then be used to predict the 
acceptability judgments of different types of exclusion that are based on the manipulation 
of both contextual as well as target characteristics.  
Lastly, and in addition to the above mentioned points that need to be addressed, it 
will remain important, to the extent that it is possible, to separate out stereotypic activities 
from neutral activities. As a relevant example, using dolls and trucks, versus playing at 
the water table could be one easy way to hold constant the stereotypicality of the activity 
in question. This point is practically important, as using stereotypical activities prevented 
Theimer, Killen and Stangor, (2001) from developing the appropriate control condition 
for their study (a nonstereotypical child who had more experience with the 
nonstereotypical activity). The reason they did not include this condition is simply due to 
the fact that children rejected the premise that this scenario could exist. This finding 
alone suggests that stereotypes are strongly held even at the age of 4, which is generally 
known (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006). The additional benefit of having a stereotype 
neutral activity is that one can assess the use of group membership information in 
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isolation from a stereotypic activity, whereas in the above studies, the two were 
conflated. This might matter to the extent that children only use group membership 
information when the activity is somehow relevant to that information. Again, the only 
reason group membership would be relevant to the activity in question would be if 
participants held a stereotypic expectation about performance in that activity based on 
group membership. Indeed, play activities have been shown to be highly stereotyped 
along gender lines (Fein, Johnson, Kosson, Stork, & Wasserman, 1975). In this proposal, 
the decision was made to use a soccer exclusion context, as it is normative for both males 
and females to play the sport.  
Developmentally, older children are less likely to agree with statements that 
include explicit stereotypes than are younger children, and this has led to a move toward 
implicit measures to capture stereotypes (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006). Although an 
important literature, the reason for bringing up this work is not to make progress in this 
literature per se but rather to isolate variables of interest in the judgment of exclusion, 
without having to deal with any preconceived notions about aptitude given stereotypic 
activities.    
In summary then, the argument is that relevant information about a target is used 
to assess the extent to which inclusion would result in reductions in group functioning. If 
reductions in group functioning are perceived to be likely upon inclusion, then exclusion 
will be evaluated more positively than if reductions in group functioning are perceived to 
be unlikely. In order to study this, one needs to systematically vary target-group 
mismatch, as well as the nature of the mismatch so as to be able to document under what 
conditions people judge certain information to be relevant to an exclusion decision.  
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 Social Domain theory has provided the field with thoughtful critiques to many 
practically and theoretically important arguments, including arguing that moral beliefs 
are universally shared across time and place, and that it is our informational beliefs that 
create different practices or responses to identical events across time and place (Wainryb, 
1991, 1993); that moral education might profit from a more bottom-up approach, 
specifically that children should be taught to attend to important features of other’s 
beliefs rather than being taught the right way to think (Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, 
& Lewis, 2004); and that the acceptability of lying is contextually bound (Perkins & 
Turiel, 2007; Shaw, & Wainryb, 2006). It is hoped that this review provides some insight 
into the nature of moral judgments and potential ways in which research on social 
exclusion, and maybe the field of moral psychology more generally can be linked 
together with other fields.   
 





 Participants were 122 7th (M = 12.6 years, SD = .69, 70 Female) and 79 11th (M = 
16.5 years, SD = .57, 52 Female) grade students, for a total sample size of 201 
participants (see table 9). The sample size was chosen based on results from multiple 
power analyses (Cohen, 1992; Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003) using relevant data in the 
literature (Horn, 2003; McGlothlin & Killen, 2006; Park & Killen, 2010).  
 The decision was made to study these age ranges based on the salience of 
exclusion for adolescents in middle and high school (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). 
Beyond the salience of exclusion, with age, adolescents make less use of information 
about group membership (Horn, 2003), and give increasingly greater consideration to 
group functioning (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007). 
 The ethnic breakdown of the sample was as follows: 36% African-American, 33% 
European-American, 11% Hispanic-American, and 11% mixed ethnicity, representing a 
heterogeneous sample, similar to past studies utilizing similar methods (e.g., Crystal, 
Killen, & Ruck, 2008). It was hypothesized that those participants in the numeric 
minority, (i.e., groups other than European-American), would be less accepting of 
exclusion based on nationality than will those participants in the numeric majority. No 
differences were expected however in judgments given information about a target’s 
personality traits (aggression, shyness) or physical characteristics (ability, hair length). 
All participants were from low-middle, to middle income backgrounds.   
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Design 
The study involves between-subjects and within-subjects factors for an overall 
design that includes a 2 (gender: Female, Male) X 2 (age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (ethnicity:  
majority, minority) X 2 (group goal: competitive, noncompetitive) X 6 (target 
characteristic: shyness, gender, aggression, nationality, ability, hair length) model with 
repeated measures on the last factor. 
As shown in Figure 1, the group goal is a between-subjects variable; participants 
evaluated either a competitive or a non-competitive group goal. The target characteristics 
factor is a within-subjects variable: all participants evaluated each of 6 target 
characteristics as a basis for exclusion. Specifically, this survey employed a within (target 
characteristic: aggressive, shy, gender, nationality, ability, hair length) and between-
subjects design (group goal: competitive, noncompetitive) (see tables 2 and 3). 
Measures 
 Group Goal. There were two different group goals to be evaluated in this survey: 
competitive and noncompetitive. Each participant evaluated one of these two goals. In 
both goals, it was a soccer club that was presented as the group context (description of 
the competitive context: “A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. They 
had been playing with a noncompetitive soccer club, but they want to create their own 
club so they can enter different tournaments to try to win trophies and prizes”). 
 Dependent Measures. As mentioned above, participants were first asked to 
consider the acceptability of exclusion within either a competitive or noncompetitive 
group goals based on one of the following descriptions of a target: aggression, shyness, 
female, Brazilian, long hair, and not good at soccer. After this, participants were asked to 
reconsider their judgment given additional information about the target’s ability or lack 
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thereof (see below). It should be noted that five of the six characteristics do not include 
ability information, and thus the manipulation of information about ability proceeds 
logically. This is not the case, however when the target is described as bad at soccer, and 
therefore the follow-up adjustments are not assessed for this characteristic due to the 
incoherence of such a manipulation.   
 Judgment, and Justifications. Specifying group members desires for exclusion 
was chosen as the means by which participants would be presented with an opportunity to 
judge the acceptability of excluding different targets: 1) Acceptability of exclusion 
judgment – Characteristic (e.g., “People who are from Brazil cannot be members” (1 = 
Very not okay, 6 – Very okay); “Why (is this okay or not okay)?”); 2) Acceptability of 
exclusion judgment – Ability + Characteristic (e.g., “Do you think it would be okay or 
not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than 
most of the current members?”); and, 3) Acceptability of exclusion judgment – No 
Ability + Characteristic  (e.g., “Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to 
exclude a person from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current 
members?”). 
The three Judgment questions were evaluated on a 6-point Likert scale, from 1 = 
very not okay, to 6 = very okay, while the associated open-ended Justification questions 
allowed the participant to write-in a justification for their judgment. Justifications were 
coded (for coding rules, see table 3).  
As mentioned in the introduction, having participants evaluate target 
characteristics was meant to provide an anchor for exclusion judgments on a trait that was 
likely to have no association to group goals (length of hair) and a trait that could not be 
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more closely linked to group goals (information about how skilled the target is at soccer). 
With these anchors, it was believed that interpretation of the other four characteristics 
(i.e., aggression, shyness, gender, nationality) would be enhanced. 
 
 Independent Measures Hypercompetitiveness Attitude Scale. Participants 
were asked to answer questions about their orientation to competition (e.g., “I find myself 
turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest or conflict.”).  A 5-point Likert 
scale, from 1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree, was filled out for 25 of the 
original 26 items specified in the original formulation of the scale (Ryckman, Hammer, 
Kaczur, & Gold, 1990). This instrument was modified to remove any negatively worded 
items to reduce the processing capacity required to answer the questions, and one item 
that referred to driving was removed as it was not relevant for a middle school sample. In 
order to assess whether shortening the length of the scale from 25 to 10 items was 
feasible, 28 college student participants were recruited to complete the scale. Items were 
selected from the initial pool for the reduced scale by assessing the strength of the 
correlation of each item to the total score, which was calculated as the sum of responses 
to all items. The 10 items with the highest item-total correlations were retained (range of 
item-total correlations for items retained: r = .53 - .86). Cronbach’s alpha for the full 
scale was .86. Recalculating alpha with the reduced scale revealed no reduction in alpha 
(.90).  
 The Hypercompetitiveness Attitude Scale (HCA) (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & 
Gold, 1990) was selected for this study as a psychometrically reliable instrument 
designed to measure how competitive one is in daily life. This scale was administered to 
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all participants (see Appendix A). This measure of individual difference in propensity to 
see the world in competitive terms was chosen to assess whether any differences in 
hypercompetitiveness would relate to the acceptability of exclusion. Specifically, those 
who were deemed more hypercompetitive may be more likely to accept exclusion based 
on ability in the noncompetitive context than those who were deemed less 
hypercompetitive.  
 As mentioned above, the HCA scale has demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) and test-retest reliability (r = .81). 
Validity evidence has been argued through correlation analyses between the HCA and the 
Win-at-any-Cost Sports Competition Scale (r = .24), competitive-cooperative attitude 
scale (r = .48), as well as a negative correlation (r = -.34) between HCA and a Self-
Esteem Scale, and finally through a positive correlation (r = .48) between HCA and a 
scale of Neuroticism. 
 The choice to utilize the HCA as opposed to the win-at-any-cost scale was made 
because of the moral neutrality in item writing for the HCA. Where the win-at-any-cost 
scale had participants assess items such as the following: “Player A during a golf match 
made noises and movements when player B was getting ready to make a shot”, the HCA 
assessed participants on items that did not have the “sportsmanship” component 
embedded in the question (i.e., “I compete with others whether they are competing with 
me or not.”). The win-at-any-cost scale items ask participants to indicate whether they 
approve or disapprove of doing something that is a violation of good sportsmanship. Said 
another way, this win-at-any-cost scale was thought to conflate hypercompetitiveness 
with moral concerns for good sportsmanship.  
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 As mentioned above, following Ryckman and colleagues’ (1997) procedures for 
scoring this instrument, responses to each item were scored from 1 to 5, and total scores 
were calculated as the summation of the scores on each individual item. While evidence 
for validity has been reported, no factor analyses have yet been undertaken to assess the 
validity of the 1-factor model specified in the authors’ theoretical formulations. Because 
a sufficiently large sample size was not utilized for the pilot study to be able to conduct 
and produce stable results in a factor analysis, (Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003) total 
scores were utilized at this piloting stage. For the study sample however, factor analysis 
was run on the 10 items that were retained.  
 Experience with exclusion. Participants were asked to answer questions about: 
1) their experience with being excluded (e.g., “I have been excluded from competitive 
athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball)”; questions 33-36 in Appendix C); 2) 
their experience with excluding others (e.g., “I have excluded someone from an activity 
before”; question 37 in Appendix C); and, 3) their involvement in groups (e.g., “I have 
been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball)”; questions 
39-41 in Appendix C). As above, a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Never, to 5 = 
Always was filled out for all items. Because the experience with exclusion items were 
expected to load on the same factor (perceptions of exclusion experience), as with the 
HCA scale, a total score was derived and reliability (alpha) and validity (Factor Analysis) 
of the scale items were assessed. If appropriate in light of reliability and validity analyses, 
the total score will be used as a predictor of acceptability judgments in regression 
analyses.   
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 Stereotype Affirmation Measure. Participants were asked to answer questions 
about their perception of the extent to which different groups are competitive and good at 
soccer (e.g., “When it comes to soccer, how good are Brazilians?”). A 6-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 1 = Not at all, to 6 = Very was filled out for all 12 items. Like with 
the experience with exclusion items, these items were not expected to load together, and 
were utilized in isolated regression equations as relevant (i.e., items about affirmation of 
gender stereotypes will be used as predictors of acceptability of exclusion judgments 
given a female target). In order to guard against model misspecification, participant 
gender and ethnicity were included in the model as predictors along with the propensity 
to stereotype when the stereotype referenced either gender or ethnicity-based stereotypes. 
 Belief in Change. Participants were asked to answer two questions about their 
perception of the extent to which individuals can change their personality (e.g., “No 
matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change their personality”) 
(Levy & Dweck, 1999). A 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Very strongly disagree, 
to 6 = Very strongly agree was filled out for both items. Because the items were expected 
to load on one factor, the scores on each item will be summed to create a total score over 
the two items. This total score will be used as a predictor of exclusion judgments.  
Procedure 
 The IRB granted a waiver of parental consent. After receiving school district 
approval and contacting principals, visits to schools were made for the administration. 
Only adolescents who gave assent were surveyed (for flyer and assent form, see 
Appendices B & C, respectively). 
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 At the school visit, the study was described, the assent form was distributed and 
the voluntary, confidential and anonymous nature of the survey was described during 
allotted class time for group administration, and the survey was distributed to all who 
provided assent. Adolescents who chose not to participate were given the choice of 
working on their own work, or were provided with a short research article to read.  
Adolescents were told that they could raise their hands and ask questions at any 
time during the session. In addition, adolescents were told that there were no right or 
wrong answers, and failure to complete the survey would in no way affect their school 
grades. They were instructed to fill out the survey as completely as possible. The survey 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
Each participant was asked to provide basic demographic information (age, 
gender, school, and ethnicity). Next, participants were presented with the social reasoning 
about exclusion survey as well as the Independent variables mentioned above. 
Justification Coding Responses 
 Justification responses were coded using a coding category system based on 
previous research used to analyze social reasoning (Killen et al., 2001; Smetana, 1995) 
and on the results of the pilot data reported below. The categories that were used to code 
the justifications were: 1) Moral (e.g., “The team is jumping to conclusion that he 
wouldn’t be an asset to the team without even getting to know him”); 2) Social 
Conventional – Group Functioning (e.g., “If Joe is bad [at soccer], he should not play on 
a competitive team, regardless of where he’s from”); 3) Social Conventional – Group 
Functioning with Stereotype use (e.g., “If they are shy, they will not run after the 
ball/stand around”); 4) Social Conventional – Conventions/Traditions (e.g., “My parents 
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say that it is not alright to exclude a child”); 5) Psychological – Personal Choice (e.g., “If 
they don’t want the kid to join, it’s okay. It’s their club”); 6) Psychological – Personal 
Development (e.g., “Maybe being active in soccer will take his anger away”); 7) 
Prudential (e.g., “His hair could get pulled and he could get hurt”) and, 8) 
Undifferentiated (unreadable, incomplete). (See Table 3).  
Reliability 
 Reliability of the coding system was calculated using two coders who 
independently code 20% of the surveys. Inter-rater reliability was determined by the 
percent agreement between the coders as well as the more conservative Cohen’s kappa 
statistic, which adjusts for chance agreement. 
Plan for Analysis 
Hypotheses were tested using ANOVA and Regression. Any required follow-up 
tests for significant findings in ANOVA were conducted using the Bonferroni correction 
to control for accumulation of Type 1 error given multiple follow-up tests. The main 
hypotheses and analyses run to test each hypothesis is listed in table 4. 
Participant Variables 
Gender, numeric minority status, and age of participant were included in all 
analyses. Any relations found between gender of participant and acceptability judgments 
were expected to be explained by gender differences in levels of hypercompetitiveness. 
Numeric ethnic minority status was expected to be related to the propensity to reject 
exclusion based on ethnicity. Age of participant was expected to relate to the 
acceptability of exclusion, as studies have suggested that younger adolescents are more 
accepting of exclusion given ambiguous situations (Horn, 2003). The primary goal 
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however was to assess the extent to which differences in context affected the 
acceptability of exclusion based on different target characteristics.  
Exclusion Scenario 
Hypotheses concerning the six questions about the acceptability of exclusion in 
each exclusion scenario respectively were assessed with 2 (Gender: Female, Male) X 2 
(Age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Ethnicity: Minority, Majority) X 6 (Target characteristics: Shy, 
Gender, Nationality, Aggression, Hair Length, Ability) ANOVAs. This served to provide 
a between subjects comparison for participants’ ratings of the acceptability of excluding 
based on a target’s characteristics.   
It was expected, and has been shown in past studies (Park & Killen, 2010), that 
excluding based on aggression would be seen as most acceptable. Justifications were 
expected to differ according to the characteristic described in much the same way that 
acceptability judgments would. Specifically, it was expected that moral concerns for the 
target would be less salient (i.e., less often cited as justification) when the target was 
described as aggressive than when the target was described by group membership (gender 
or nationality) or as shy.  
It was further predicted that gender and nationality of target would be inversely 
related to acceptability judgments in the competitive context to the extent that the 
participant stereotypes females as worse at soccer than males, and Brazilians as better at 
soccer than Americans. To assess this, as well as other links to participant variables, 
regressions were conducted testing relations between the independent variables and 
acceptability judgments and justifications. Regressions were conducted on acceptability 
judgments with hypercompetitiveness, experience with exclusion, stereotypic 
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conceptions of groups, and perceptions of the changeability of traits as the predictors. As 
another example, it was expected that those who self-identify as hypercompetitive would 
be more accepting of exclusion based on ability and less concerned about the harm to the 
target as a result of exclusion.   
2 (gender: Female, Male) X 2 (age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Ethnicity: Minority, Majority) 
X 2 (Group Goal: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristics: Shyness, 
Gender, Aggression, Nationality, Hair Length, Ability) repeated measures ANOVAs with 
repeated measures on the last factor were conducted to assess the effect of context on the 
acceptability of different exclusion scenarios. It was expected that exclusion based on 
aggression would be seen as more acceptable in the noncompetitive context than in the 
competitive context.  
When adding information about a target’s ability, it was expected that exclusion 
judgments would depend on whether the target was described as good or bad at soccer. 
Further this information was predicted to make a greater impact on judgments in the 
competitive than in the noncompetitive context.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Result 
Plan for Analysis 
 Hypotheses were tested using repeated measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA)1 (1 = footnote: ‘see Wainryb, et al, 2004, or Wainryb, et al, 2001 for logic of 
this analysis for dichotomous justification data’) and multiple linear regression analysis. 
When appropriate, follow-up tests on the ANOVAs were conducted using univariate 
ANOVAs for the within-subject factors and all follow-up paired samples t-tests were 
corrected for type-I error inflation using the Bonferroni correction. To control for 
violations of sphericity in the repeated measures ANOVAs, the Huynh-Feldt correction 
was utilized. The primary participant variables of interest for this study include the 
independent variables of gender, age, and ethnicity, and the predictor variables of hyper-
competitiveness, belief in the changeability of traits, propensity to stereotype, and 
experience with exclusion. The primary design variables of interest include the soccer 
context (between subjects: competitive, noncompetitive) and the target characteristics 
(within subjects: shy, aggressive, gender, nationality, soccer ability, and hair length). The 
primary dependent variables include participant judgment about the acceptability of 
exclusion (“How acceptable is it to exclude [girls]?”), and their justification for their 
judgments (“Why?”).  
Data Entry, Cleaning, and Examination of Outliers 
 The data for this study were double entered to ensure accuracy. Examination of 
outliers and deletion of incomplete cases proceeded as follows. First, for examination of 
outliers, participants whose responses fell 3 standard deviations above or below the mean 
on any survey question were noted and patterns of extreme responding were tracked. 
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Given the size of the standard deviation terms, only one participant was flagged twice, 
and it was decided that this participant would be retained in the data file given the 
infrequency with which the responses were extreme. Secondly, missing data was 
analyzed, and it was found that one participant had failed to complete the second half of 
the survey. This participant was deleted from the data file. 93% of participants responded 
to all questions, with the rest missing responses to one or two questions. Analysis of 
questions revealed that the personality change items that referred to shy and aggressive 
traits were overrepresented in terms of missing data. After looking at the surveys, it was 
found that these questions were not included in a subset of the noncompetitive version 
surveys (7 packets were affected), and that these packets were distributed only to 11th 
grade participants. Given the nature and minimal extent of the missing data (resulting 
from experimenter error), this missing data was considered missing at random. 
Judgments of Social Exclusion 
A 2 (Sex: Male, Female) X 2 (Grade: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Nationality: Majority, 
Minority) X 2 (Context: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristic: 
Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA was 
conducted on participants’ acceptability judgments with repeated measures on the last 
factor (see Table 8 for descriptive statistics). Three- and four-way interaction effects were 
not analyzed, given the small number of participants in each group. 
Participant Variables (Demographic) 
 Participant Gender. Results revealed as predicted, that across target 
characteristics females were less accepting of exclusion than were their male counterparts 
F (1,175) = 6.67, p< .05, η2 = .04 (Female M = 2.29; SD = .60; Males M = 2.52; SD = 
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.63). Results also revealed an interaction effect between gender and target characteristics 
F (5,875) = 2.73, p< .05, η2 = .02.Follow-up analyses revealed that males were more 
accepting of exclusion based on gender F (1,175) = 15.71, p< .001, η2 = .08 (Males M = 
2.38, SD = 1.33; Females M = 1.74, SD = 1.09) and hair length F (1,175) = 4.61, p< .05, 
η2 = .03 (Males M = 1.58, SD = .87; Females M = 1.30, SD = .56) than were females.  
 Participant Age. Results revealed that across target characteristics, 11th graders 
were more accepting of exclusion than were 7th graders, F (1,175) = 5.11, p< .05, η2 = .03 
(7thM = 2.30; SD = .62; 11thM = 2.51; SD = .63). An interaction effect between 
participant age and characteristics was revealed F (5,875) = 4.16, p< .01, η2 = .02. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that participants in 11th grade were more accepting of 
gender F (1,175) = 14.34, p< .001, η2 = .08 (11thM = 2.40, SD = 1.42; 7thM = 1.72, SD = 
1.00) and ability F (1,175) = 4.72, p< .05, η2 = .03 (11thM = 3.22, SD = 1.66; 7thM = 2.96, 
SD = 1.35) based exclusion than were 7th graders.  
 Participant Ethnicity. Contrary to expectations, there were no interaction effects 
between participant ethnicity and characteristic nor were there any main effects of 
participant ethnicity across characteristics. 
 Target Characteristics. A significant main effect was found for Target 
Characteristic, F (5,875) = 257.94, p< .001, η2 = .60. Follow-up tests confirmed the 
expectation that participants would rate exclusion based on a target’s aggression as the 
most acceptable reason to exclude (M = 4.60, SD = 1.23). Lack of soccer ability was seen 
as the next most acceptable reason to exclude (M = 3.05, SD = 1.62), while nationality 
was seen as the least most acceptable reason to exclude (M = 1.23, SD = .65). Exclusion 
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based on the length of the target’s hair length (M = 1.41, SD = .79) was seen as more 
acceptable than excluding based on nationality but less acceptable than excluding based 
on shyness (M = 1.98, SD = 1.19) and gender (M = 2.16, SD = 1.27) which were not 
differentiated.  
 It is instructive to note that only aggression had a mean on the ‘acceptable’ end of 
the response scale (from 4 = okay to exclude to 6 = very okay to exclude). A descriptive 
analysis of the proportion of participants who rated exclusion as acceptable provides 
another means of analyzing the differences found in the above analysis of the role of 
target characteristic in one’s exclusion judgments. Results revealed that while 87% of 
participants rated it as acceptable to exclude an aggressive target, only 1 and 2% of 
participants rated it as acceptable to exclude a target based on his nationality or on the 
target’s hair length, respectively. In contrast, 10% of participants rated it as acceptable to 
exclude based on shyness, 15% based on gender, and 38% based on soccer ability.    
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 Target Characteristics X Group Goals (Competitive/noncompetitive). The 
expected interaction between characteristics and group goals was significant F (5,875) = 
3.69, p< .01, η2 = .02. Follow-up analyses revealed, partially disconfirming expectations, 
that exclusion based on shyness and aggression was not evaluated contextually. However, 
a distinction in exclusion judgments was made that took into account the group’s goals 
when the target was described by his lack of soccer playing prowess. Specifically, 
participants found it more acceptable to exclude a target who was no good at soccer when 
the group goal was competitive than when it was noncompetitive F (1,175) = 6.03, p< 
.05, η2 = .03(Competitive M = 3.33, SD = 1.44; Noncompetitive M = 2.76, SD = 1.48).  
All other comparisons were not statistically significantly different (see figure 1).     
 In summary, while gender- and nationality-based exclusion was evaluated 
similarly to hair length-based exclusion (i.e., evaluated negatively regardless of goal 
condition), expectations were only partially confirmed for the expected relation between 
aggression, shyness, and ability; only ability was evaluated contextually based on goal 
condition, whereas exclusion based on shyness and aggression was evaluated similarly 
across goal conditions. 
 Judgments of Social Exclusion Given Further Individuating Information. A 3 
(Individuating Ability Information: Good, Bad, Undefined) X 6 (Target Characteristic: 
Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA was 
conducted on participants’ acceptability judgments with repeated measures on both 
factors. Consistent with expectations, there was a main effect of Characteristic F (4,792) 
= 357.34, p< .001, η2 = .64; Individuating Ability Information F (2,396) = 105.51, p< 
.001, η2 = .35, and an interaction between Characteristic and Individuating Ability 
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Information F (8,1584) = 38.53, p< .001, η2 = .16. Because the main effect of target 
characteristic was previously reported, the focus in this section will be on the effect that 
individuating information has on judgments. Pairwise comparisons between the three 
different information conditions revealed that, across all characteristics, there was no 
difference between the baseline characteristics (hair length, shyness, aggression, gender, 
nationality) and when these targets were described as better at soccer than others on the 
team (M = 2.24, Std Error = .04 M = 2.23, Std Error = .05, respectively). These 
conditions revealed negative judgments of exclusion compared to when the targets were 
described as worse at soccer than all of the members (M = 3.15, Std Error = .08). The 
interaction between characteristic and individuating information revealed unexpected use 
of information for nationality & hair length-based exclusion, such that compared to the 
baseline characteristic condition, adolescents were more accepting of exclusion when the 
target was described as better than other members (Nationality: Mno info = 1.24, Std Error 
= .04; Mgood at soccer = 1.61, Std Error = .08; Hair length: Mno info = 1.40, Std Error = .05; 
Mgood at soccer = 1.64, Std Error = .08). Aggression-based exclusion revealed that it was 
seen as less acceptable to exclude if the target was good at soccer than if the target was 
only described as aggressive (Mno info = 4.55, Std Error = .08; Mgood at soccer = 4.04, Std 
Error = .09). 
As expected, for all characteristics except aggression, when the target was 
described as worse than others it was found to be more acceptable to exclude than the 
baseline description and when the target was described as good at soccer (Gender: Mno info 
= 1.99, Std Error = .09; Mbad at soccer = 3.02, Std Error = .10; Nationality: Mno info = 1.24, 
Std Error = .04; Mbad at soccer = 2.68, Std Error = .10; Shyness: Mno info = 2.04, Std Error = 
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.08; Mbad at soccer = 2.96, Std Error = .11; Hair Length: Mno info = 1.40, Std Error = .05; 
Mbad at soccer = 2.68, Std Error = .10). In contrast, there was no difference between baseline 
judgments and judgments when the aggressive target was described as bad at soccer (Mno 
info = 4.55, Std Error = .08; Mgood at soccer = 4.44, Std Error = .10).  
 In summary, the group goal manipulation was effective to the extent that 
participants viewed exclusion based on ability as more acceptable in competitive than in 
noncompetitive contexts, but the findings were unexpectedly overwhelmed by the main 
effect of ability, which revealed that participants viewed ability information as salient 
across both competitive and noncompetitive group goals. 
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Participant Variables (Predictor) 
 Hypercompetitiveness. In evaluating the ten items in the adjusted 
hypercompetitiveness attitude (HCA) scale, three questions did not correlate with the 
other seven, which cohered together in a statistically significant manner (i.e., all rs 
ranging between .14 - .48). As a consequence, Cronbach’s alpha was low (.63). 
Rerunning Cronbach’s alpha with the reduced 7-item scale resulted in an increase in 
alpha (.73). A factor analysis was run to assess the tenability of the 1-factor structure of 
the HCA as posited by the authors (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990). Fit 
indices suggested that the 1 factor model was not tenable (SRMR = .058; RMSEA = 
087). In light of the disconfirmatory results, and given that the items formed a reliable 
scale, it was decided that the summative scale would be used in regression and compared 
to regression analyses in which principal components (an analysis technique in which no 
model is specified) were used in predicting exclusion acceptability judgments. 
 As with the correlation analysis above, a principal components analysis was run 
on the 10 indicators to see whether the three items flagged were also flagged in this 
analysis.  While Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy met the conventional criteria for factorability (>.7) for the 10-
indicator set, the item individual measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) indicated that 
the same three items that did not correlate significantly to the other items as mentioned 
above did not reach the conventional criteria of .7, suggesting that the items did not 
cohere with the other seven. In looking at the scree plot from the PCA, two factors were 
indicated, with the three uncorrelated questions loading on the second component, and 
the seven questions that had shown coherence loaded on the first component (see table 1). 
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Given that varimax rotation did not improve interpretability of the components, a 
decision was made to leave the two extracted components uncorrelated.   
 Finally, in order to assess whether participant age may have affected the 
interpretability and factorability of the HCA items, separate reliability analyses were run 
for 7th and 11th grade participants respectively. Results revealed no difference in the 
reliability of the items across grade (alpha = .71 and .75 for 7th and 11th grade 
participants, respectively).  
 Two regressions were run; one that regressed the summative HCA scale against 
the acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player, particularly in the noncompetitive 
context, and one that regressed the first two principal components extracted from the 
seven HCA indicators against the same exclusion acceptability question. When using the 
HCA scale as a regressor, it was found that those who were more hypercompetitive were 
more accepting of excluding a bad soccer player in the noncompetitive group goal 
condition than those who were less competitive (r2 = .06, F = 6.15, p< .05; ß = .239). 
Similar results were revealed when running the regression with the first two components 
as regressors; such that the higher scores on the first component, the more acceptable it 
was seen to exclude a bad soccer player from a noncompetitive club (r2 = .05, F = 5.65, 
p< .05; ß = .230). As expected, given that the second PC revealed loadings inconsistent 
with any substantive interpretations, the second component did not relate to exclusion 
acceptability judgments. 
 Experience with exclusion. As with hypercompetitiveness, the items measuring 
experience with exclusion were correlated to assess the extent to which the self-reported 
experiences with exclusion cohered. Indeed, those reporting more exclusion experiences 
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in one domain (e.g., competitive nonathletic) reported significantly more exclusion 
experiences in other domains (e.g., noncompetitive athletic, with correlations ranging 
from .174-.476). Unlike with the HCA scale however, Cronbach’s alpha estimate (.65) 
did not meet conventional criteria for reliability of a scale. Running a PCA revealed a 1-
factor solution for the four exclusion experience items. The first factor explained 51.69% 
of the variance in the four items. As above, a decision was made to sum the scores from 
the four items into one Exclusion Experience item, to use for prediction purposes, but 
caution in interpretation of the results of regression analyses with this summed scale 
score was maintained.  
 Using this summative scale to assess whether experience with exclusion was 
related to the acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player, particularly in the 
noncompetitive context, it was found, contrary to expectations, that those with more 
exclusion experiences were more accepting of exclusion than those with less exclusion 
experiences (r2 = .04, F = 3.93, p = .05; ß = .194). As above, a regression was run with 
the first extracted component, and as above, the regression confirmed the results found 
with the summative scale. Again, this finding is not given much weight given the low 
reliability.   
 Because the above sets of analyses for experience with exclusion and HCA were 
run with just the ability question in mind, and because there was a concern that the model 
may have been misspecified given that simple univariate regression analyses were run 
which would not allow for a test of the extent to which collinearity effects may have 
adjusted the above interpretations of significance, a decision was made to include the 
above HCA and experience with exclusion predictors, as well as the participant variables 
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of gender, grade, and majority/minority status in a stepwise regression. Results revealed 
that only majority/minority status, experience with exclusion and HCA level predicted 
and remained significant predictors in the model, such that those who self-reported as 
more hypercompetitive (r2 = .07, F = 6.84, p = .05; ß = .25), having more experience with 
exclusion (r2 = .04, F = 4.03, p = .05; ß = .22), and those with minority status (r2 = .05, F 
= 6.06, p = .05; ß = -.24) were more accepting of exclusion of a bad soccer player in the 
noncompetitive context, with each predictor adding significantly to the variance 
explained in exclusion acceptability judgments (R2 = .16).    
 Involvement in competitive activities. Judgments of acceptability of excluding a 
bad soccer player from a competitive context were regressed against participant self-
report of frequency with which they engaged in competitive activities (both athletic and 
nonathletic). Contrary to expectations, there was no relation between the extent to which 
a participant reported being involved in competitive activities and the acceptability of 
excluding a bad soccer player from a competitive soccer club. 
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Stereotyping. It was expected that participants who affirmed stereotypes about 
competitiveness and ability would make use of those stereotypes in exclusion judgments. 
For these stereotypes in particular, it was expected that participants would be more likely 
to judge females as less good at soccer than males, while participants would judge 
Brazilians as better at soccer than Americans, and that these stereotypes would be more 
likely to influence exclusion decisions in the competitive context. In order to test this, 
participant’s scores on gender and nationality stereotypes were regressed on participants’ 
exclusion acceptability judgments for gender and nationality, respectively.  
 When gender exclusion was regressed on participants’ perceptions of how good 
females are at soccer, it was found that the more able you thought females were at soccer, 
the less acceptable you found exclusion of females in the competitive context (r2 = .15, F 
= 16.74, p = .001; ß = -.39). This finding remained significant when participant sex was 
entered in the model, despite the significant correlation between participant sex and 
propensity to stereotype females as good at soccer (-.385) (note that the tolerance (.911) 
and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) (1.098) statistics did not suggest problems with 
collinearity). The same was true for nationality-based exclusion, such that the more 
talented you perceived Brazilians to be, the less acceptable you found their exclusion 
from competitive soccer clubs  (r2 = .13, F = 14.17, p = .001; ß = -.36). As above, this 
interpretation was not altered despite entering participant majority/minority status in the 
model, which did not correlate with perceptions of Brazilian’s soccer ability.  
 When analyzing stereotypes about shy individuals’ competitiveness, the more 
competitiveness perceived, the less acceptable it was seen to exclude (r2 = .04, F = 4.32, p 
= .05; ß = -.21). Similarly, when perceived as more able in soccer, exclusion of shy 
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individuals was seen as less acceptable (r2 = .05, F = 4.80, p = .05; ß = -.22). Because no 
measure of participant shyness was provided to participants, it was not possible to assess 
whether these results would hold taking into account the participants’ levels of shyness.  
 HCA-Stereotype Interactions (Moderation effects). It was thought that as HCA 
increased, the effect of stereotypic conceptions of groups would become more relevant in 
noncompetitive contexts. According to Baron and Kenny, (1986) moderation effects of 
HCA on the relation between stereotypic conceptions of groups and exclusion 
acceptability of a target from the group in question were tested by regressing exclusion 
acceptability judgments on stereotypic conceptions of groups, HCA scale score, and then 
the product of the stereotypic conceptions of groups and HCA scale score. Contrary to 
expectations, there was no interactive/moderation effect of HCA on the relation between 
stereotypic conceptions of groups and exclusion acceptability for the gender, nationality, 
or the shyness based exclusion scenarios.  
Involvement in Competitive Contexts-Stereotypes Interactions 
 Similar to the above expectations, it was expected that the more experience with 
competitive activities one reports, the more that stereotypic conceptions of groups would 
influence one’s acceptability of exclusion judgments. As above, exclusion acceptability 
judgments were regressed on stereotypic conceptions of groups, HCA scale score, and the 
product of the two variables. When analyzing the acceptability of excluding females from 
competitive soccer clubs, and given that female participants were found to be less 
accepting of excluding females, participant gender was included in the regression 
analysis. Results revealed that when participant gender was included in the model, the 
effect of involvement with competitive activities failed to reach statistical significance. In 
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contrast, and while there was no interaction between competitive activity involvement 
and stereotypic conceptions of groups, there was a negative relation between involvement 
in competitive athletic activities and exclusion acceptability regarding the exclusion of a 
Brazilian target from a competitive group (r2 = .07, F = 7.25, p = .01; ß = -.27). No 
relations tested revealed the expected relation between involvement in competitive 
activities and stereotypic conceptions of groups. 
 Change. In order to assess whether participants’ exclusion judgments were 
influenced by their belief in the changeability of traits, we regressed participants’ 
exclusion judgments on explicit questions asking whether people can change. No 
relations were revealed between exclusion acceptability and the belief in the 
changeability of traits. 
 Justifications for Judgments. To assess whether participants’ group functioning 
justifications (e.g., “You may not win if you have bad players”) differed by group goal 
condition, a 2 (Goals: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Group Functioning 
Justifications across Target Characteristics: Gender, Ethnicity, Shyness, Hair length, 
Aggression, Lack of Ability) ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on the last 
factor. Results revealed a main effect of characteristic F (5,995) = 205.31, p< .001, η2 = 
.51. Across goal conditions, group functioning justifications were used with minimal 
frequency for Nationality (M = .01), Hair length (M = .02), and Gender (M = .05), and 
used with more frequency when considering exclusion of a shy (M = .11) or aggressive 
target (M = .74) as well as a target that was described as bad at soccer (M = .40). Focused 
follow-up analyses on group functioning justification data that was utilized by more than 
10% of participants was conducted to assess whether there existed an interaction effect 
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between goal condition and target characteristic. Three independent samples t-tests were 
conducted on the following characteristics: aggression, shyness, and lack of soccer 
ability. Contrary to expectations, no differences between goal condition and group 
functioning justifications emerged.  
 To assess whether stereotype reasoning was influential when evaluating the 
exclusion of a female and a Brazilian target (negatively and positively stereotyped soccer 
ability groups, respectively), t-tests were run with participant judgment taken into 
account. While stereotypic reasoning was not utilized frequently, as expected all 9% of 
participants utilized this form of reasoning when justifying why it was unacceptable to 
exclude a Brazilian from a soccer team (e.g., “You shouldn’t exclude because he is good 
at soccer”) t (197) = -4.91 p < .001. Contrary to expectations, gender based exclusion did 
not reveal differential stereotype justifications in support of accepting the exclusion of 
females. Finally, and unexpectedly, shyness based exclusion elicited stereotype reasoning 
(M = .10). When evaluating the acceptability of excluding a shy target, participants more 
frequently specified a negative stereotype (e.g., “he won’t go after the ball”) when 
justifying why it is acceptable to exclude (45%) than when justifying why it is not 
acceptable to exclude (M = .06) t (223) = 3.42, p< .01. 
 In summary, while justification data failed to reveal the same group goal 
distinction as was found in the judgment data for bad soccer playing targets, it was found 
that group functioning justifications were heavily influenced by the nature of the 
characteristic under consideration. That is, surface information about targets regarding 
nationality, gender, and hair length did not evoke group functioning concerns, whereas 
more deep level information about aggressiveness, shyness, and soccer ability did evoke 
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group functioning considerations. Finally, and regardless of goal condition, stereotypic 
conceptions of persons informed judgments when focusing on the acceptability of 
excluding a female, Brazilian, and a shy target from a soccer group. 
 Because there was no interaction effect in the above analysis of group functioning 
justification data, and because justification data represent the proportion of the sample 
that used a particular justification category, it was deemed important to make sure that 
participants’ justifications were properly represented. One means by which one can judge 
whether the justification data has been properly represented is to assess the extent to 
which certain justifications reflect a majority of participants’ reasoning through adding 
proportion data for each justification category. Results from this descriptive analysis 
reveal that social conventional and moral justifications account for a large percent of 
participant reasoning given each characteristic evaluated (see table 4). Specifically, moral 
justifications for gender exclusion accounted for 74% of the participant responses, while 
accounting for 86% and 90% of the responses in the nationality and hair length exclusion 
decisions, respectively. In contrast, group functioning considerations accounted for 74% 
of responses in the aggressive target scenario.  It should, however be noted that while 
gender, nationality, hair length and aggression are all well represented by the two moral 
and social conventional justifications, there is a substantial lack of representation of the 
sample for shyness and lack of soccer ability (the moral and social conventional codes 
only account for 57% and 53% of the participant sample, respectively).  
 In order to better represent the sample’s justifications, as well as to test the 
hypothesis that certain characteristics (aggression, shyness, lack of ability) will make 
salient the idea that the target in question can change over time, and should therefore be 
  106      
given a chance in the group, (particularly in a noncompetitive context where the goal of 
winning does not preclude the chance to let someone develop) a second 6 (Target 
Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on participants’ justifications that referenced 
personal development. While again no interaction effect was found between goal 
condition and target characteristic, a main effect was found for personal development 
justifications across the six target characteristics, F (5,995) = 87.76, p< .001, η2 = .31. 
Personal development justifications were similarly infrequently used when the target was 
excluded because of his ethnicity, gender or his hair length (justifications for all three 
characteristics rounded to 0%). In contrast, a greater number of participants used personal 
development as a justification for their judgments when the target was excluded because 
of his aggression, shyness, or lack of soccer ability (5%, 27%, and 41%, respectively). 
This result suggests that personal development concerns become more salient when 
speaking about a target’s personality or skills than when speaking about physical or 
group membership traits represented by gender, nationality or hair length.  
 Coupled with the above results for group functioning justifications as well as 
acceptability of exclusion judgments, exclusion based on gender, nationality, and hair 
length are evaluated as unacceptable because there is no clear link to group functioning 
concerns, whereas exclusion based on aggression is justified because the link between 
aggression and group functioning is very salient. Finally, exclusion based on shyness and 
lack of ability present a more complex story in that participants can link the traits to 
potential reductions in group functioning, but also seem to judge that the targets can 
change if given a chance.   
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 In order to assess differences for the use of justifications for different exclusion 
judgments, the data file was split by participant judgment, and justifications were re-
analyzed using independent samples t-tests. Because the data was split by participants’ 
exclusion acceptability judgment, and given that few participants accepted exclusion of a 
target based on ethnicity or hair length, analyses of justifications for these targets were 
not analyzed. Given that 12 t-tests were run, the Bonferroni adjustment was utilized to 
correct for type-1 error inflation (from .05 to .004).  
 First, for all analyses comparing the proportion of participants’ citing moral 
justifications for their judgments, it was found that those who viewed exclusion as 
unacceptable were more likely to use moral justifications. This was not the case however 
when evaluating an aggressive target, in which 13% and 17% of those indicating that 
exclusion was acceptable and unacceptable, respectively justified their judgment with 
moral concerns (see Table 4).  
Contrast the above results with the finding for group functioning justifications, in which 
only ability based exclusion revealed a difference in justifications, with those judging 
exclusion as acceptable overwhelmingly justifying their judgment with group functioning 
concerns (79%) while those finding ability based exclusion unacceptable only 
infrequently employing group functioning reasoning in their justifications (15%) t (197) 
= 12.55, p< .001. 
 Finally, participants were found to utilize personal development justifications 
differently depending on their judgment of the acceptability of exclusion only when 
evaluating shy and bad soccer playing targets. Specifically, and in both target conditions, 
participants utilized more personal development justifications when they viewed the 
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exclusion as unacceptable (shyness: 30%, ability: 60%) than when they viewed it as 
acceptable (shyness: 3%, ability: 9%) shyness: t (197) = -6.60, p< .001; ability: t (197) = 
10.24, p< .001. 
 Because there was such a discrepancy in participants’ utilization of personal 
development justifications across shy and aggressive targets, a paired samples t-test was 
run on the questions that inquired explicitly about participants’ beliefs in the 
changeability of shyness and aggression, respectively. Interestingly, when asked 
explicitly, there were no differences between judgments of the changeability of 
aggression and shyness, suggesting that while aggression is believed to be changeable, it 
is perhaps at the same time perceived to be less the group’s responsibility to assist the 









 This study investigated the nature of adolescents’ judgments about peer exclusion 
given systematic variation of both the group’s goals (competitive or noncompetitive 
soccer club) as well as the target’s characteristics (gender, nationality, hair length, soccer 
ability, aggression, and shyness). Drawing on domain theory (Smetana, 2006) and the 
peer relations literature (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006), this study provides further 
insight into the considerations that influence exclusion judgments.   
Social Domain Theory 
 Two main findings from this study contribute to Social Domain Theory research: 
1) target characteristics contributed to evaluations of exclusion as legitimate or unfair; 
and, 2) the use of justifications varied by the target characteristics.  
 Social Domain theory posits three domains of social knowledge (Moral, 
Conventional, Personal). Given that social exclusion is a multifaceted issue, judgments 
about exclusion allow for the study of coordination of domain considerations. In short, 
this study was an attempt at systematically adjusting the salience of negative group 
functioning concerns in a social exclusion situation (e.g., "He will ruin the group"). It was 
reasoned that the more salient the negative group functioning concern, the less impact the 
moral concerns for exclusion would influence the exclusion acceptability judgments (e.g., 
"he will feel sad if you exclude him"). It was expected that when negative group 
functioning concerns were salient, exclusion would be seen as acceptable. Conversely, 
when negative group functioning concerns were not salient, exclusion would be seen as 
unacceptable.  
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 Target hair length was utilized as an arbitrary exclusion characteristic, thought to 
be devoid of any associations that would evoke group functioning concerns, regardless of 
whether the group was competitive or noncompetitive. In other words, exclusion based 
on hair length served as a baseline where only moral concerns were expected to be 
salient. Indeed, most participants found exclusion based on the length of one’s hair to be 
unacceptable, and they overwhelmingly justified these judgments with moral concerns 
(e.g., “It’s not fair, you don’t know if he will be good at soccer/fun to be around”). These 
responses suggest that participants evaluated exclusion based on hair length as arbitrary.  
 In contrast, target soccer ability was utilized as a definitional exclusion 
characteristic, thought to fully evoke group functioning concerns, particularly in the 
competitive context. In other words, exclusion based on a target’s lack of soccer ability 
served as an exclusion situation in which conventional, rather than moral considerations 
were highly salient. Judgments and justifications were supportive of this expectation, 
with exclusion based on lack of ability seen as more acceptable in competitive than 
noncompetitive contexts. Additionally, participants who accepted exclusion did so 
largely because of group functioning considerations (e.g.,  “He will ruin the group”). As 
expected, these responses suggest that participants evaluated exclusion based on lack of 
ability as nonarbitrary, which stands in contrast to hair length based exclusion.  
 With these two characteristics as reference points, it was possible to evaluate 
whether the characteristics used in prior research would be evaluated similarly across 
context. For example, it was thought that different contexts would evoke differential 
stereotypical responding based on target characteristics. One hypothesis was that 
stereotypical conceptions of female soccer ability would relate more strongly to exclusion 
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judgments in competitive than in noncompetitive contexts. Consistent with expectations, 
only in competitive contexts was there a negative relation between stereotypic 
perceptions of females’ soccer ability and exclusion acceptability. That is, the less soccer 
skill attributed to females, the more acceptable it was seen to exclude.  
 This result adds to a growing body of literature that demonstrates contextual 
variability in the use of information (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Killen et al, in 
prep; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). In this study, “information” also includes stereotypic 
conceptions of individuals based on group membership. Not only does this study 
demonstrate that stereotypes are invoked in support of a judgment, but that stereotypes 
are invoked narrowly rather than generally. That is, stereotypes seem to be invoked that 
are relevant to group functioning considerations (e.g., ability stereotypes for competitive 
contexts). This study adds to prior studies that show similar effects with information 
about peer crowd affiliation, such as the Jocks, Preppies, and Dirties (Horn, 2003; Horn, 
Killen, & Stangor, 1999). In this study, while the ambiguity of the context was not 
manipulated, target information and group goals were varied. With these manipulations, 
it was possible to determine whether certain stereotypes were more or less salient in 
different contexts. In noncompetitive contexts, stereotypic conceptions of ability were not 
as salient as they were in competitive contexts.   
 Stereotypes serve in part to reduce the cognitive load in situations that are marked 
by ambiguity (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). When evaluating whether exclusion 
based on gender is acceptable, ability stereotypes serve to increase (or decrease) the 
relevance of the characteristic. It should be noted that despite the function stereotypes 
serve for those who use them, there are real and often negative consequences that result 
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for their use (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010; 
Steele & Aronson, 1995). Future studies could assess the motivational underpinnings of 
stereotyping, toward the end of identifying mechanisms upon which stereotype-reduction 
interventions might prove efficacious. One construct that may relate to the propensity to 
utilize stereotypes may be need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This construct 
may allow for a further identification of the distinction between stereotype use and 
awareness, with those who possess a high need for closure more likely to use a stereotype 
in an ambiguous situation than those without a high need for closure. If links between 
stereotype use and need for closure existed, then there would be a motivational 
mechanism that could be targeted for intervention in an attempt to reduce the propensity 
to utilize stereotypes in ambiguous situations.  
 One reason to intervene to reduce the propensity to stereotype given ambiguous 
situations would be so that individuals can search for group goal relevant information. 
For example, rather than working with the assumption that a female is no good at a task 
that is required for a group’s effective/efficient functioning, one could allow that female 
to demonstrate her competence. If she turns out to be bad at the group-relevant skill, then 
exclusion may be evaluated as legitimate. If she is good at that skill, then exclusion may 
be evaluated as illegitimate. Whether she is good or bad though, the inherent bias created 
by stereotypic assumptions of competence would be reduced, ideally replaced by a new 
motivational orientation that directs one to directly measure rather than assume relevant 
competencies. 
 The finding that moral reasons were used equally for why it was seen as wrong to 
exclude based on group membership (nationality, gender) and an arbitrary characteristic 
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(hair length) suggests that any negative stereotypes that were activated were either: 1) not 
salient enough to warrant exclusion; or, 2) were salient enough but were disguised given 
self-presentational concerns. The latter interpretation is not favored, given that steps were 
taken to reduce any concerns for self-presentation (i.e., ensuring anonymity and 
confidentiality of responses). Despite this, the results may nevertheless be a result of a 
conscious attempt to downplay the role that stereotypic conceptions of groups plays in 
one’s judgments. Conceptual replications with information about peer crowd affiliation 
(e.g., Jocks, Preppies) would allow for a stronger conclusion as to whether concerns for 
self-presentation were driving the results. For instance, if it were shown that adolescents 
did not approve of crowd membership-based exclusion, then it would suggest that the 
results in this study reflect the adolescents’ concern with the predictive value of group 
membership information rather than a concern with withholding biased responses. On 
their own, group membership characteristics do not allow for an assessment of how well 
the target will fit with the group, unless there are “relevant” stereotypes associated 
activated during the exclusion decision. This study provides further confirmatory 
information that adolescents reject this type of exclusion, waiting for more information 
about the target before concluding that exclusion is warranted. 
 That group functioning considerations were so heavily utilized when ability and 
aggression-based exclusion was evaluated suggests that this information was seen as 
relevant to an exclusion consideration. Further conceptual replication with different 
group goals (e.g., to be disruptive) and exclusion contexts (e.g., nonathletic, social, 
academic) would provide further support for the contention that group functioning 
considerations become more salient when a target doesn’t fit well with the group’s goals.   
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 Finally, informational assumptions (Wainryb, 1991) seem to have played a role in 
exclusion judgments. Where Park and Killen (2010) found that descriptions of targets as 
either shy or aggressive made group functioning considerations salient, this study failed 
to replicate that finding. Instead, when considering exclusion of a shy individual, many 
adolescents rejected exclusion in favor of exclusion because they believed that shy 
individuals could be come less shy if given a chance. When considering this type of 
exclusion, informational assumptions about the changeability of shyness may have served 
to reduce the salience of any group functioning considerations that may have been 
evoked with this characteristic. From a target-group fit account of exclusion judgments, it 
seems as though shyness is irrelevant to an exclusion decision given the assumption that 
shy individuals can become less shy. 
 It is curious then that even though adolescents acknowledged that aggressive 
individuals have the capacity to become less aggressive over time, they still accepted 
exclusion. It may be that group functioning concerns were more salient when an 
aggressive target was being considered as compared to a shy target. A prediction based 
on this target-group fit account warrants further study: exclusion will be seen as less 
acceptable if an aggressive target promises to become less aggressive in order to be 
included. In this case, as with shyness-based exclusion, what was previously considered a 
relevant characteristic from a group goal perspective may become less relevant given the 
ability of the target to change. Note that the type of change should matter, such that 
exclusion of a shy person who promises to become more rather than less shy might be 
seen as more acceptable than a exclusion of a shy person who promises to become less 
shy. 
  115      
Peer Relation 
The overarching prediction based on a Social Domain theoretical account of 
social exclusion (Killen & Stangor, 2001) was that exclusion would be seen as acceptable 
if the adolescent could identify a way in which the target would reduce the group’s ability 
to achieve its goal. As an example, it was hypothesized that exclusion of shy targets 
would be evaluated more negatively in competitive than noncompetitive contexts, 
because only in the latter context would shyness negatively affect the group’s ability to 
achieve its goal (e.g., “It’s okay to exclude because shy people will make the group less 
fun”). In the competitive context, it was expected that adolescents would have trouble 
figuring out why a shy target would make it difficult to achieve the group’s goal. As a 
result, adolescents in the competitive goal condition were expected to reject exclusion of 
a shy target as unfair (e.g., “It’s not okay to exclude because he might be good at 
soccer”). It is worth noting that the above expectations were identical in form for 
aggressive targets (e.g., “you shouldn’t exclude them from a competitive team because 
they could be good at soccer”). 
 Contrary to expectations, there was no contextual variation in judgments for either 
shyness or aggression-based exclusion. That is, while shyness-based exclusion was 
evaluated as less acceptable than aggression-based exclusion, the acceptability judgments 
did not depend on whether the exclusion took place in a competitive or noncompetitive 
soccer club. In short then, this study successfully replicated, but was unsuccessful in 
extending past findings given the lack of interaction between personality characteristics 
and group goals. 
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 Might this be an artifact of the context used (soccer), or the target characteristics 
used? Indeed, aggression and the externalizing symptoms that are associated with the 
personality trait are socially salient (Hymel, Rubin, Rowden, & LeMare, 1990) and the 
justification data suggests that this target’s behavioral propensities overwhelmed any and 
all group goal considerations (e.g., “He will ruin our chance to have fun/ability to win 
because he is always getting into fights”). But if it were the concern over others’ welfare 
that was overwhelming context effects, then why was shyness-based exclusion not 
evaluated contextually? Shyness, like aggression, is socially salient, but the internalizing 
symptoms associated with this profile do not have similar implications for others’ welfare 
(Rubin, Burgess, & Coplan, 2002). As with aggression-based exclusion, the justification 
data allowed for further inquiry into the reasoning behind the judgment. In contrast to 
aggression-based exclusion, justifications for shyness-based exclusion suggested that the 
lack of differentiation between contexts was driven in part by adolescents’ belief in the 
changeability of this personality trait (e.g., “It’s not okay to exclude because he could 
become less shy”).  
 It is important to note that this differential use of ‘changeability’ justifications 
between aggressive and shy targets was not a result of a differential belief in the ability of 
shy and aggressive people to change how they act. When asked explicitly, adolescents 
were largely supportive of the notion that both aggressive and shy targets could change 
(i.e., become less aggressive and shy, respectively). This suggests then that aggressive 
targets evoke different concerns than do shy targets. Indeed, the justification data bears 
this out, in that participants give greater weight to conventional (e.g., “He will ruin our 
ability to have fun/win tournaments”) than personal development considerations (e.g., 
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“He may become less aggressive”) when evaluating an aggressive target. One interesting 
implication of these results is that aggressive targets may be the victims of a double 
standard. That is, the group in question is asked to assist the shy individual in becoming 
more outgoing, while the aggressive individual is left to change on her or his own before 
interacting with the group.  
 Beyond the finding that adolescents ask groups to help shy but not aggressive 
individuals change, there was an unexpected effect of stereotypic conceptions of shy 
individuals on exclusion judgments. Across group goals, participants who accepted 
shyness-based exclusion did so largely because of the belief that shy individuals would 
not engage with the sport as would their non-shy counterparts (e.g., “He will not run after 
the ball”). This finding is interesting given that the peer relations literature typically 
considers shyness in situations that rely on social interaction. In a sport context, an 
activity mediates social interaction, thus potentially reducing the group’s concerns with 
shyness as well as the shy individual’s motivation to withdraw from interaction. Indeed, 
some support has been shown for the latter relation between athletics and reductions in 
shy individuals’ anxiety (Findlay & Coplan, 2008). 
 Whether the above results are specific to an athletic context or represent a more 
general orientation to shy individuals, justification data once again provides powerful 
evidence that helps to explain social judgments. This study then extends past research in 
the peer relations literature by showing that aggressive and shy targets are evaluated very 
differently. Adolescents overwhelmingly accept exclusion of an aggressive target given 
their concerns with group functioning, while overwhelmingly rejecting exclusion of a shy 
target given the belief that shy individuals can change. While many have tried to 
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intervene on behalf of aggressive children by focusing on training for the child in 
question, (e.g., Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, 2002) this study suggests 
that a focus on the peer group’s perception of the aggressive individual may be in order. 
As with the increased use of stereotypical conceptions of individuals in ambiguous 
situations, it seems that adolescents are ready to use past information about an 
individuals’ aggression to predict whether they will negatively impact group functioning. 
Behavior change may become more full if groups allow an aggressive individual to show 
that they are ready to act appropriately. If, upon inclusion the aggressive individual 
regresses back to aggressive behavior, then the group has the legitimate right to exclude. 
If the aggressive individual does not regress back to aggression, and is consistent with 
group goals in other ways, then they have no legitimate right to exclude. 
Participant personality traits 
 It was expected, and revealed that individuals who reported being more 
hypercompetitive were more likely to accept exclusion of a target described as not good 
at soccer in the noncompetitive context. While the relation was significant, it was small in 
magnitude. It may be that self-reports of one’s propensities are not as stable as other 
measures, or that the relation between these variables is small compared to other 
considerations. Indeed, multi-informant and multi-method (observation, survey, 
interview) studies would undoubtedly further clarify the extent to which 
hypercompetitiveness relates to exclusion acceptability ratings. From the point of view of 
relevance of characteristics to group goals, hypercompetitive individuals may find ability 
considerations more salient in the noncompetitive context than those who do not self-
report a hypercompetitive drive, which is consistent with the results.    
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Participant Demographics 
 It was expected that female participants and participants in the ethnic minority 
would evaluate exclusion of females and Brazilians as less acceptable than males and 
ethnic majority adolescents. These results were expected based on females and ethnic 
minority participants’ potentially greater experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion. 
Results revealed that not only did females evaluate gender and nationality-based 
exclusion as less acceptable than their male counterparts, but that they evaluated all forms 
of exclusion as less alright. Contrary to expectations, there was no effect of participant 
ethnicity on exclusion judgments.  
 Future research should begin to look beyond these demographic variables and 
utilize measures that more directly assess the variables thought to drive these effects (e.g., 
experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion). With a measure of the actual variables 
thought to relate to exclusion judgments, it will be possible to more thoroughly interpret 
null and significant effects. Null effects may, for instance, point to a lack of influence of 
the personal experience variables on exclusion judgments, or may result from a result of 
trying to measure personal experience through proxy measures such as one’s 
demographic status. In contrast, with direct measures it would be possible to verify 
whether significant effects of demographic variables on exclusion judgments were a 
result of personal experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion or some other variable.  
 11th grade participants were more accepting of gender and ability-based exclusion 
than were 7th graders. This finding adds to a growing body of literature that reveals 
similar increases in group functioning considerations in social exclusion judgments 
(Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). This finding stands in contrast to 
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developmental findings from studies that utilize peer crowd affiliation as a criterion for 
social exclusion (e.g., Jocks and Preppies; Horn, 2003). While peer crowd membership is 
highly salient for adolescents, (Brown, 1990) this switch in age related findings is argued 
to result in part from a differential need for group functioning relevant stereotypes in each 
situation. In the peer crowd manipulation, stereotypes about individuals from those 
groups are required to justify exclusion, whereas in the ability manipulation, the group 
functioning relevance is inherent in the characteristic. Grade differences in the 
acceptability of gender-based exclusion cannot be explained by group functioning 
considerations, or by stereotypic conceptions of ability, given that no grade differences 
were found in justifications or in stereotype knowledge. Future research may elucidate 
this grade difference by employing less explicit measures of associations such as the IAT 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
 As with gender and nationality demographic variables, it would seem interesting 
and worthwhile to try to identify the mechanism behind this differential focus on group 
functioning considerations. Does it result from an accumulation of experience in groups? 
If so, then it should be possible to separate age and experience components of this 
relation, to verify whether these effects are due to maturation or experience. It is of 
interest to note that if it were experience with groups that was found to qualify these age 
effects, that this would suggest a shift in perspective taking that results from experience 
with groups. Given the dearth of perspective taking measures that reveal variance in later 
childhood, adolescence and later stages of life, the development of a measure of group 
perspective taking may be of interest.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 Experience with exclusion & Perspective taking. If you have been excluded, 
does your perspective change on what is most salient to an exclusion decision? Note that 
this is the first consideration that might not relate to objective relevance of characteristics 
and group goals, in that perspective taking just shifts the salience of different 
considerations. As mentioned in the introduction, exclusion judgments in a group context 
involve multiple considerations (harm to the target, group functioning considerations) 
that may shift in salience depending on one’s perspective. With exclusion experiences, 
the salience of psychological harm to the target may increase relative to group 
functioning considerations. In this data set however, the relation between exclusion 
acceptability judgments when focusing on a bad soccer player indicated that those who 
had experienced more exclusion in the past were more accepting of exclusion than were 
those who self-reported less exclusion experience. While largely speculative, this result 
may have been driven by a self-presentational bias in that those who reported more 
exclusion experience may have been more at ease or had more fully resolved the 
exclusion experiences than those who did not report experiencing exclusion. Whatever 
the reason for the relation, future research should assess the predictors with more than 
one reporting method, given that multi-method studies provide a more thorough picture 
of the phenomenon in question.  
 One alternative would be to assess the participants’ sociometric status, providing 
more reliability in participant scores on a measure of school-wide peer affiliation. With 
sociometric status data, it would be expected that those who were more well liked would 
be more inclined to take the group’s goals into account when judging the acceptability of 
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exclusion than those who were less well liked, but that this relation would be mediated by 
one’s ability to judge others’ mental states. 
 Yet another option would be to include not only a measure of exclusion 
experience, but also a measure of inclusion attempts in order to qualify exclusion 
experience. In this study, there were many individuals who reported a few or no 
exclusion experiences, leaving it unclear whether these individuals are those who are 
uninterested in social interaction (Rubin, 1982), or popular individuals. Again, these data 
were thought to be critical from the perspective of a perspective taking account of 
exclusion acceptability in that it was thought that those individuals who had experienced 
exclusion might be more likely to reject exclusion given their knowledge of how it feels 
to be excluded (i.e., moral concern for the target may have increased in salience). Slightly 
orthogonal to this prediction is the possibility that individuals who get excluded from 
competitive groups may be better prepared to take the group’s perspective, and therefore 
may more readily condone exclusion for legitimate reasons.  
 Peer Relations Correlates of Exclusion Judgments. While sociometric status 
provides a measure of likeability, perceived popularity provides a measure of individuals’ 
perceptions of how the peer group perceives a target individual. Including both measures 
of sociometric popularity and perceived popularity may allow for a more fine grained 
distinction of peer group members. There seem to be a number of coherent expectations 
that derive from the interaction between perceived popularity and likeability ratings. One 
of these expectations is that peers who are proactively aggressive will disregard group 
functioning (conventional domain) considerations in favor of personal choice (personal 
domain) considerations. This differential focus on personal choice may result in the 
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acceptance of exclusion of a particular disliked target over a range of group goals, even if 
the target fits well with the group (e.g., “even though she is good at soccer, I don’t like 
her and think we should exclude her”). To the extent that this type of proactively 
aggressive peer can be distinguished compared to others in her social milieu through her 
lack of sociometric popularity and high levels of perceived popularity, the use of both 
measurement tools will serve to advance both the peer relations evidence base as well as 
Social  Domain theoretical conceptions of exclusion. In contrast, a peer who is rated as 
sociometrically popular may show a greater consideration of group functioning 
(conventional domain) than personal choice (personal domain) considerations. This may 
result, in comparison to a proactively aggressive peer, in a more contextualized 
understanding of exclusion (e.g., “Just because you don’t like her doesn’t mean we 
shouldn’t let her in. Look at how good she is at soccer. We want to win, remember?”). 
 Socially withdrawn children (sociometrically and perceived unpopular) present 
yet another interesting possibility for linkages to Social Domain theoretical conceptions 
of exclusion. To the extent that socially withdrawn youth also score high on measures of 
rejection sensitivity (Romero-Canyas, Downey, Reddy, Rodriguez, Cavanaugh, & 
Pelayo, 2010), they may prioritize moral considerations for harm to the target over group 
functioning (conventional domain) or personal choice (personal domain) considerations 
(e.g., “I don’t care if including her will make it harder to win the tournament, she will 
feel bad and I don’t want her to feel bad”).  
 Stereotypes. To the extent that individuals had stereotypes about ability of certain 
groups (i.e., females are bad at soccer, Brazilians are good) it was expected that they 
would shift their judgments of the acceptability of excluding individuals belonging to 
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those groups. The reason behind this expectation was that a stereotype might build up 
more relevance of the otherwise irrelevant characteristic. In particular, two main 
expectations derive from this account of how stereotypes may influence exclusion 
acceptability judgments: 1) stereotypes about likeability should be most salient in the 
noncompetitive context, and 2) stereotypes about ability should be most salient to the 
competitive context. The inclusion of Brazilians and females was purposeful, serving as 
examples of two typically different ability stereotypes: females are often considered to be 
inferior in ability when compared to males; while Brazilians are often considered to be 
superior in ability when compared to Americans. Indeed, the relation between gender and 
nationality stereotypes and exclusion acceptability was found to be significant in the 
expected direction. Finally, and surprisingly, many participants revealed stereotypes 
about shy individuals (e.g., “they won’t go for the ball”). Not surprisingly, these 
stereotypes were used to justify exclusion. 
 One potential direction for future research would be to employ a less explicit 
measure of stereotyping susceptibility, such as the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) that makes use of latency responses as an index of ease of associating 
certain traits with certain descriptors. Use of this type of measure, may provide greater 
reliability and validity when attempting to measure individuals’ ethnicity, gender, or 
personality-based stereotypes.  
Interactions between stereotypes, involvement in groups, and HCA 
 Similar to the above concerns with the ability to validly and reliably assess one’s 
stereotypes in an explicit manner, the extent to which it was possible to find a relation 
between stereotypic conceptions of groups and one’s level of hypercompetitiveness or 
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involvement with competitive activities will be limited in part by the quality of the 
measure of stereotyping. In addition to this concern is the more general concern with 
measurement error, and future research may benefit by recruiting parent report of 
activities in which their children engage. Additionally, collecting a cross-validation 
sample would seem to be of some utility in attempting to document through confirmatory 
factor analytic methods the existence of the one-dimensional factor structure proposed by 
the HCA scale authors (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990).  
 Contextual Variations. The fact that the participants were only asked to evaluate 
an athletic context limits the scope of this study, as there are many groups that require 
vastly different types of individuals to function effectively (e.g., shyness on a debate team 
may be very problematic, whereas it may not be a concern in soccer). Future studies 
should assess more than one context to assess the robustness of the ability effect across 
contexts. In addition to attempting replication across a diverse set of group contexts, 
future studies should consider making less salient the aggressive personality 
characteristic. Instead of describing the aggressive target as having a propensity to get 
into fights, the aggressive target could be described as hypercompetitive. This shift in 
description might allow for the identification of personality traits that are evaluated 
contextually based on group goal. 
 It remains important to assess younger children’s capacity to integrate information 
in an exclusion context, to see whether the ability to consider multiple perspectives is 
consistent with other studies (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). Shaw and Wainryb (2006) have 
shown that beyond the age of 6, children begin to coordinate the transgressor’s unfair 
request with the victim’s response (resistance, compliance, or subversion). It is expected 
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that at around this age, children will likewise take into account the group’s goals as well 
as the target’s characteristics when making an exclusion decision. Additionally, it will be 
important for future studies to inquire as to the participant’s perception of how the target 
will feel about the exclusion, as this will clear up any ambiguity in how individuals 
understand exclusion and its effects on the excluded. Young children, for example may 
understand the desires of the group members, but they may not find them to be sufficient 
justification to exclude someone because of concerns for psychological harm to the target 
of exclusion.   
Related to the perception of information, this study sought to extend our 
knowledge of how it is that adolescents use contextual information, as well as whether 
person information interacted with context. There are numerous legitimate reasons to 
exclude individuals from groups, and it is hoped that this study has provided more insight 
into how it is that context affects those judgments. Much more effective than the 
“exclusion is bad” orientation to socialization of children and adolescents then may be a 
more nuanced orientation that acknowledges group functioning concerns. This new 
orientation might align more closely with the notion that some forms of exclusion can be 
justified on, if not prudential grounds (“I don’t want to include her because she hits”) 
then group functioning grounds (“She keeps messing up our game”). If nothing else, this 
adjusted orientation to social exclusion may resonate more with children and adolescents 
(Killen, Breton, Ferguson, & Handler, 1994), potentially resulting in a greater openness 
to other considerations on the part of children and adolescents. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Overview of Survey: Exclusion Scenario 
 
















Some only want to 
include... 
Competitive Group plays 
for prizes 
Aggressive people who do not get 
into fights 
  Shy people who are outgoing 
  Female boys 
  Brazilian people who are from 
America 
  Long Hair people who have short 
hair 
  Soccer Ability people who are good at 
soccer 
    
Noncompetitive Group plays 
for fun 
Aggressive people who do not get 
into fights 
  Shy people who are outgoing 
  Female boys 
  Brazilian people who are from 
America 
  Long Hair people who have short 
hair 
  Not Good at 
Soccer 
people who are good at 
soccer 
Evaluated on a 6-point Likert scale, from 1 = very not okay to 6 = very okay. 
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Table 2: Overview of Survey: Dependent Measures 
 
Overview of Survey: Dependent measures 
 
Evaluation of Characteristic 
 
Some only want to include people who are 
from America. Okay or not okay?  
 
Why is this okay or not okay? 
  
Evaluation of Characteristic + 
Ability 
A Brazilian wants to join who is better than 
most of the current members. Do you think it 
would be okay for the club to exclude him? 
  
Evaluation of Characteristic + 
No Ability 
A Brazilian wants to join who is worse than all 
of the current members. Do you think it would 
be okay for the club to exclude him? 
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Table 3: Overview of Survey: Justifications 
 
Overview of Survey: Justifications 
Coding 
Category 




Appeals to the wrongfulness of 
prejudgment, including references to 
stereotyping & discrimination, and 
the concerns of fairness, equity, & 
(harm to/protection of others). 
Recognition/acknowledgment of 
stereotype coupled w/ rejection. 
Examples:  
“The team is jumping to conclusion 
that he wouldn’t be an asset to the 
team without even getting to know 
him” 
“It doesn’t matter, they can pull it 
up. Hair doesn’t matter in sports” 
“This is the 
stupidest/crappiest/craziest reason to 
exclude someone” 
“It is not okay to stereotype” 
“Exclusion based on where someone 
is from/hair length/ability/etc...is 
discriminatory and not fair” 
“If you would put others at risk, you 
shouldn’t be a member” 
“He could hurt other people” (this 
refers to hurting people outside the 
group of interest) 
“All activities should be available for 
all ethnicities/genders/hair 
lengths/etc...” 
“How would you feel?” 
“If you want to play, you should 
play” 
“Ability is not something you can 
control” (does this mean 
prejudgment, or unfair to exclude 
based on something not 
controllable? If unsure, then code 
here) 
“It’s not fair/not okay to exclude 
someone” 




(w/out Stereotype Use) 
Appeals to group concerns - general. 
Examples:  
“If Joe is bad [at soccer], he should 
not play on a competitive team, 
regardless of where he’s from” 
“That would make the team look 
bad” 
“Don’t have a violent person because 
the team won’t win” 
“Maybe he should practice more 
before he tries to join” 
“If Joe is too good or too bad, then 
the group might not have fun”  
“They shouldn’t be allowed in b/c 
they might get in trouble” 
“He might hurt/get into fights with 





Appeals to group concerns - 
utilization of a stereotype about a 
group. Stereotype = extend group 
membership/personality trait beyond 
itself.  
Examples: 
“If they are shy, they will not run 
after the ball/stand around” 
“You should exclude a female 
because they are bad at soccer” 
“If they are aggressive, they will play 
well” 
 Conventions/Traditions 
(From Park & Killen, 
2010) 
Appeals to others’ opinions on 
whether to exclude (source of 




“My parents say that it is not alright 
to exclude a child” 
“There is no rule that says you 
cannot have girls on the team” 
“His friends may exclude him if he 
plays with her” 
“Boys and girls teams are separate. 
That’s just how it is” 
“Girls and boys soccer is different. 
That would be like mixing softball 
and baseball” 
  131      
Psychological Personal Choice  Appeals to individual/group 
preferences. Focus on the personal 
choice of the excluder. Unemotional 
claims, no reason given for why it is 
their choice. 
Examples:  
“If they don’t want the kid to join, 
it’s okay. It’s their club”  
 Personal Development 
(Park & Killen’s 
Prosocial code – 2010, 
based on Nucci’s 
conceptions of the 
Personal) 
Appeals to the potential for the target 
to change. 
Examples:  
“Maybe being active in soccer will 
take his anger away” 
“Maybe being active in soccer will 
make him better” 
Prudential Safety Appeals to the need for safety (harm 
to/protection of self). 
Examples:  
“His hair could get pulled and he 
could get hurt” 
“Well if your bad at it than you 
shouldn’t play because it can be 
dangerous” 
analogy “I took the scissors away 
because she was running with them” 
“I excluded him because he kicked 
himself”  
“you don’t want to make yourself 
look bad” 
Uncodable  If the referent or interpretation is 
confusing, code here. 
Examples:  
“I like Doritos and brown sugar, but 
not when mixed together” 
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Hypothesis & Analysis 
Target Characteristic X 
Context 
1. Competitive context: Exclusion based on harmful 
aggression and a lack of ability will be seen as the 
most acceptable reasons to exclude.  
(Justification: A target’s harmful aggression and lack 
of ability will be seen as more likely to pose a risk to 
the group’s competitive goals than will a target’s 
shyness, nationality, gender, or hair length) 
a. Conduct a 2 (context: Competitive, 
noncompetitive) X 6 (target characteristic: 
harmful aggression, shyness, hair length, 
gender, nationality, lack of ability) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor.  
b. Conduct follow-ups on the main analysis 
to assess the interaction effect of context 
with target characteristic.  
 2. Noncompetitive context: Exclusion based on 
harmful aggression and shyness will be seen as 
the most acceptable reason to exclude. 
(Justification: A target’s harmful aggression will be 
seen as the only characteristic likely to pose a threat 
to the group’s noncompetitive goals) 
a. Conduct a 2 (context: Competitive, 
noncompetitive) X 6 (target characteristic: 
harmful aggression, shyness, hair length, 
gender, nationality, lack of ability) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA with 
repeated measures on both factors.  
b. Conduct follow-ups on the main analysis 
to assess the interaction effect of context 
with target characteristic. 
Justifications 3. Participants will use more group functioning 
justifications when faced with exclusion based on 
a lack of ability in the competitive context than 
when faced with exclusion based on a lack of 
ability in the noncompetitive context. 
(Justification: Domain justifications are expected to 
be driven by the extent to which the participant sees a 
fit with a target’s characteristic and a group’s goal) 
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a. Conduct a repeated measures ANOVA on 
acceptability of excluding based on ability 
with context as the repeated measure.  
 4. Across contexts, participants will use more moral 
– characteristic irrelevant justifications when 
faced with exclusion based on gender, nationality, 
and shyness. 
(Justification: Domain justifications are driven by the 
extent to which the participant sees a fit with a 
target’s characteristic and a group’s goal) 
a. Conduct three repeated measures 
ANOVAs on acceptability of excluding 
based on gender, nationality, and shyness 
with context as the repeated measure. 
Hypercompetitiveness 5. The more hypercompetitive one is the more 
acceptable they will find exclusion based on a 
lack of ability across contexts. 
(Justification: The more meaning one puts on 
competition, the more likely they will be to accept 
exclusion based on ability considerations across 
contexts). 
a. Conduct a Factor Analysis on the 
Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (HCA) 
items and save factor scores for each 
participant. Conduct Regressions on the 
acceptability judgments given a target’s 




6. Competitive context: The more a participant is 
involved with competitive activities the more 
acceptable they will find exclusion based on 
harmful aggression and a lack of ability. 
(Justification: Those who have been involved in 
competitive group activities will focus on the group 
perspective more readily than those without 
experience in competitive group contexts). 
a. Conduct 2 Regressions on the 
acceptability judgments given a target’s 
harmful aggression and lack of ability 
with experience with competitive contexts 
as the predictor. 
Perception of 
changeability of traits 
7. The more one believes that personality is 
changeable the less acceptable they will find 
exclusion based on harmful aggression and 
shyness.  
(Justification: Those who perceive the ability to 
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change will consider past behavior as irrelevant to a 
current exclusion decision) 
a. Conduct Regressions on the acceptability 
judgments given a harmfully aggressive 
and a shy target with perception of 
changeability as the predictor.   
Stereotypic conception of 
groups 
8. Competitive context: The more one believes that 
a group is good at soccer the less acceptable they 
will find exclusion based on the knowledge that 
the target is a member of the stereotyped group. 
(Justification: Perception that a group can be 
categorized through ability will help support the 
relevance of that trait for an exclusion decision in a 
competitive context in which ability is helpful from a 
group goals perspective). 
a. Conduct 4 regressions on the acceptability 
judgments given the different decision 
rules with stereotypic conception of ability 
based on each group as a predictor, 
respectively (e.g., regression on 
acceptability of gender exclusion with 
gender stereotypes about ability as a 
predictor). 
 9. Noncompetitive context: The more one believes 
that a group is competitive the more acceptable 
they will find exclusion based on the knowledge 
that the target is a member of the stereotyped 
group.  
(Justification: Perception that a group can be 
categorized through competitiveness will help 
support the judgment that a member of that group 
should be excluded, as competitiveness is not the 
group goal in the noncompetitive condition). 
a. Conduct 4 regressions on the acceptability 
judgments given the different decision 
rules with stereotypic conception of 
competitiveness based on each group as a 
predictor, respectively (e.g., regression on 
acceptability of gender exclusion with 
gender stereotypes about competitiveness 
as a predictor). 
Hypercompetitiveness by 
Stereotypic conception of 
groups 
10. Those who are hypercompetitive and who believe 
a group to be bad at an activity will accept 
exclusion based on information about one’s group 
membership.  
(Justification: The more meaning one puts on 
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competition and group membership, the more likely 
they will be to accept exclusion based on a target’s 
group membership across contexts). 
a.  Conduct a Factor Analysis on the 
Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (HCA) 
items and save factor scores for each 
participant. Conduct Regressions on the 
acceptability judgments given a target’s 
group membership with HCA score and 
stereotypic conception of groups as 
predictor variables.  
Age of Participant 11. Older participants will be less willing to exclude 
based on nationality and gender than will younger 
participants.  
(Justification: Older participants are less willing to 
make use of stereotypes in ambiguous situations) 
a. Conduct two Univariate ANOVAs with 
age as a fixed factor and acceptability of 
exclusion based on nationality and gender 
as dependent measures.  
 12. Older participants will be more willing to exclude 
based on harmful aggression and shyness than 
will younger participants. 
(Justification: Older participants are more concerned 
about group functioning considerations than are 
younger participants) 
a. Conduct two Univariate ANOVAs with 
age as a fixed factor and acceptability of 
exclusion based on aggression and 
shyness as dependent measures. 
 
  136      
Table 5: Hypercompetitiveness Attitude (HCA) Scale Component Matrix 
 
Component 
HCA Item 1 2 3 4 
Q1 0.504 -0.131 -0.412 -0.225 
Q2 (R) -0.067 0.824 -0.215 0.158 
Q3 (R) 0.001 0.837 -0.25 -0.06 
Q4 (R) 0.601 0.061 0.114 0.388 
Q5 0.605 0.163 0.071 -0.4 
Q6 0.676 -0.088 -0.232 0.322 
Q7 0.465 -0.127 -0.157 0.584 
Q8 0.717 -0.001 0.131 -0.178 
Q9 (R) 0.097 0.322 0.789 0.215 
Q10 0.719 0.102 0.198 -0.347 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 6: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments, by Target Characteristic 
and Acceptability Judgment (Proportions) 
  




































Moral 0 87  0 92  5 50  8 85  3 18  13 17 
Group 
Functioning 0 1  0 2  23 10  3 5  79 15  77 58 
Personal 
Development 50 0  0 1  3 30  0 0  9 60  2 15 
Stereotypes 0 9  0 0  45 6  17 2  0 0  1 0 
Social 
Conventions 0 1  0 1  0 0  44 4  0 1  1 0 
Personal 
Choice 50 0  0 1  15 0  16 2  0 0  1 0 
Prudential 0 0  75 1  0 0  5 1  4 2  0 2 
Unelaborated 0 2   25 4   10 4   7 1   4 4   5 8 
Note: Proportions may not add up due to rounding. Numbers in brackets represent the number of participants judging the 
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Table 7: Mean Table for the 2 (Sex: Male, Female) X 2 (Grade: 7th, 11th) X 2 
(Nationality: Majority, Minority) X 2 (Context: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 




Group Goal Grade Sex Ethnicity 
Mean SD N 
Minority 1.79 0.89 14 
Majority 2.38 1.51 8 
Male 
Total 2.00 1.15 22 
Minority 1.44 0.58 25 
Majority 1.78 1.30 9 
Female 
Total 1.53 0.83 34 
Minority 1.56 0.72 39 
Majority 2.06 1.39 17 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.71 0.99 56 
Minority 2.80 1.23 10 
Majority 3.00 2.00 5 
Male 
Total 2.87 1.46 15 
Minority 1.92 1.16 12 
Majority 1.91 1.45 11 
Female 
Total 1.91 1.28 23 
Minority 2.32 1.25 22 
Majority 2.25 1.65 16 
11th 
Total 
Total 2.29 1.41 38 
Minority 2.21 1.14 24 
Majority 2.62 1.66 13 
Male 
Total 2.35 1.34 37 
Minority 1.59 0.83 37 
Majority 1.85 1.35 20 
Female 
Total 1.68 1.04 57 
Minority 1.84 1.00 61 




Total 1.95 1.20 94 
Minority 1.89 0.88 19 
Gender 
Noncompetitive 7th Male 
Majority 2.50 1.69 8 
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 Total 2.07 1.17 27 
Minority 1.47 0.84 19 
Majority 1.27 0.47 11 
Female 
Total 1.40 0.72 30 
Minority 1.68 0.87 38 
Majority 1.79 1.27 19 
 
Total 
Total 1.72 1.01 57 
Minority 3.63 0.92 8 
Majority 2.25 1.89 4 
Male 
Total 3.17 1.40 12 
Minority 2.00 1.19 18 
Majority 2.60 1.65 10 
Female 
Total 2.21 1.37 28 
Minority 2.50 1.33 26 
Majority 2.50 1.65 14 
11th 
Total 
Total 2.50 1.43 40 
Minority 2.41 1.19 27 
Majority 2.42 1.68 12 
Male 
Total 2.41 1.33 39 
Minority 1.73 1.04 37 
Majority 1.90 1.34 21 
Female 
Total 1.79 1.15 58 
Minority 2.02 1.15 64 




Total 2.04 1.26 97 
Minority 1.85 0.87 33 
Majority 2.44 1.55 16 
Male 
Total 2.04 1.15 49 
Minority 1.45 0.70 44 
Majority 1.50 0.95 20 
Female 
Total 1.47 0.78 64 
Minority 1.62 0.80 77 
Majority 1.92 1.32 36 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.72 1.00 113 
Minority 3.17 1.15 18 
Majority 2.67 1.87 9 
Male 




Female Minority 1.97 1.16 30 
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Majority 2.24 1.55 21  
Total 2.08 1.32 51 
Minority 2.42 1.29 48 
Majority 2.37 1.63 30 
 
Total 
Total 2.40 1.42 78 
Minority 2.31 1.16 51 
Majority 2.52 1.64 25 
Male 
Total 2.38 1.33 76 
Minority 1.66 0.94 74 
Majority 1.88 1.33 41 
Female 
Total 1.74 1.09 115 
Minority 1.93 1.08 125 




Total 1.99 1.23 191 
Minority 1.36 0.50 14 
Majority 1.25 0.46 8 
Male 
Total 1.32 0.48 22 
Minority 1.24 0.52 25 
Majority 1.00 0.00 9 
Female 
Total 1.18 0.46 34 
Minority 1.28 0.51 39 
Majority 1.12 0.33 17 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.23 0.47 56 
Minority 1.10 0.32 10 
Majority 1.20 0.45 5 
Male 
Total 1.13 0.35 15 
Minority 1.17 0.39 12 
Majority 1.36 0.67 11 
Female 
Total 1.26 0.54 23 
Minority 1.14 0.35 22 
Majority 1.31 0.60 16 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.21 0.47 38 
Minority 1.25 0.44 24 
Majority 1.23 0.44 13 
Male 
Total 1.24 0.43 37 
Minority 1.22 0.48 37 




Total 1.21 0.49 57 
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Minority 1.23 0.46 61 
Majority 1.21 0.48 33 
  Total 
Total 1.22 0.47 94 
Minority 1.63 1.01 19 
Majority 1.25 0.46 8 
Male 
Total 1.52 0.89 27 
Minority 1.11 0.32 19 
Majority 1.00 0.00 11 
Female 
Total 1.07 0.25 30 
Minority 1.37 0.79 38 
Majority 1.11 0.32 19 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.28 0.67 57 
Minority 1.63 1.41 8 
Majority 1.00 0.00 4 
Male 
Total 1.42 1.16 12 
Minority 1.06 0.24 18 
Majority 1.30 0.67 10 
Female 
Total 1.14 0.45 28 
Minority 1.23 0.82 26 
Majority 1.21 0.58 14 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.23 0.73 40 
Minority 1.63 1.11 27 
Majority 1.17 0.39 12 
Male 
Total 1.49 0.97 39 
Minority 1.08 0.28 37 
Majority 1.14 0.48 21 
Female 
Total 1.10 0.36 58 
Minority 1.31 0.79 64 




Total 1.26 0.70 97 
Minority 1.52 0.83 33 
Majority 1.25 0.45 16 
Male 
Total 1.43 0.74 49 
Minority 1.18 0.45 44 
Majority 1.00 0.00 20 
Female 
Total 1.13 0.38 64 




Majority 1.11 0.32 36 
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  Total 1.26 0.58 113 
Minority 1.33 0.97 18 
Majority 1.11 0.33 9 
Male 
Total 1.26 0.81 27 
Minority 1.10 0.31 30 
Majority 1.33 0.66 21 
Female 
Total 1.20 0.49 51 
Minority 1.19 0.64 48 
Majority 1.27 0.58 30 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.22 0.62 78 
Minority 1.45 0.88 51 
Majority 1.20 0.41 25 
Male 
Total 1.37 0.76 76 
Minority 1.15 0.39 74 
Majority 1.17 0.50 41 
Female 
Total 1.16 0.43 115 
Minority 1.27 0.65 125 




Total 1.24 0.59 191 
Minority 2.14 0.95 14 
Majority 1.38 0.52 8 
Male 
Total 1.86 0.89 22 
Minority 2.00 0.91 25 
Majority 1.56 0.88 9 
Female 
Total 1.88 0.91 34 
Minority 2.05 0.92 39 
Majority 1.47 0.72 17 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.88 0.90 56 
Minority 2.20 1.40 10 
Majority 2.20 0.45 5 
Male 
Total 2.20 1.15 15 
Minority 2.00 0.74 12 
Majority 1.73 1.01 11 
Female 
Total 1.87 0.87 23 
Minority 2.09 1.06 22 
Majority 1.88 0.89 16 
11th 
Total 
Total 2.00 0.99 38 
Shyness Competitive 
Total Male Minority 2.17 1.13 24 
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Majority 1.69 0.63 13  
Total 2.00 1.00 37 
Minority 2.00 0.85 37 
Majority 1.65 0.93 20 
Female 
Total 1.88 0.89 57 
Minority 2.07 0.96 61 
Majority 1.67 0.82 33 
  
Total 
Total 1.93 0.93 94 
Minority 2.74 1.41 19 
Majority 2.00 0.76 8 
Male 
Total 2.52 1.28 27 
Minority 2.11 1.15 19 
Majority 1.91 1.04 11 
Female 
Total 2.03 1.10 30 
Minority 2.42 1.31 38 
Majority 1.95 0.91 19 
7th 
Total 
Total 2.26 1.20 57 
Minority 2.25 1.58 8 
Majority 1.75 0.50 4 
Male 
Total 2.08 1.31 12 
Minority 1.89 1.18 18 
Majority 1.90 0.74 10 
Female 
Total 1.89 1.03 28 
Minority 2.00 1.30 26 
Majority 1.86 0.66 14 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.95 1.11 40 
Minority 2.59 1.45 27 
Majority 1.92 0.67 12 
Male 
Total 2.38 1.29 39 
Minority 2.00 1.15 37 
Majority 1.90 0.89 21 
Female 
Total 1.97 1.06 58 
Minority 2.25 1.31 64 




Total 2.13 1.17 97 
Minority 2.48 1.25 33 
Majority 1.69 0.70 16 
 
Total 7th Male 
Total 2.22 1.16 49 
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Minority 2.05 1.01 44 
Majority 1.75 0.97 20 
Female 
Total 1.95 1.00 64 
Minority 2.23 1.13 77 
Majority 1.72 0.85 36 
 
Total 
Total 2.07 1.08 113 
Minority 2.22 1.44 18 
Majority 2.00 0.50 9 
Male 
Total 2.15 1.20 27 
Minority 1.93 1.01 30 
Majority 1.81 0.87 21 
Female 
Total 1.88 0.95 51 
Minority 2.04 1.18 48 
Majority 1.87 0.78 30 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.97 1.04 78 
Minority 2.39 1.31 51 
Majority 1.80 0.65 25 
Male 
Total 2.20 1.17 76 
Minority 2.00 1.01 74 
Majority 1.78 0.91 41 
Female 
Total 1.92 0.97 115 
Minority 2.16 1.15 125 




Total 2.03 1.06 191 
Minority 1.86 0.77 14 
Majority 1.25 0.46 8 
Male 
Total 1.64 0.73 22 
Minority 1.24 0.44 25 
Majority 1.22 0.67 9 
Female 
Total 1.24 0.50 34 
Minority 1.46 0.64 39 
Majority 1.24 0.56 17 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.39 0.62 56 
Minority 1.20 0.42 10 
Majority 1.40 0.55 5 
Male 
Total 1.27 0.46 15 
Minority 1.25 0.45 12 
Hair Length Competitive 
11th 
Female 
Majority 1.36 0.50 11 
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 Total 1.30 0.47 23 
Minority 1.23 0.43 22 
Majority 1.38 0.50 16 
 
Total 
Total 1.29 0.46 38 
Minority 1.58 0.72 24 
Majority 1.31 0.48 13 
Male 
Total 1.49 0.65 37 
Minority 1.24 0.43 37 
Majority 1.30 0.57 20 
Female 
Total 1.26 0.48 57 
Minority 1.38 0.58 61 




Total 1.35 0.56 94 
Minority 1.68 1.20 19 
Majority 1.63 1.06 8 
Male 
Total 1.67 1.14 27 
Minority 1.63 0.83 19 
Majority 1.09 0.30 11 
Female 
Total 1.43 0.73 30 
Minority 1.66 1.02 38 
Majority 1.32 0.75 19 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.54 0.95 57 
Minority 1.75 0.89 8 
Majority 1.50 0.58 4 
Male 
Total 1.67 0.78 12 
Minority 1.22 0.43 18 
Majority 1.30 0.67 10 
Female 
Total 1.25 0.52 28 
Minority 1.38 0.64 26 
Majority 1.36 0.63 14 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.38 0.63 40 
Minority 1.70 1.10 27 
Majority 1.58 0.90 12 
Male 
Total 1.67 1.03 39 
Minority 1.43 0.69 37 
Majority 1.19 0.51 21 
Female 




Total Minority 1.55 0.89 64 
  146      
Majority 1.33 0.69 33    
Total 1.47 0.83 97 
Minority 1.76 1.03 33 
Majority 1.44 0.81 16 
Male 
Total 1.65 0.97 49 
Minority 1.41 0.66 44 
Majority 1.15 0.49 20 
Female 
Total 1.33 0.62 64 
Minority 1.56 0.85 77 
Majority 1.28 0.66 36 
7th 
Total 
Total 1.47 0.80 113 
Minority 1.44 0.70 18 
Majority 1.44 0.53 9 
Male 
Total 1.44 0.64 27 
Minority 1.23 0.43 30 
Majority 1.33 0.58 21 
Female 
Total 1.27 0.49 51 
Minority 1.31 0.55 48 
Majority 1.37 0.56 30 
11th 
Total 
Total 1.33 0.55 78 
Minority 1.65 0.93 51 
Majority 1.44 0.71 25 
Male 
Total 1.58 0.87 76 
Minority 1.34 0.58 74 
Majority 1.24 0.54 41 
Female 
Total 1.30 0.56 115 
Minority 1.46 0.76 125 





Total 1.41 0.71 191 
Minority 4.14 1.46 14 
Majority 4.38 1.41 8 
Male 
Total 4.23 1.41 22 
Minority 4.56 1.16 25 
Majority 4.33 0.71 9 
Female 
Total 4.50 1.05 34 
Minority 4.41 1.27 39 
Majority 4.35 1.06 17 
Aggression Competitive 7th 
Total 
Total 4.39 1.20 56 
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Minority 4.40 0.84 10 
Majority 4.60 0.89 5 
Male 
Total 4.47 0.83 15 
Minority 4.75 0.97 12 
Majority 4.55 1.44 11 
Female 
Total 4.65 1.19 23 
Minority 4.59 0.91 22 
Majority 4.56 1.26 16 
11th 
Total 
Total 4.58 1.06 38 
Minority 4.25 1.22 24 
Majority 4.46 1.20 13 
Male 
Total 4.32 1.20 37 
Minority 4.62 1.09 37 
Majority 4.45 1.15 20 
Female 
Total 4.56 1.10 57 
Minority 4.48 1.15 61 




Total 4.47 1.14 94 
Minority 4.68 1.16 19 
Majority 5.00 0.93 8 
Male 
Total 4.78 1.09 27 
Minority 4.79 0.85 19 
Majority 4.45 1.04 11 
Female 
Total 4.67 0.92 30 
Minority 4.74 1.00 38 
Majority 4.68 1.00 19 
7th 
Total 
Total 4.72 1.00 57 
Minority 5.00 0.93 8 
Majority 5.00 0.82 4 
Male 
Total 5.00 0.85 12 
Minority 4.28 1.27 18 
Majority 4.60 0.84 10 
Female 
Total 4.39 1.13 28 
Minority 4.50 1.21 26 
Majority 4.71 0.83 14 
11th 
Total 
Total 4.58 1.08 40 




Majority 5.00 0.85 12 
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 Total 4.85 1.01 39 
Minority 4.54 1.10 37 
Majority 4.52 0.93 21 
Female 
Total 4.53 1.03 58 
Minority 4.64 1.09 64 
Majority 4.70 0.92 33 
  
Total 
Total 4.66 1.03 97 
Minority 4.45 1.30 33 
Majority 4.69 1.20 16 
Male 
Total 4.53 1.26 49 
Minority 4.66 1.03 44 
Majority 4.40 0.88 20 
Female 
Total 4.58 0.99 64 
Minority 4.57 1.15 77 
Majority 4.53 1.03 36 
7th 
Total 
Total 4.56 1.11 113 
Minority 4.67 0.91 18 
Majority 4.78 0.83 9 
Male 
Total 4.70 0.87 27 
Minority 4.47 1.17 30 
Majority 4.57 1.16 21 
Female 
Total 4.51 1.16 51 
Minority 4.54 1.07 48 
Majority 4.63 1.07 30 
11th 
Total 
Total 4.58 1.06 78 
Minority 4.53 1.17 51 
Majority 4.72 1.06 25 
Male 
Total 4.59 1.13 76 
Minority 4.58 1.09 74 
Majority 4.49 1.03 41 
Female 
Total 4.55 1.06 115 
Minority 4.56 1.12 125 





Total 4.57 1.09 191 
Minority 2.86 1.10 14 
Majority 2.25 1.28 8 
Male 
Total 2.64 1.18 22 
Ability Competitive 7th 
Female Minority 3.56 1.33 25 
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Majority 3.28 0.67 9  
Total 3.49 1.18 34 
Minority 3.31 1.28 39 
Majority 2.79 1.10 17 
 
Total 
Total 3.15 1.24 56 
Minority 3.90 1.79 10 
Majority 3.60 2.07 5 
Male 
Total 3.80 1.82 15 
Minority 3.67 1.44 12 
Majority 3.55 1.75 11 
Female 
Total 3.61 1.56 23 
Minority 3.77 1.57 22 
Majority 3.56 1.79 16 
11th 
Total 
Total 3.68 1.65 38 
Minority 3.29 1.49 24 
Majority 2.77 1.69 13 
Male 
Total 3.11 1.56 37 
Minority 3.59 1.34 37 
Majority 3.43 1.35 20 
Female 
Total 3.54 1.34 57 
Minority 3.48 1.40 61 




Total 3.37 1.44 94 
Minority 3.21 1.58 19 
Majority 1.88 1.13 8 
Male 
Total 2.81 1.57 27 
Minority 2.95 1.43 19 
Majority 2.36 1.03 11 
Female 
Total 2.73 1.31 30 
Minority 3.08 1.50 38 
Majority 2.16 1.07 19 
7th 
Total 
Total 2.77 1.43 57 
Minority 3.38 1.69 8 
Majority 3.25 2.22 4 
Male 
Total 3.33 1.78 12 
Minority 2.56 1.42 18 





Total 2.54 1.43 28 
  150      
Minority 2.81 1.52 26 
Majority 2.71 1.68 14 
 Total 
Total 2.78 1.56 40 
Minority 3.26 1.58 27 
Majority 2.33 1.61 12 
Male 
Total 2.97 1.63 39 
Minority 2.76 1.42 37 
Majority 2.43 1.25 21 
Female 
Total 2.64 1.36 58 
Minority 2.97 1.50 64 




Total 2.77 1.48 97 
Minority 3.06 1.39 33 
Majority 2.06 1.18 16 
Male 
Total 2.73 1.40 49 
Minority 3.30 1.39 44 
Majority 2.78 0.98 20 
Female 
Total 3.13 1.29 64 
Minority 3.19 1.39 77 
Majority 2.46 1.12 36 
7th 
Total 
Total 2.96 1.35 113 
Minority 3.67 1.71 18 
Majority 3.44 2.01 9 
Male 
Total 3.59 1.78 27 
Minority 3.00 1.51 30 
Majority 3.05 1.69 21 
Female 
Total 3.02 1.57 51 
Minority 3.25 1.60 48 
Majority 3.17 1.76 30 
11th 
Total 
Total 3.22 1.66 78 
Minority 3.27 1.52 51 
Majority 2.56 1.64 25 
Male 
Total 3.04 1.59 76 
Minority 3.18 1.44 74 
Majority 2.91 1.38 41 
Female 
Total 3.08 1.42 115 





Majority 2.78 1.48 66 
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    Total 3.07 1.48 191 
Table 8: Participant breakdown 
 
  Grade 
Demographics 7th Grade  11th Grade  Total 
Male African-American 17  11  28 
 European-American 17  9  26 
 Hispanic-American 7  4  11 
 Mixed 7  3  10 
 Other 2  0  2 
 Total 50  27  77 
       
Female African-American 27  17  44 
 Asian-American 1  1  2 
 European-American 20  21  41 
 Hispanic-American 10  2  12 
 Mixed 6  7  13 
 Other 0  3  3 
  Total 64   51   115 
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Figure 1: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal 
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Note: Error bars represent 95% CI 
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Figure 2: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal 
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Figure 3: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments (Okay to Exclude)  
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Figure 4: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic 
(Not Okay to Exclude) 
Proportion of Justifications by Target Characteristics
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: IRB Approval 
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Appendix B: Assent Form 
ASSENT FORM 
Project Title Evaluations of Exclusion in Competitive and Noncompetitive 
Contexts 
Why is this research 
being done? 
This is a research project being conducted by Professor 
Melanie Killen at the University of Maryland, College Park.  
We are inviting you to participate in this research project 
because you are either an 8th or 11th grader. The purpose of this 
research project is to understand how adolescents think about 
social exclusion. We are interested to know more about how 
adolescents’ think about social exclusion because social 
exclusion can affect the quality of relationships with others 
your age. 
What will I be 




The procedures involve a trained research assistant coming 
into your school to administer the survey. The survey will last 
20-25 minutes. Specifically, you will be asked to evaluate 
whether different exclusion scenarios are acceptable or 
unacceptable. You will be asked to explain why you thought 
that a certain form of exclusion was acceptable or not. You do 





We will do our best to keep your personal information 
confidential.  To help protect your confidentiality, we will 
store all files under lock and key, and will only allow trained 
research assistants to access the files. The surveys are 
anonymous (the surveys will not include identifying 
information on them), and the surveys will be destroyed upon 
project completion. 
What are the 
risks of this 
research? 
 
There are no foreseeable risks of participating in this study.  
What are the 
benefits of this 
research? 
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the 
results will help the investigator learn more about how it is that 
adolescents think about their social world. We expect that, in 
the future, other people will benefit from this study through 
improved understanding of what it is that adolescents see as 
acceptable and unacceptable reasons for exclusion. 
Do I have to be in 
this research? 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  
Participation is not a course requirement. You may choose not 
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May I stop 
participating at 
any time? 
to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to 
participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, 
you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you 
otherwise qualify. If you are disturbing other participants, you 
may be asked to stop participating. In this situation, you would 
be asked to leave the classroom until the administration is 
over.  
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Project Title Evaluations of Exclusion in Competitive and Noncompetitive 
Contexts 





This research is being conducted by Professor Melanie Killen 
in the Department of Human Development at the University of 
Maryland, College Park.  If you have any questions about the 
research study itself, please contact Professor Melanie Killen 
at:  
3304 Benjamin Building, COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742-1131 
OFFICE #: 301-405-3176  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research 
participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please 
contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of 
Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742;  (e-mail) 
irb@umd.edu;  (telephone) 301-405-0678 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of 
Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving 
human subjects. 
Statement of Age 
of Subject and 
Assent 
 
Your signature indicates that: 
the research has been explained to you; 
your questions have been fully answered; and 
you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research 
project. 
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Appendix C: Noncompetitive Version 
 
University of Maryland  
SURVEY 
This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. This 
survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There 
are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers 
and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us know. 
 
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask! 
Today’s date:   _______________________________  
Your age in years (e.g., 10):  _______________________________ 
Gender (CIRCLE ONE):  Male  Female 
Ethnicity:     _______________________________ 
SCHOOL NAME:   _______________________________ 
Thank you!  Please turn the page!
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University of Maryland  
SURVEY ABOUT PEER GROUPS 
This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. 
This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and 
friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not 
tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us 
know. 
 
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask! 
Today’s date:   _______________________________   
Birthday:  Please write the month, and year you were born  
(e.g., July, 1999):    _______________________________ 
Your age in years (e.g., 10):  _______________________________ 
Gender (CIRCLE ONE):  Male  Female 
Ethnicity:     _______________________________ 
SCHOOL NAME:    _______________________________ 
 
Thank you!  Please turn the page!
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
You are going to read about some things that kids do who are about your age.  Then 
you will answer some questions about these kids.  We are interested in finding out 
what you think about the types of decisions that kids make. There are no right or 
wrong answers. This is not a test and we do not put anyone’s name on any reports 
about the project. 
 
When you see this type of line on the form: 
 














…this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer 
to the question. 
 
For example: Do you think it would be okay or not okay to sleep in late on the 
weekend?  
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A group of kids decide to form a noncompetitive soccer club. There are many other 
soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to be able to 
have the most amount of fun playing together. 
 
They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to 
exclude based on each rule. 
 
1. Girls cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














2. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or 





3. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl even 
if she was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one). 
 














4. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl if she 
was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one). 
 


















  164      
5. People who are from Brazil cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














6. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or 





7. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person 
from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? 
(circle one). 
 














8. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person 
from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one). 
 














9. People who are anxious and shy cannot be members. (circle one). 
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10. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 





11. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who is anxious and shy even if he was better at soccer than most of the 
current members? (circle one). 
 














12. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who is anxious and shy if he was worse at soccer than all of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














13. People who have long hair cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














14. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 
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15. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person with long hair even if he was better at soccer than most of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














16. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person with long hair if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? 
(circle one). 
 














17. People who get into fights cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














18. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 
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19. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who gets into fights even if he was better at soccer than most of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














20. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who gets into fights if he was worse at soccer than all of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














21. People who are bad at soccer cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














22. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay 
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In this section you will be asked to select the best option based on your experiences 
and knowledge of yourself. Please circle one option. 
 
23. Winning in competition makes me feel more powerful as a person. 
 













24. I find myself being competitive only in situations that call for 
competition. 
 













25. I compete with others only if they are competing with me. 
 













26. I am okay with losing in athletic competition. 













27. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I 
feel envy. 
 


















28. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest 
or conflict. 
 













29. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in 
competition, I will do so. 
 













30. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition. 
 













31. In school, I am okay with doing as well on tests as others students.  
 













32. Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person. 
 



















33. I have been excluded from competitive athletic group activities (i.e., 
soccer, basketball). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
34. I have been excluded from competitive nonathletic group activities 
(i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
35. I have been excluded from noncompetitive athletic group activities 
(i.e., playing soccer or basketball for fun). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
36. I have been excluded from noncompetitive nonathletic group activities 
(i.e., going to the movies, playing together on the weekend, joining a choral/musical 
group). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
37. I have excluded someone from an activity before. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
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39. I have been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., 
soccer, basketball). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
40. I have been involved in competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., 
debate, music, science, mathematics). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
41. I have been involved in noncompetitive group activities (i.e., Going 
out to movies, playing together for fun, joining a group that gets together for fun) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 














In the following section, please select the best option based on your beliefs. Please 
circle one option. 
 
42. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Americans? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
43.  When it comes to soccer, how competitive are girls? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
  172      
 
44. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are 
aggressive? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
45. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Boys? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
46. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Brazilians? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
47. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are shy? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
48. When it comes to soccer, how good are Americans? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
49. When it comes to soccer, how good are girls? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
50. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are aggressive? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
51. When it comes to soccer, how good are Boys? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
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52. When it comes to soccer, how good are Brazilians? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
53. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are shy? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
54. People can’t really change what kind of personality they have. Some 
people have a good personality and some people don’t, and that can’t change much.  
 












55. No matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change 
their personality.  
 












56. No matter how often someone gets into fights, they can always change 
their behavior. 












57. No matter how anxious and shy someone is, they can always change 
their behavior. 
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Appendix D: Competitive Version 
 
University of Maryland  
SURVEY ABOUT PEER GROUPS 
This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. 
This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and 
friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not 
tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us 
know. 
    
Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask! 
Today’s date:   _______________________________   
Birthday:  Please write the month, and year you were born  
(e.g., July, 1999):    _______________________________ 
Your age in years (e.g., 10):  _______________________________ 
Gender (CIRCLE ONE):  Male  Female 
Ethnicity:     _______________________________ 
SCHOOL NAME:    _______________________________ 
Thank you!  Please turn the page!
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INTRODUCTION: 
You are going to read about some things that kids do who are about your age.  Then 
you will answer some questions about these kids.  We are interested in finding out 
what you think about the types of decisions that kids make. There are no right or 
wrong answers. This is not a test and we do not put anyone’s name on any reports 
about the project. 
 
When you see this type of line on the form: 
 














…this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer 
to the question. 
 
For example: Do you think it would be okay or not okay to sleep in late on the 
weekend?  
 






















  176      
      
A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. There are many other 
soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to have the best 
shot at winning the local tournament's first prize trophy. 
 
They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to 
exclude based on each rule. 
 
1. Girls cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














2. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or 





3. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl even 
if she was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one). 
 














4. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl if she 
was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one). 
 














5. People who are from Brazil cannot be members. (circle one). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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6. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or 





7. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person 
from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? 
(circle one). 
 














8. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person 
from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one). 
 














9. People who are anxious and shy cannot be members. (circle one). 
 















10. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 
okay or not okay to exclude people who are anxious and shy?) 
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11. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who is anxious and shy even if he was better at soccer than most of the 
current members? (circle one). 
 














12. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who is anxious and shy if he was worse at soccer than all of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














13. People who have long hair cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














14. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 
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15. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person with long hair even if he was better at soccer than most of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














16. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person with long hair if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? 
(circle one). 
 














17. People who get into fights cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














18. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 





19. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who gets into fights even if he was better at soccer than most of the current 
members? (circle one). 
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20. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a 
person who gets into fights if he was worse at soccer than all of the current 
members? (circle one). 
 














21. People who are bad at soccer cannot be members. (circle one). 
 














22. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it 
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In this section you will be asked to select the best option based on your experiences 
and knowledge of yourself. Please circle one option. 
 
23. Winning in competition makes me feel more powerful as a person. 
 













24. I find myself being competitive only in situations that call for 
competition. 
 













25. I compete with others only if they are competing with me. 
 













26. I am okay with losing in athletic competition. 













27. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I 
feel envy. 
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28. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest 
or conflict. 
 













29. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in 
competition, I will do so. 
 













30. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition. 
 













31. In school, I am okay with doing as well on tests as others students.  
 













32. Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person. 
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33. I have been excluded from competitive athletic group activities (i.e., 
soccer, basketball). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
34. I have been excluded from competitive nonathletic group activities 
(i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
35. I have been excluded from noncompetitive athletic group activities 
(i.e., playing soccer or basketball for fun). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
36. I have been excluded from noncompetitive nonathletic group activities 
(i.e., going to the movies, playing together on the weekend, joining a choral/musical 
group). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
37. I have excluded someone from an activity before. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
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39. I have been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., 
soccer, basketball). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
40. I have been involved in competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., 
debate, music, science, mathematics). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALWAYS 
 
41. I have been involved in noncompetitive group activities (i.e., Going 
out to movies, playing together for fun, joining a group that gets together for fun) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 






In the following section, please select the best option based on your beliefs. Please 
circle one option. 
 
42. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Americans? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
43.  When it comes to soccer, how competitive are girls? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
44. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are 
aggressive? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
45. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Boys? 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
46. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Brazilians? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
47. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are shy? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
48. When it comes to soccer, how good are Americans? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
49. When it comes to soccer, how good are girls? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
50. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are aggressive? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
51. When it comes to soccer, how good are Boys? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
 
52. When it comes to soccer, how good are Brazilians? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
53. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are shy? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NOT AT ALL     VERY 
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54. People can’t really change what kind of personality they have. Some 
people have a good personality and some people don’t, and that can’t change much.  
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55. No matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change 
their personality.  
 












56. No matter how often someone gets into fights, they can always change 
their behavior. 












57. No matter how anxious and shy someone is, they can always change 
their behavior. 
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Appendix E: Pilot Study 
 
Purpose 
In order to refine and test the feasibility of the survey, a pilot study was 
conducted at a university in a large Mid-Atlantic city in the fall of 2009.  
 
Participants 
 Participants were 51 undergraduate students (42 Females).   
Procedure 
 The procedure involved was identical to that described above. Participants were 
told that they would receive a point for participation, and that they would be given 
alternate means by which to receive that point if they decided not to participate. Further, 
participants were told that: 1) they could ask questions at any time during the 
administration; 2) their answers would be confidential and anonymous; 3) their 
participation was strictly voluntary; and, 4) they could stop at any time. Additionally, 
they were instructed to fill out the survey as completely as possible and that there were no 
right or wrong answers to the questions. A quick description of the purpose of the survey 
was relayed to the participants (including a request to include comments on anything 
confusing or poorly worded), and they were then asked to begin the survey. The survey 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
Results 
The pilot study was used to assess whether refinement of aspects of the 
instrument was needed. Most participants responded to all items, and informal analysis of 
the Justification questions suggested that the coding system would not require any 
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refinement. Further, participants did not comment about confusions in wording or 
presentation of the scenarios.  
A brief quantitative assessment of the major hypotheses (table 4) revealed 
support for the hypotheses. Specifically, participants evaluated the Context (Competitive, 
Noncompetitive) differently. As expected, when the target was described as not being 
good at soccer, participants were more accepting of exclusion in the competitive context 
than in the noncompetitive context. As described in Park and Killen, (2010) aggression 
was seen as the most acceptable reason to exclude, and, as expected, this finding was 
replicated across the competitiveness of the context. Finally, and as expected, participants 
were more accepting of exclusion based on lack of ability in the competitive context than 
in the noncompetitive context, while a decision rule to exclude based on hair length was 
evaluated as similarly unacceptable across competitive and noncompetitive contexts.    
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